

***United States Court of Appeals
for the
District of Columbia Circuit***



**TRANSCRIPT OF
RECORD**

**BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
CHENERY CORPORATION ET AL.**

IN THE
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

—
No. 8074
—

877
DEC 19 1941

CHENERY CORPORATION, H. M. ERSKINE, R. H.
NEILSON, ET AL., *Petitioners,*

v.

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
Respondent.

—
**Petition for Review of Order of Securities and Exchange
Commission.**
—

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**BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS CHENERY
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT.

Jurisdiction in this case is based on the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 803, 15 U. S. C. A., Sec. 79, particularly Section 7 of said Act relating to filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission by registered holding companies and their subsidiaries of declarations in respect to security transactions, and Section 24 of said Act providing for a review by this Court of orders issued by the Commission.

November 8, 1937, Federal Water Service Corporation (hereinafter called Federal) filed with the Commission an application for a report on a plan of reorganization, and declarations regarding the alteration of rights of holders of outstanding securities and the solicitation of consents. March 30, 1940, amendments were filed proposing the merger into Federal of two other Delaware corporations, Utility Operators Company and Federal Water and Gas Corporation, which companies also filed declarations with the Commission regarding the alteration of the rights of the holders of their securities in accordance with the proposed merger agreement. (Petitioners' Appendix 67)

August 15, 1941, the petitioners Chenery Corporation, H. M. Erskine, R. H. Neilson, et al., who were preferred stockholders in Federal, filed an application for leave to intervene in the proceedings before the Commission, and objected to the approval of any plan of reorganization containing a provision to the effect that preferred stock purchased by them should be treated on a less favorable basis than other preferred stock of the same class. August 18, 1941, the Commission ordered that these petitioners be permitted to intervene and become parties to the proceeding and allowed them to file a brief. September 24, 1941, the Commission overruled the objections urged by these petitioners, and issued an order approving a plan containing the provisions to which objection had been made. (Pet. App. 85, 96, 97, 104, 111)

October 22, 1941, these petitioners filed in this Court their petition for review of the Commission's order of September 24, 1941. (Pet. App. 1.)

These pleadings and orders are more fully set forth in the following statement.

STATEMENT OF CASE.

Federal, a Delaware corporation, is a holding company owning securities of subsidiaries which operate water, gas, electric and other properties. November 8, 1937, Federal registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, and since said date has been a registered holding company as therein defined. November 8, 1937, Federal also filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, pursuant to Section 7 of said act and the rules of the Commission, an application for a report on a plan of reorganization, and declarations regarding the alteration of rights of holders of outstanding securities and the solicitation of consents. The application and declarations set forth a plan for the voluntary reorganization of Federal, to be accomplished by amendment to its certificate of incorporation pursuant to Section 26 of the Delaware Corporation Law, and by a reduction in its capital pursuant to Section 28 of the Delaware Corporation Law. At the time of the filing of the application and declarations, Federal had outstanding six classes or series of stock: \$7, \$6.50, \$6, \$4 series preferred stock, Class A stock and Class B stock. Dividends in arrears had accumulated on all series of preferred stock and upon the Class A stock. Federal had valuable assets and had substantial annual net income, but, by reason of earlier losses and depreciation in the value of investments, the corporation had a capital deficit which under Delaware law prevented the payment of dividends. The directors of Federal desired to simplify its corporate structure and to eliminate the capital deficit by reduction of capital, and thus to enable the corporation to resume the payment of dividends. (Pet. App. 18, 19, 63 to 67 inc.)

The Commission objected to the plan first proposed, new plans were filed, and continued discussions were had with representatives of the Commission toward the development of a plan which the Commission would permit to become effective under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of

1935, which would comply with the law of Delaware as to the rights of holders of preferred stock to arrears of dividends, and which would also command the necessary consent of the stockholders of Federal as required by Delaware law. After the decision on January 16, 1940, in *Havender v. Federal United Corporation*, 11 A. (2d) 331, which established that under Delaware law preferred stock together with dividends in arrears thereon might be converted into new securities through a merger, Federal filed with the Commission on March 30, 1940, amendments to its application and declarations, setting forth a new plan of reorganization by way of merger. These amendments proposed the merger into Federal of two other Delaware corporations, Utility Operators Company and Federal Water and Gas Corporation. Utility Operators Company, the stock of which was largely owned by officers and employees of Federal and its subsidiary companies, owned all of the Class B stock of Federal. Federal owned all of the stock of Federal Water and Gas Corporation. Utility Operators Company and Federal Water and Gas Corporation also filed with the Commission declarations regarding the alteration of the rights of the holders of their securities in accordance with the proposed merger agreement. (Pet. App. 63, 64, 67.)

During the period from November 8, 1937, to June 30, 1940, the petitioners purchased preferred stock in Federal in amounts as follows:

Name	\$6.00 Preferred	Shares \$6.50 Preferred	\$7.00 Preferred
Chenery Corporation	3860	3547	1211
H. M. Erskine	25	50	—
R. H. Neilson	10	—	—
W. A. Culin	50	110	—
F. T. Tansill	—	65	—
H. D. McHenry	—	75	15
T. H. Wiggin	50	30	—
C. M. Chenery	150	170	—
J. N. Greene	45	—	—
H. G. Calder	—	40	—
C. P. Rather	110	310	—
Wm. E. Matthews, III	—	65	—
C. van den Berg, Jr.	25	1535	140
W. R. Edwards	100	—	—
Watson Dark	5	160	60
E. C. Deal	85	—	—
F. R. Harris	130	173	40
E. C. Elliott	27	—	—

A comparison of these purchases with the total stock transferred during the period and the total stock outstanding in each class is as follows:

	\$6.00 Preferred	\$6.50 Preferred	\$7.00 Preferred
Total outstanding	71,706	69,888	15,296
Transfers during period from January 1, 1938, to June 30, 1940*	69,578	61,595	12,919
Purchased by petitioners during period from November 8, 1938, to June 30, 1940	4,672	6,633	1,460

The only sales of this stock by petitioners during the period were as follows: C. M. Chenery sold 125 shares of the \$6.00 preferred stock and 20 shares of the \$6.50 preferred

*This does not include transfers from November 8, 1937, to December 31, 1937, inclusive, since the evidence only gave that year as a whole.

stock, and C. van den Berg, Jr., sold 25 shares of the \$6.00 preferred stock and 700 shares of the \$6.50 preferred stock. (Pet. App. 56-61, 65)

When these purchases were made the petitioners other than Chenery Corporation were officers or directors of Federal or of Utility Operators Company. Chenery Corporation is a family holding company which had nine stockholders, of whom two, who owned approximately 47 per cent of the stock of Chenery Corporation, were officers or directors of Federal or Utility Operators Company. All of these purchases and sales of stock in Federal were currently reported to the Commission by the purchasers as required by Section 17 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. (Pet. App. 13, 56-61.)

June 29, 1940, the Commission issued tentative findings in which the question was raised for the first time whether the preferred stock which had been purchased by officers and directors of Federal and Utility Operators Company and by Chenery Corporation while plans of reorganization were pending before the Commission should be treated on any different basis than other preferred stock. (Pet. App. 10, 23.) Hearings were had on this question, and testimony was introduced establishing that all such stock had been purchased through brokers in the over-the-counter market at prices prevailing from time to time, except 2700 shares acquired by Chenery Corporation from an investment banking house in exchange for debenture bonds of Federal. (Pet. App. 15.) A partner of the investment banking house testified that he was fully acquainted with the value of the stock and bonds, and that it had been a most satisfactory trade. (Pet. App. 36.) C. T. Chenery, the President of Federal, testified that he had advised the purchases of preferred stock of Federal by the Chenery Corporation and by the individual officers and directors, because he believed that the preferred stock was a very good investment, and because by its purchase the management could maintain a voting interest if the B stock should be eliminated. The

testimony also showed that full information in regard to the corporation had always been given to the stockholders and to the public.* (Pet. App. 24, 27, 28.)

March 24, 1941, the Commission filed formal findings and an opinion in the proceeding. The plan then under consideration had contemplated the conversion of the four classes of preferred into new common stock. The Commission stated that the plan could not be approved in so far as it provided for participation of the preferred shares purchased by officers or directors of Federal or Utility Operators Company, or by the Chenery Corporation, after November 8, 1937, on a parity with other shares of preferred stock of the same class. The Commission held that the officers and directors were "trustees" who had purchased trust property, that they must account for any profit on such purchases and that

" . . . honesty, full disclosure and purchase at a fair price do not take the case out of the rule."

Entry of an order was deferred, and it was stated that further consideration would be given to the matter if Federal filed amendments to its proposed plan designed to cure this and other alleged defects therein. (Pet. App. 27, 28, 32.)

Thereafter amendments to the declarations and applications were filed by the corporations, in order to present a plan which complied with the findings and opinion of the Commission. The proposed merger agreement was amended to provide among other things that no shares of common stock of the surviving corporation should be issued for the shares of preferred stock of Federal purchased since November 8, 1937, by Chenery Corporation or by the individual petitioners when they were officers or directors of Federal or of Utility Operators Company, but that each such purchaser should receive upon surrender of such stock to the surviving corporation the cost of such stock with interest at 4 per cent per annum from the dates of its purchase to the effective date of the merger agreement. It was

* This is elaborated at page 17 of this brief.

further provided in effect that the petitioners should account to the surviving corporation for any profit realized on any such stock as had been sold by them. (Pet. App. 79-85.)

August 15, 1941, the petitioners filed an application for leave to intervene in the proceedings before the Commission, and objected to the approval of any plan of reorganization containing a provision to the effect that the preferred stock purchased by the petitioners should be treated on a less favorable basis than other preferred stock of the same class. The petitioners contended that the entry of an order approving a plan containing such a discriminatory provision would be unfair, inequitable, and detrimental to the interest of investors, and would be erroneous and illegal, and they stated that no principle of common or statutory law or of equity forbade directors or officers of a corporation from purchasing stock therein, whether or not an application contemplating reorganization was under submission to the Securities and Exchange Commission. They prayed that their application to intervene should be allowed and that they should be made parties to the proceeding, that they should be permitted to file briefs and make oral argument, that the case should be reconsidered by the Commission to the extent that the holding then in effect treated stock held by the petitioners on a different basis from other preferred stock, that the Commission should enter findings and an opinion to the effect that the plan should be modified so that these petitioners should be treated in the same manner as other holders of preferred stock, and that the Commission should deny effectiveness to the declarations filed in the proceedings unless they should be so modified. (Pet. App. 85.)

August 18, 1941, the Commission ordered that the petitioners be permitted to intervene and become parties to the proceeding, and gave leave to file briefs. Leave to make oral argument was denied, subject to further order after consideration of the briefs. August 28, 1941, the petitioners filed a brief in support of their contentions. (Pet. App. 96.)

September 24, 1941, the Commission made a report on the amended plan of reorganization, entered supplemental findings and opinion, and issued an order permitting the declarations, as amended in conformity with the Commission's opinion of March 24, 1941, to become effective, and granting the applications as amended. The effect of this order was to deny the prayers of these petitioners contained in their intervening petition and brief. The Commission stated:

"After careful consideration of the briefs filed by counsel for the interveners we are satisfied no useful purpose would be served by oral argument thereon." (Pet. App. 105.)

"* * * It is now provided that the surviving corporation shall purchase this stock at its cost to the management plus 4 per cent interest from the dates of purchase by the management to the date of the merger. The intervenors have filed a brief asking that we enter findings and an opinion to the effect that the plan should be modified so that they shall be treated in the same manner as other holders of preferred stock and that we deny effectiveness to the declaration unless it is so modified. After consideration of the brief we adhere to the views expressed in our original opinion." (Pet. App. 108.)

October 22, 1941, the petitioners filed in this Court their petition for review of the Commission's order of September 24, 1941, and prayed that the order be modified or set aside to the extent necessary to treat these petitioners on the same basis as other holders of preferred stock of Federal of the same class. The petitioners ask such other relief as this Court may deem appropriate. (Pet. App. 1.)

STATEMENT OF POINTS.

The petitioners contend that the Commission erred in holding that the preferred stock purchased by the petitioners should be treated on a less favorable basis than other preferred stock of the same class. This error occurred in:

1. The findings and opinion of March 24, 1941 (Pet. App. 71-79.)
2. The report of September 24, 1941, on plan of reorganization (Pet. App. 97).
3. The supplemental findings and opinion of September 24, 1941 (Pet. App. 104).
4. The order of September 24, 1941, permitting the pending declarations of Federal and its subsidiaries to become effective and granting their pending application. (Pet. App. 111.)

Particularly the petitioners contend that the order of the Commissioner of September 24, 1941, approving a plan of reorganization containing a provision that the preferred stock purchased by the petitioners should be treated on a less favorable basis than other preferred stock, is unfair and inequitable, is detrimental to the public interest and the interest of investors (including these petitioners), is in violation of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, and of Delaware Corporation law, and is erroneous and illegal. (Pet. App. 8, 111.)

STATUTE INVOLVED.

Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.*

“Sec. 6. (a) Except in accordance with a declaration effective under section 7 and with the order under such section permitting such declaration to become effective, it shall be unlawful for any registered holding company or subsidiary company thereof, by use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or otherwise, directly or indirectly (1) to issue or sell any security of such company; or (2) to exercise any privilege or right to alter the priorities, preferences, voting power, or other rights of the holders of an outstanding security of such company.”

* * *

“Sec. 7. (a) A registered holding company or subsidiary company thereof may file a declaration with the Commission, regarding any of the acts enumerated in subsection (a) of section 6, * * *.”

* * *

“(d) If the requirements of subsections (c) and (g) are satisfied,** the Commission shall permit a declaration regarding the issue or sale of a security to become effective unless the Commission finds that —”

“(6) the terms and conditions of the issue or sale of the security are detrimental to the public interest or the interest of investors or consumers.”

“(e) If the requirements of subsection (g) are satisfied,** the Commission shall permit a declaration to become effective regarding the exercise of a privilege or right to alter the priorities, preferences, voting power, or other rights of the holders of an outstanding security unless the Commission finds that such exercise of such privilege or right will result in an unfair or inequitable distribution of voting power among holders of the securities of the declarant or is otherwise detrimental to the public interest or the interest of investors or consumers.”

*49 Stat. 803, 15 U. S. C. Sec. 79.

**Subsection (c) and (g) are not material.

“Sec. 17. (a) Every person who is an officer or director of a registered holding company shall file with the Commission in such form as the Commission shall prescribe (1) at the time of the registration of such holding company, or within ten days after such person becomes an officer or director, a statement of the securities of such registered holding company or any subsidiary company thereof of which he is, directly or indirectly, the beneficial owner, and (2) within ten days after the close of each calendar month thereafter, if there has been any change in such ownership during such month, a statement of such ownership as of the close of such calendar month and of the changes in such ownership that have occurred during such calendar month.

(b) For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by any such officer or director by reason of his relationship to such registered holding company or any subsidiary company thereof, any profit realized by any such officer or director from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any security of such registered holding company or any subsidiary company thereof within any period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the holding company or subsidiary company in respect of the security of which such profit was realized, irrespective of any intention on the part of such officer or director in entering into such transaction to hold the security purchased or not to repurchase the security sold for a period of more than six months. * * *

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.

No rule of common law or equity prohibits the purchase of stock by an officer or director, nor does any statute prohibit such purchase. When the purchases involved in these proceedings were made no regulation of the Commission indicated that the purchases might be objectionable to the Commission. Purchases of stock by officers and directors should generally be encouraged, whether or not the corporation is in process of reorganization. There was no unfairness in these particular purchases.

This case arises under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, and the jurisdiction of the Commission is predicated entirely thereon. Section 17 of that very statute deals with purchases of stock by officers and directors. The Section provides for reports thereon to the Commission and for recovery by the corporation of profits made by such officers and directors from sales within six months of purchase. The absence of any further requirement, prohibition, or penalty in a statute dealing with the subject shows a Congressional intent to permit officers and directors to purchase such stock freely to the extent such purchases are not affected by the statute.

The order of the Commission approving a plan of reorganization containing a provision that the preferred stock purchased by the petitioners should be treated on a less favorable basis than other preferred stock is unfair and inequitable, and is illegal and erroneous.

The Commission has invaded the legislative field. Its action is equivalent to an attempt to legislate retrospectively.

ARGUMENT.

I.

NO RULE OF COMMON LAW OR EQUITY PROHIBITED THE PURCHASE OF STOCK BY THE PETITIONERS.

A. The Prevailing Doctrine in the Courts Imposes No Legal or Equitable Restriction on Purchases by an Officer or Director from a Shareholder.

An officer or director of a corporation may freely purchase the stock of his corporation from the stockholders, provided only that he is not guilty of fraud or misrepresentation. Such is the law of the State of Delaware, under the laws of which the three corporations involved in the proposed merger and reorganization were organized. *Cahall v. Lofland*, 12 Del. Ch. 299, 114 Atl. 224 (1921); *Du Pont v. Du Pont*, 242 Fed. 98 (D. Del. 1917), 256 Fed. 129 (C. C. A. 3rd 1919); *Rogers v. Drewry*, 196 Minn. 16, 264 N. W. 225 (1935). This statement also correctly represents the law of the great majority of jurisdictions of this country as well as the law of England and Canada. The authorities are collected in an annotation entitled *Duty of Officer or Director of Corporation Toward One from Whom He Purchases Stock*, 84 A. L. R. 615 (1933). See also 3 Fletcher on Corporations, Sec. 1168; Thompson on Corporations, Sec. 1258; 13 Am. Jur. 962.

The leading early authority is the case of *Carpenter v. Danforth*, 52 Barb. 581 (N. Y. 1868). Other leading decisions include *Bawden v. Taylor*, 254 Ill. 464, 98 N. E. 941 (1912); *Blabon v. Hay*, 269 Mass. 401, 169 N. E. 268 (1929); *Walsh v. Goulden*, 130 Mich. 531, 90 N. W. 406 (1902); *Dutton v. Barnes*, 162 Minn. 430, 203 N. W. 414 (1925); *Crowell v. Jackson*, 53 N. J. L. 656, 23 Atl. 426 (1891); *Klerlein v. Werner*, 307 Pa. 16, 160 Atl. 719 (1932); and *Percival v. Wright*, [1902] 2 Ch. 421.*

* Other jurisdictions which deny the existence of any unusual duty on the part of a director in purchasing stock from a shareholder include Arizona, California, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia. 84 A. L. R. 617-618.

The rule is succinctly stated in 3 Fletcher on Corporations, Sec. 1168:

“By the weight of authority a director or officer has the same right to buy stock from a stockholder of the company as any one else.”

As was said by the Illinois Court in *Bawden v. Taylor*, *supra*, at page 942:

“The officers * * * are trustees for the stockholders as a body with respect to the business and property of the corporation, which is under their control and management for the benefit of stockholders generally; but an officer has no control over the shares of the individual stockholder and is not a trustee for such stockholder with respect to his stock; *officers of a corporation may purchase the stock of stockholders on the same terms and as freely as they might purchase of a stranger.*”

The italicized language was quoted with approval within the year in *Anchor Realty & Investment Co. v. Rafferty*, 308 Ill. App. 484, 32 N. E. (2d) 394, 401 (1941). *Seitz v. Frey*, 152 Minn. 170, 188 N. W. 266 (1922), states the same doctrine:

“* * * a director or officer does not stand in a fiduciary relation to a stockholder in respect to his stock, and *has the same right as any other stockholder to buy stock from or sell stock to another stockholder*”.

Similar language could be multiplied many times.

It can be said categorically that no court has ever laid down a general restriction against the purchase of stock by officers and directors such as was contained in the opinion and order of the Commission in this case. The prevailing judicial doctrine imposes no restrictions on such transactions other than those ordinarily imposed by the law of torts.

B. The Only Criticism of the Prevailing Doctrine Has Been Directed Toward Its Failure to Impose a Duty of Disclosure on the Director.

Dissent from the prevailing doctrine has centered solely on the issue of whether or not an officer or director is under a duty to disclose to the seller information known to the officer or director but not known to the stockholder who is about to sell his shares. A few courts purport to require that the director inform the seller of important information affecting the value of the corporation's shares of which the stockholder is ignorant. *Oliver v. Oliver*, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S. E. 232 (1903); *Stewart v. Harris*, 69 Kans. 498, 77 Pac. 277 (1904).

These few states hold that in the absence of disclosure of relevant important information the stockholder who sold may have an accounting to recover any profit which accrued to the purchasing director. This minority rule—requiring disclosure—has been rejected by all the important financial states. But even this rule does not prohibit purchases, it merely requires disclosure.

What has sometimes been considered a third view, referred to as the "special facts" doctrine, originated with the case of *Strong v. Repide*, 213 U. S. 419 (1909). This doctrine is that although ordinarily a director is under no duty to disclose information to the stockholder from whom he is purchasing the stock, it may be that because of unusual circumstances surrounding the transaction the director must make a full disclosure. Again it must be emphasized that the point under consideration is whether or not there is a duty of disclosure; in no case is there a suggestion that there is a duty to refrain from purchasing if there has been no failure to disclose. Actually every case classified under the "special facts" doctrine may be explained on the basis of traditional legal principles, such as govern cases of fraud, misrepresentation, etc. Thus it is stated in *Fischer v. Guaranty Trust Co.*, 259 App. Div. 176, 18 N. Y. S. (2nd) 328, 333 (1940):

"I believe it will be found that in every instance where a director has been held accountable to the stockholder, in an action arising out of negotiations resulting in the purchase of his stock, not only the element of active fraud of the director existed, but the reliance of the stockholder thereon as the inducement to part with the stock also existed."

C. Petitioners Have Withheld No Information Which Should Have Been Disclosed.

The successive plans for reorganization as filed from time to time with the Commission were available to the public, including all stockholders, as were all financial reports filed with the Commission. The purchases of stock by the petitioners were currently reported to the Commission pursuant to Section 17 of the Act. (Pet. App. 17, 22)

Mr. Culin, the treasurer of Federal, testified that the management had always been very free in giving information to everyone who asked for it. (Pet. App. 27.) Mr. Culin said,

" * * * The statistical agencies carried pretty full information about the plans. Since 1937 we have had on file a great amount of detail in the S. E. C. We have always given information to various brokers and investment dealers and they have published and distributed a number of memoranda about the plan and about the company, and at various times the newspapers have asked us for a release or have asked us to give them a story as to the company and its position, its finances and the status of the plan." (Pet. App. 28.)

The annual reports of the company gave complete information, quarterly earning statements were published in the financial pages of the newspapers, the newspapers carried reports of the plans before the Commission from time to time, and various investment houses also gave information and advice with respect to the stock. (Pet. App. 28).

Mr. Chenery testified:

“* * * my feeling has been that if there is one corporation that has ever operated in the full glare of publicity, that this one is it. It was one of the first corporations to start and give full and complete details of every transaction. Standard Statistics has given reports at three-month intervals. There have been a dozen brokerage houses which have circularized preferred stockholders consistently, telling them of every development and plan and advising them what to do. Our own policy has been not to refuse any stockholder any information at any time. There is no record since we have been in control of the company since March 14, 1932, of our having refused any stockholder any information on any subject.” (Pet. App. 32.)

The stock was sold in the open market, and its quotations appeared daily in New York newspapers. All of the purchases in question were made in the open market except in one instance when Chenery Corporation acquired 2700 shares of 6½ per cent preferred from the investment house of Ingalls & Snyder in exchange for \$100,000 principal amount of Federal debentures. Mr. Ingalls testified that his firm had full knowledge of the facts relating to Federal, and that

“* * * today I am very much delighted that we made the trade. * * * it's been a most satisfactory trade.” (Pet. App. 15, 36.)

There has been no contention by the Commission that there was a failure to disclose any particular fact which would have affected the value of the stock. The Commission's decision is based squarely on the assumption that officers and directors of a corporation may not purchase its stock while a reorganization plan is pending. The Commission stated,

“* * * honesty, full disclosure and purchase at a fair price do not take the case outside the rule.” (Pet. App. 72)

The "rule" referred to was that a "trustee" (the Commission assumed that officers and directors were trustees) may not deal with the trust *res* (the Commission assumed that the stock of the corporation was the trust *res*).^{*} (Pet. App. 72) We shall attempt to demonstrate that this holding by the Commission is erroneous as a matter of law. No question of fact appears to be involved in the case.

II.

SECTION 17 OF THE PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY ACT OF 1935 RECOGNIZES THE RIGHT OF PETITIONERS TO PURCHASE STOCK.

As we have shown, the courts have not restricted or prohibited the purchase of stock in a corporation by its officers and directors. The only qualification which need be made to this statement is that the courts of a few states have held that a director is under a duty to disclose to the selling shareholder any special information which the director has with reference to the value of the stock. The important financial legislation in the period from 1933 to 1935, however, imposed certain new requirements on directors of corporations listed on a stock exchange and on directors of public utility holding companies.

These restrictions are embodied in Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934^{**} and Section 17 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. Section 16 of the 1934 Act, which is the counterpart of Section 17 of the 1935 Act, " * * * aroused great controversy", Tracy and MacChesney, *The Securities Exchange Act of 1934*, 32 Mich. L. Rev. 1025, 1056 (1934). Extended hearings were held on this portion of the Act. Throughout the discussion it

^{*} This is utterly at variance with the Court decisions. See this brief page 24 *et seq.*

^{**} 48 Stat. 896, 15 U. S. C. Sec. 78(p).

was recognized that the proposed legislation would be an innovation. As one writer put it:

“The Section has established for the management and those in control of the larger corporations of the United States a new standard of conduct far beyond that required by prior statutory or case law.” Yourd, *Trading in Securities by Directors, Officers and Stockholders: Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act*, 38 Mich. L. Rev. 133 (1939).

These sections, like other portions of the acts of which they are a part, impose on the management a definite duty of disclosure. Purchase of the stock of the company by its officers and directors must be reported to the Commission. Other sections provide for periodic financial reports and the disclosure of other information which might in the past have been used by directors or officers for their personal gain. See MacChesney and O'Brien, *Full Disclosure Under the Securities Act*, 4 Law and Contemporary Problems 143 (1937); MacChesney, *Further Developments in "Disclosure" Under the Securities Act*, 33 Ill. L. Rev. 145 (1939).

Section 17 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act provides for forfeiture to the corporation of “any profit realized by any such officer or director from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any security of such registered holding company or any subsidiary company thereof *within any period of less than six months*”. The statute says that this is “for the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by any such officer or director by reason of his relationship to such registered holding company”. In this section, Congress for the first time went somewhat beyond the imposition of a duty to disclose, and placed a definite and certain limitation on the right to profit from trading in the securities of the corporation.

The legislative history of these sections shows that Congress considered that, through the provisions of Section 16 of the 1934 Act and Section 17 of the 1935 Act, the pur-

chase of securities by the management had been sufficiently regulated to eliminate the alleged abuses brought out at the hearings. Thus, in Senate Report No. 792, 73rd Congress, page 9, with reference to what became Section 16 of the 1934 Act, the committee stated:

“Such a provision will render difficult or impossible the kind of transactions which were frequently described to the committee, where directors and large stockholders participated in pools trading in the stock of their own companies, with the benefit of advance information regarding an increase or resumption of dividends in some cases, and the passing of dividends in others.”

Again, at page 20, with reference to the six-month provision, the report states that:

“The expressed purpose of this provision is to prevent the unfair use of inside information.”

At page 68 of the Senate Report No. 1455, 73rd Congress, 2nd Session, the provisions of Section 16 are analyzed under the heading “Regulation of Market Activities of Officers, Directors and Principal Stockholders”. This would seem to indicate that Section 16 expressed the full extent of Congress’ intent to change the law with respect to purchase of stock by management.

At page 40 of Senate Report No. 621, 74th Congress, which is an analysis of the bill which became the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, it is said:

“This section corresponds to section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and covers the transactions by officers, directors, and affiliates of registered holding companies in the securities of those companies and of subsidiary companies thereof.”

From this legislative history it appears that Congress had no intention to create any other prohibition against or limitation on trading in corporate securities by the officers and directors of a corporation. This seems clear from the

continued references to trading under specified conditions in the committee reports on both acts. The proposition acquires further support in view of the cause of action given to the issuing corporation to recover any profits realized within a period of six months. It seems clear that Congress did not intend that profits from trading by management should result to the corporation, except in those specified instances where the profit was realized within *six months* of the date of purchase. Yet the Commission is now attempting to require that management give up stock acquired during a period of two and a half years. By well recognized tenets of statutory construction, it must be held that since the problem of trading in securities by management was expressly covered by Section 17, no further prohibition or limitation can be read into the statute through the generalities of Section 7. Crawford on Statutory Construction, Sec. 195 (1940).

As late as August 7, 1941, the Commission itself stated in its *Report on Proposals for Amendments to the Securities Act of 1933 and Exchange Act of 1934*, at page 82:

“It is only where the insider makes a profit within the relatively short period of six months that his profit is required to be turned over to the corporation.”

As one commentator put it:

“As long as equity securities are acquired for the purposes of investment or control, Section 16(b) is not concerned with the circumstances of the acquisition”. Yourd, *Trading in Securities by Directors, Officers and Stockholders: Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act*, 38 Mich. L. Rev. 133, 148 (1939).

III.

THE AUTHORITIES CITED BY THE COMMISSION IN ITS MARCH OPINION DO NOT SUPPORT A RESTRICTION OF THE RIGHT OF PETITIONERS TO PURCHASE STOCK.**A. Cases Dealing with Trustees.**

The theory of the Commission is succinctly set forth in the following quotation from the March opinion (p. 21):

“Corporate directors are fiduciaries. * * * in the process of formulation of a ‘voluntary’ reorganization plan, the management of a corporation occupies a fiduciary position toward all of the securities holders to be affected, * * * The trustee may not ‘become the purchaser of the property which he represents’ or any portion of it though he has done so for a fair price without fraud at a public sale * * * accordingly, honesty, full disclosure and purchase at a fair price do not take the case outside the rule.” (Pet. App. 72.)

The Commission thus promulgates a rule that a corporate director is subject to the same restrictions as is a trustee, at least during the period of the formulation of a reorganization plan, that a trustee may not ever purchase the trust property, and therefore that corporate directors may not purchase stock during a reorganization.

The mere statement of this proposition reveals the extent of the Commission’s departure from recognized business practice and corporate legal principles. Corporate directors, from the beginning of the corporate system, have purchased and sold the stock of their corporations. More than 25,000 individuals, as officers and directors of corporations subject to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, have filed with the Commission statements showing their ownership, purchase, and sale of the stock of the corporations which they serve. Yourd, *Trading in Securities by Directors, Officers and Stockholders: Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act*, 38 Mich. L. Rev. 133, 138 (1939).

As we have pointed out, no judicial authority supports the position that a corporate director may not purchase the shares of stock of his corporation, whether or not the company is contemplating reorganization. Nor is this position advocated in the voluminous literature on the subject of the relation between the stockholders and the directors of the corporation. The Commission cites Berle and Means, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*, as authority for the statement that the management's "duty of fair dealing with persons for whom it acts is as great as that of a trustee". Yet the authors of this important study do not suggest prohibition of market operations by management, and conclude that "as the standards of disclosure of corporate affairs become more exacting the problem of the directors and managers in the market will become increasingly less important". (p. 330)

Rather than discourage the purchase of stock by management legislators and economists have frequently stressed the benefits which result to the corporation from such a union of ownership and management. "It is a common statutory provision that the directors must be share holders in the corporation", 83 U. Pa. L. Rev. 56, 57 (1939). And in a very recent note in 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1191, 1196 (May 1941) it is stated that "Theoretically it is desirable that the management have a proprietary interest in the corporation".

The Commission says that "corporate directors are fiduciaries" (Pet. App. 72). This does not greatly advance the argument. The question is; to whom do the directors owe an obligation, and what is the extent of that obligation. The traditional view in American corporate law was expressed by Chief Justice Shaw in *Smith v. Hurd*, 12 Metc. 371, 384 (Mass. 1847): "The directors are not the bailees, the factors, agents or trustees of such individual stockholders". Again in *Blabon v. Hay*, 269 Mass. 401, 407, 169 N. E. 268, 271 (1929) the rule was enunciated as follows:

"The fact that the defendants were directors created no fiduciary relation between them and the plaintiff in the matter of the sale of this stock."

Likewise the Michigan Court in *Walsh v. Goulden*, 130 Mich. 531, 539, 90 N. W. 406, 410 (1902), stated the orthodox view:

“Directors, of course, stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation itself. They do not stand in that relation, however, when dealing with other stockholders for the purchase or sale of stock”.

In a case decided in 1939 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania said:

“The duty of an officer or director is owed to the corporate entity and not to the shareholder as an individual”. *Binns v. Copper Range Co.*, 335 Pa. 257, 6A (2d) 895, 898 (1939)

But even assuming, despite the legal tradition to the contrary, that there is some kind of a fiduciary duty of a corporate director toward the individual stockholder, it by no means follows that it is a violation of his duty for a director to purchase from a stockholder. As was said in *Perry v. Pearson*, 135 Ill. 218, 25 N. E. 636 (1890), even if it be admitted that confidential relations exist between a director and a shareholder, there must still be proof of “abuse of such relations”. Certainly a realistic approach would recognize that “a corporate director occupies a *sui generis* status and is neither an agent nor a trustee, * * *” Fuller, *Restrictions Imposed by the Directorship Status on the Personal Business Activities of Directors*, 26 Wash. Univ. L. Q. 189 (1941). And in a recent note in 39 Col. L. Rev 219 (1939) it is pointed out that the liabilities of a director are not those of a trustee:

“Although it is often said that a director of a corporation occupies the position of a trustee with respect to the corporation, closer analysis shows that this is far from accurate. A trustee of an express trust may not ordinarily buy trust property; he may not sell to the trust estate any property he owns or in which he has a personal interest; nor may he borrow trust funds for his own purposes. On the other hand a director may either buy from or sell to the corporation, provided that

he can prove the price is fair; in many instances, borrowing corporate funds is permissible. These departures from the norm of a trustee's conduct are not asserted as exceptions to his character as a trustee, but rather are put forth as ordinary instances of his duties and powers. Accordingly, while a director bears some relation to a trustee, it is impossible to base an accurate estimate of his powers, duties, or liabilities upon the tenuous theory that he is a 'trustee'."

Clearly the management has not been entrusted by the stockholder with the custody of his stock. On the contrary the stockholder retains full possession of it and full freedom to deal with it as he sees fit—including the right to sell it, mortgage it, vote for or against management, vote for or against a reorganization plan, and generally to deal with it as his untrammelled discretion dictates. In all these respects the position of a corporate director differs fundamentally from that of a trustee. The Commission's citation of cases from the law of trusts dealing with the duty of a trustee not to purchase from his trust indicates the inability to discover any precedent for such a restriction in the law of corporations.

Nor is there any indication in the decisions that there should be a different rule during periods of reorganization. Directors have a duty to advance the interests of the corporation during the period of reorganization as much as during the period of its ordinary business life, and there is no real difference between their relation to the stockholders in one period than in another. Thus Mr. Joseph L. Weiner wrote that a serious discussion

"must recognize that control of corporations is profitable; that fees are a source of income; that a friendly management is a source of business; that there are dangers when persons acting in a representative capacity owe allegiance to more than one interest. *I believe, however, that these dangers are no greater in corporate reorganization than they are in corporate activity generally.*" (Italics ours.) Weiner, *The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Reorganization*, 38 Col. L. Rev. 280, 285-86 (1938).

B. Bankruptcy Cases.

The only cases cited by the Commission, in addition to cases dealing with the duties of trustees, are cases arising under the bankruptcy statutes, which are not here involved.* These decisions dealt with situations totally different from the case at bar.

The Commission relies principally on three recent opinions of the Supreme Court written by Mr. Justice Douglas. Each of these cases involves a reorganization in bankruptcy, and in none of these cases is there a situation remotely comparable to that presented in the present case. In *Pepper v. Litton*, 308 U. S. 295 (1939), the court found that there was a "planned and fraudulent scheme" by the dominant stockholder of a corporation to defraud other creditors by presenting an alleged claim for accrued salary. The case holds that the bankruptcy court may disallow a judgment obtained by such fraudulent means. This is the case which the Commission cites for the proposition that a director is a fiduciary. It is clear, however, that in this case Mr. Justice Douglas is referring to "dealings with the corporation" by a director. This conforms to traditional legal theory.

In *American United Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. City of Avon Park*, 311 U. S. 138 (1940), the Supreme Court set aside an order of confirmation of the bankruptcy court. In that case the fiscal agent of a municipality was under a duty to solicit assents to the plan and to induce creditors to vote for the plan. The fiscal agent purchased claims from creditors and voted them in favor of the plan. The court found that the vote in favor of the plan should be set aside because the fiscal agent's claims had been allowed to vote. It was pointed out (pp. 144-145) that the fiscal agent

"was acting in a dual capacity. While it was representing the city it likewise purported to represent the

* A reclassification of stock to permit the resumption of dividend payments on preferred stock is not a transaction which is in any respect touched by the bankruptcy statutes. *In re Picadilly Realty Co.*, 78 F. (2d) 257 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935), *In re Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corp.*, 30 F. Supp. 106 (D. Pa. 1940).

interest of bondholders. The very minimum requirement for fair dealing was the elementary obligation of full disclosure of all its interests and the burden was on it to show that at least such disclosure was made”.

In the present case there is no conflict of interest. It is entirely proper for officers and directors of a corporation to purchase its securities. Thereafter they will be interested in helping the corporation, as officers and directors should. It is quite different for a fiscal agent, who is representing a city and is trying to effect a reorganization, to purchase for himself the securities of the city, since as a security holder he will wish to get as much as he can from the city, whereas as agent of the city it is his duty to make the best deal possible for the city.

The third Supreme Court case relied upon in the Commission's opinion is *Woods v. City National Bank and Trust Company*, 312 U. S. 262 (1941). This decision is simply that counsel who represent conflicting interests may not be allowed compensation, because it is impossible to determine in such a case whether their services have been loyal and disinterested. By the bankruptcy statutes the courts are given complete control over the compensation to be given representatives of various interests. The Supreme Court lays down the rule that

“Where an actual conflict of interests existed no more need be shown in this type of case to support a denial of compensation”.

There is nothing in the case which changes the well established rule that corporate directors and officers may purchase stock in the corporation.

The Commission in its March opinion also cites a number of other cases dealing with reorganizations in bankruptcy. Most of these cases involve provisions of the Chandler Act, which are not contained in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. For example, Section 249 of the Chandler Act, 52 Stat. 901, 11 U. S. C. A. 649 is construed in *Otis and*

Co. v. Insurance Building Corporation, 110 (2d) 333 (C. C. A. 1st 1940). This section provides in part that:

“No compensation or reimbursement shall be allowed to any committee or attorney, or other person acting in the proceedings in a representative or fiduciary capacity, who at any time after assuming to act in such capacity has purchased or sold such claims or stock, or by whom or for whose account such claims or stock have, without the prior consent or subsequent approval of the judge, been otherwise acquired or transferred”.

In commenting on this section and on Section 212 of the Chandler Act (Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act of 1938) which contained somewhat similar provisions, Professor Dodd wrote:

“The suggested restrictions on the purchase and sale of securities of a corporation by committee members are in like manner more stringent than any limitations which the law has ever attempted to impose upon directors.”

Dodd, *Securities and Exchange Commission's Reform Program for Bankruptcy Reorganization*, 38 Col. L. Rev. 223, 250 (1938).

In Re Mountain States Power Co., 35 F. Supp. 307 (D. Del. 1940) also involves an interpretation of Section 249 of the Chandler Act. The court points out that this provision does not prohibit purchasing and selling of securities by members of committees or other representatives, but does prohibit the allowance of compensation to any such person who has dealt in the securities of the bankrupt corporation. “Purchases and sales must be reported if the fiduciary asks for compensation” (page 309).

Another bankruptcy case, *In Re Norcor Manufacturing Co.*, 109 F. (2d) 407 (C. C. A. 7th 1940), held that the principal stockholder and officer of a corporation in bankruptcy could not purchase the claims of creditors against the corporation and prove them for the full amount. This is merely an application of the doctrine that a corporate

officer cannot compete with his company by purchasing claims against his company when the company was in the market to retire these claims. Another such case is *In Re McCrory Stores Corporation*, 12 F. Sup. 267 (S. D. N. Y. 1935). As was pointed out *In Re New York Railways Corporation*, 82 F. (2d) 739 (C. C. A. 2nd 1936) this restriction does not apply when the corporation is not in the market for its obligations. There is no suggestion in the present proceeding that the interveners were competing with their corporation in purchasing the preferred stock.

Other bankruptcy cases cited by the Commission include *In Re Republic Gas Corporation*, 35 F. Supp. 300 (S. D. N. Y. 1936), *In Re Standard Commercial Tobacco Co.*, 34 F. Supp. 304 (S. D. N. Y. 1940) and *In Re Paramount-Publix Corporation*, 12 F. Supp. 823 (S. D. N. Y. 1935). These cases restrict the compensation to be received by members of committees representing creditors or classes of stockholders in bankruptcy proceedings, but in no respect support the proposition that the officers and directors of a corporation, whether or not it is undergoing reorganization, violate a fiduciary duty in purchasing stock which will share on a parity with other stock of a like class in the reorganization.

We submit that the Commission has cited no authority which supports its decision.

IV.

THE COMMISSION HAS ATTEMPTED TO INVADE THE LEGISLATIVE FIELD.

As we have pointed out in this brief, the law has always been that officers and directors of a corporation may freely purchase its stock. The only difference in the decisions has been in the extent to which the courts require disclosure to the seller of particular facts known to the officers and directors.

Now the Commission without warning suddenly announces that officers and directors * are trustees for the stockholders (as well as for the corporation) in the strictest sense of the law of trusts, and that

“* * * in the process of the formulation of a voluntary reorganization plan the management of a corporation occupies a fiduciary position toward all the security holders to be affected * * * A trustee may not become the purchaser of the property which he represents or any portion of it though he has done so for a fair price without fraud at a public sale * * *. Accordingly, honesty, full disclosure and purchase at a fair price do not take the case outside the rule” (Pet. App. 72).

Such a decision is, we respectfully submit, an invasion of the legislative field. There has never been at common law such a restriction on the right of an officer or director of a corporation to purchase its stock. The *legislature* has changed this law in two respects, by providing in Section 17 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, that officers and directors shall report their holdings, purchases and sales, and that they shall account to the corporation for any profits made upon sales within six months of purchase.

So far has the legislature changed the common law that corporate officials and directors may purchase its stock, and no further. Any further prohibition by the Commission is not only an illegal assumption of legislative power, but is wholly impracticable and conducive to confusion:

1. As pointed out in this brief, the provisions of Section 17 were enacted only after extensive hearings before Congressional committees and much public discussion. But in the promulgation by the Commission of the drastic rule challenged by the petitioners no hearings were held or testimony taken on the wisdom of this innovation. The eco-

* Petitioner Chenery Corporation is, of course, not an officer or director. Only two of its nine stockholders are officers or directors of Federal. The Commission's restriction on Chenery Corporation's participation on an equal basis is even more remote from any possible precedent.

conomic implications, the effect on the marketing and sale of securities, and the desirability of prohibiting purchases by management while outside groups may attempt to obtain control of a corporation have not been publicly debated. Without evaluation of these factors by a legislative body no change should be made in existing law and business practice.

2. Any prohibition on the purchase of stock by officers and directors should be made by the legislature because there is such a wide choice in the determination in the extent of such prohibition.

Officers and directors will always know more about the affairs of a corporation than will mere stockholders. This will be so from the organization of the corporation to its final dissolution. It will be so whether the corporation is prosperous or in failing circumstances, whether it is being reorganized or whether it is not being reorganized. Why should an officer or director have any different duty in regard to the shareholders, and in regard to his right to purchase stock, when the corporation is in process of reorganization than when the corporation is successful? In either case it is his duty to do everything that he can to advance the interests of the corporation, and in either case he necessarily has more knowledge than a mere shareholder.

What does the decision of the Commission mean? In its next decision will the Commission say that officers and directors of a corporation may not buy its stock if a reorganization is in contemplation, or perhaps that they may never buy its stock? If they may buy stock under some circumstances, what are the circumstances? No one will know.*

3. Any action by the legislature would be prospective in its operation. Section 17 of the Public Utility Holding Com-

*The situation is quite similar to that in the recent decision of this Court in *Gertman v. Burdick*, decided November 26, 1941, in which was involved the old common law rule that there may be accumulation of income for lives in being and twenty-one years thereafter. It was urged that modern conditions required the Court to fix a shorter period, but the Court pointed out that in the absence of legislative action it had no guide for determining what such a shorter period should be.

pany Act, for example, which requires officers and directors to account for profits made on purchases held for less than six months, did not apply to transactions completed prior to the enactment of the statute. But here, without warning, the Commission suddenly attempts to promulgate a rule which deprives the petitioners of their ownership in stock which they had purchased when there had been no suggestion from any quarter that their conduct might be criticized.

Certainly no one could have advised the interveners, during the period from November 8, 1937, to June 29, 1940, during which the plans of merger and reorganization to eliminate a capital deficit have been before the Commission, that they were not properly entitled to purchase shares of the company. No advance warning of the unprecedented decision of the Commission was given. Throughout this period the members of the staff of the Commission were fully cognizant of these purchases, yet no suggestion was made until the Commission's tentative opinion of June 29, 1940, that purchasing the preferred stock of the company was in any respect opposed to the standards laid down by Congress and the courts. For an administrative body to formulate a new principle and then to apply it retroactively to transactions which were reported to that body and were not objected to at the time is a harsh procedure. Such a rule should only be enacted by a legislature, and if enacted should be prospective in its operation.

CONCLUSION.

The right of all stockholders of the same class to share on an equal basis is "fundamental." Berle and Means, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*, 263 (1932). Discrimination among stockholders of the same class is the essence of unfairness. It is respectfully urged that the order of the Commission of September 24, 1941, is unfair and inequitable, is detrimental to the public interest and the interest of investors (including these petitioners), is in violation of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,

and of the Delaware Corporation Law under which Federal and its subsidiaries were organized, and is erroneous and illegal.

These petitioners therefore pray that this Court modify or set aside the order of the Commission of September 24, 1941, to the extent necessary to treat these petitioners on the same basis as other holders of preferred stock of Federal of the same class.

Respectfully submitted,

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**APPENDIX TO BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
CHENERY CORPORATION ET AL.**

IN THE
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

No. 8074

CHENERY CORPORATION, H. M. ERSKINE, R. H. NEILSON, ET AL., *Petitioners,*

v.

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
Respondent.

**Petition for Review of Order of Securities and Exchange
Commission.**

COVINGTON, BURLING, RUBLEE,
ACHESON & SHORB,
Union Trust Building,
Washington, D. C.

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Petition for Review of Order of Securities and Exchange
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APPENDIX TO BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS.

A **Petition for Review of Order of Securities and
Exchange Commission.**

(filed October 22, 1941)

To the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia:

The petition of Chenery Corporation, H. M. Erskine, R.
H. Neilson, W. A. Culin, F. T. Tansill, H. D. McHenry, T.

H. Wiggin, C. M. Chenery, J. N. Greene, H. G. Calder, C. P. Rather, William E. Matthews, III, C. van den Berg, Jr., W. R. Edwards, Watson Dark, E. C. Deal, F. R. Harris, and E. C. Elliott, (hereinafter called "the petitioners") respectfully represents:

(1).

*The Nature of the Proceedings as to Which Review
Is Sought.*

Petitioners are stockholders of Federal Water Service Corporation, and seek review of an order issued by
B the Securities and Exchange Commission September 24, 1941, in certain proceedings entitled "In the Matter of Federal Water Service Corporation, Utility Operators Company, Federal Water and Gas Corporation, File Nos. 34-9, 34-41, 70-28 (Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935)". The nature of these proceedings is more fully set forth in Part (2) hereof.

(2).

The Facts and Statutes Upon Which Jurisdiction Is Based.

(A) Federal Water Service Corporation, a Delaware corporation (hereinafter called Federal), is a holding company owning securities of subsidiaries which operate water, gas, electric and other properties. November 8, 1937, Federal registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, and since said date has been a registered holding company as therein defined. November 8, 1937, Federal also filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, pursuant to Section 7 of said act and the rules of the Commission, an application for a report on a plan of reorganization, and declarations regarding the alteration of rights of holders of outstanding securities and the solicitation of consents. The application and declarations set forth a

plan for the voluntary reorganization of Federal, to be accomplished by amendment to its certificate of incorporation pursuant to Section 26 of the Delaware Corporation Law, and by a reduction in its capital pursuant to Section 28 of the Delaware Corporation Law. At the time of the filing of the application and declarations, Federal had outstanding six classes or series of stock: \$7, \$6.50, \$6, \$4 series preferred stock, Class A stock and Class B stock. Dividends in arrears had accumulated on all series of preferred stock and upon the Class A stock. Federal had valuable assets and had substantial annual net income, but, by reason of earlier losses and depreciation in the value of investments, the corporation had a capital deficit which under Delaware Law prevented the payment of dividends. The directors of Federal desired to simplify its corporate structure and to eliminate the capital deficit by reduction of capital, and thus to enable the corporation to resume the payment of dividends.

(B) The Commission objected to the plan first proposed, new plans were filed, and continued discussions were had with representatives of the Commission toward the development of a plan which the Commission would permit to become effective under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, which would comply with the Law of Delaware as to the rights of holders of preferred stock to arrears of dividends, and which would also command the necessary consent of the stockholders of Federal as required by Delaware Law. After the decision on January 16, 1940, in *Havender v. Federal United Corporation*, 11 A. (2d) 331, which established that under Delaware Law preferred stock together with dividends in arrears thereon

might be converted into new securities through a merger, Federal filed with the Commission on March 30, 1940, amendments to its application and declarations, setting forth a new plan of reorganization by way of merger. These amendments proposed the merger into Federal of two other Delaware corporations, Utility Op-

erators Company and Federal Water and Gas Corporation. Utility Operators Company, the stock of which was largely owned by officers and employees of Federal and its subsidiary companies, owned all of the Class B stock of Federal. Federal owned all of the stock of Federal Water and Gas Corporation. Utility Operators Company and Federal Water and Gas Corporation also filed with the Commission declarations regarding the alteration of the rights of the holders of their securities in accordance with the proposed merger agreement.

(C) During the period from November 8, 1937, to June 30, 1940, the petitioners purchased preferred stock in Federal in amounts as follows:

Name	Shares		
	\$6.00 Preferred	\$6.50 Preferred	\$7.00 Preferred
Chenery Corporation	3860	3547	1211
H. M. Erskine	25	50	—
R. H. Neilson	10	—	—
W. A. Culin	50	110	—
F. T. Tansill	—	65	—
H. D. McHenry	—	75	15
T. H. Wiggin	50	30	—
C. M. Chenery	150	170	—
J. N. Greene	45	—	—
H. G. Calder	—	40	—
C. P. Rather	110	310	—
Wm. E. Matthews, III	—	65	—
C. van den Berg, Jr.	25	1535	140
W. R. Edwards	100	—	—
Watson Dark	5	160	60
E. C. Deal	85	—	—
F. R. Harris	130	173	40
E. C. Elliott	27	—	—

E C. M. Chenery sold 125 shares of the \$6.00 preferred stock and 20 shares of the \$6.50 preferred stock, and C. van den Berg, Jr., sold 25 shares of the \$6.00 preferred stock and 700 shares of the \$6.50 preferred stock. When these purchases and sales were made the petitioners other than Chenery Corporation were officers or directors of

Federal or of Utility Operators Company. Petitioner Chenery Corporation is a family holding company which had nine stockholders, of whom two, who owned approximately 47% of the stock of Chenery Corporation, were officers or directors of Federal or Utility Operators Company. All of these purchases and sales of stock in Federal were currently reported to the Commission by the purchasers as required by Section 17 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.

(D) June 29, 1940, the Commission issued tentative findings in which the question was raised for the first time whether the preferred stock which had been purchased by officers and directors of Federal or Utility Operators Company and by Chenery Corporation while plans of reorganization were pending before the Commission should be treated on any different basis from other preferred stock. Hearings were had on this question, and testimony was introduced establishing that all such stock had been purchased through brokers in the over-the-counter market at prices prevailing from time to time, except 2700 shares acquired by Chenery Corporation from an investment banking house in exchange for debenture bonds of Federal. A partner of the investment banking house testified that he was fully acquainted with the value of the stock and F bonds, and that it had been a most satisfactory trade.

C. T. Chenery, the President of Federal, testified that he had advised the purchases of preferred stock of Federal by the Chenery Corporation and by the individual officers and directors, because he believed that the preferred stock was a very good investment, and because by its purchase the management could maintain a voting interest if the B stock should be eliminated.

(E) March 24, 1941, the Commission filed formal findings and an opinion in the proceeding. The plan then under consideration had contemplated the conversion of the four classes of preferred into new common stock. The Commission stated that the plan could not be approved in so far as it provided for participation of the preferred

shares purchased by officers or directors of Federal or Utility Operators Company, or by the Chenery Corporation, after November 8, 1937, on a parity with other shares of preferred stock of the same class. The Commission found that "the provisions for participation by the preferred stock held by the management result in the terms of issuance of new securities being detrimental to the interest of investors and the plan being unfair and inequitable". Entry of an order was deferred, and it was stated that further consideration would be given to the matter if Federal filed amendments to its proposed plan designed to cure this and other alleged defects therein.

(F) Thereafter amendments to the declarations and applications were filed by the corporations in order to present a plan which complied with the findings and opinion of the Commission. The proposed merger agree-

G ment was amended to provide among other things that no shares of common stock of the surviving corporation should be issued for the shares of preferred stock of Federal purchased since November 8, 1937, by Chenery Corporation or by the individual petitioners when they were officers or directors of Federal or of Utility Operators Company, but that each such purchaser should receive upon surrender of such stock to the surviving corporation the cost of such stock with interest at 4% per annum from the dates of its purchase to the effective date of the merger agreement. It was further provided in effect that the petitioners should account to the surviving corporation for any profit realized on any such stock as had been sold by them.

(G) August 15, 1941, the petitioners filed an application for leave to intervene in the proceedings before the Commission, and objected to the approval of any plan of reorganization containing a provision to the effect that the preferred stock purchased by the petitioners should be treated on a less favorable basis than other preferred stock of the same class. The petitioners contended that the entry of an order approving a plan containing such a discrimina-

tory provision would be unfair, inequitable, and detrimental to the interest of investors, and would be erroneous and illegal, and they stated that no principle of common or statutory law or of equity forbade directors or officers of a corporation from purchasing stock therein, whether or not an application contemplating reorganization was under submission to the Securities and Exchange Commission. They prayed that their application to intervene should be allowed, and that they should be made parties to the pro-

ceeding, that they should be permitted to file briefs and make oral argument, that the case should be reconsidered by the Commission to the extent that the holding then in effect treated stock held by the petitioners on a different basis from other preferred stock, that the Commission should enter findings and an opinion to the effect that the plan should be modified so that these petitioners should be treated in the same manner as other holders of preferred stock, and that the Commission should deny effectiveness to the declarations filed in the proceedings unless they should be so modified.

(H) August 18, 1941, the Commission ordered that the petitioners be permitted to intervene and become parties to the proceeding, and gave leave to file briefs. Leave to make oral argument was denied, subject to further order after consideration of the briefs. August 28, 1941, the petitioners filed a brief in support of their contentions.

(I) September 24, 1941, the Commission made a report on the amended plan of reorganization, entered supplemental findings and opinion, and issued an order permitting the declarations, as amended in conformity with the Commission's opinion of March 24, 1941, to become effective, and granting the applications as amended. This petition is filed for review of this order.

(J) This Court has jurisdiction to review the said order of September 24, 1941, under Section 24 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 803, 15 USCA Sec. 79.

(3).

I

The Relief Prayed.

These petitioners pray that this Court review the order of the Commission of September 24, 1941, and that said order be modified or set aside to the extent necessary to treat these petitioners on the same basis as other holders of preferred stock of Federal of the same class. The petitioners ask such other relief as this Court may deem appropriate.

(4).

The Points on Which the Petitioners Intend to Rely.

1. No rule of common law or equity prohibits the purchase of stock by an officer or director, nor does any statute prohibit such purchases. When the purchases involved in these proceedings were made no regulation of the Commission indicated that they might be objectionable to the Commission.

2. Section 17 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 deals with purchases of stock by officers or directors. The section provides for reports thereon to the Commission and for recovery by the corporations of profits made by such officers and directors from sales within six months of purchase. The absence of any further requirement, prohibition or penalty in a statute dealing with the subject shows a Congressional intent to permit officers and directors to purchase such stock freely to the extent such purchases are not affected by the statute.

3. Purchases of stock by officers and directors should be encouraged, whether or not the corporation is in process of reorganization.

4. The order of the Commission approving a plan of reorganization containing a provision that the preferred stock purchased by the petitioners should be treated on a less favorable basis than other preferred stock is unfair and inequitable, is detrimental to the public interest and the interest of investors (including these petitioners), is in viola-

tion of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, and of Delaware Corporation law, and is erroneous and illegal.

5. Treatment of the petitioners on the same basis as other holders of preferred stock would not be unfair, inequitable, or detrimental to public interest or the interest of investors.

Respectfully submitted,

CHENERY CORPORATION,
H. M. ERSKINE,
R. H. NELSON,
W. A. CULIN,
F. T. TANSILL,
H. D. McHENRY,
T. H. WIGGIN,
C. M. CHENERY,
J. N. GREENE,
H. G. CALDER,
C. P. RATHER,
WILLIAM E. MATTHEWS, III,
C. VAN DEN BERG, JR.,
W. R. EDWARDS,
WATSON DARK,
E. C. DEAL,
F. R. HARRIS,
AND E. C. ELLIOTT,
By SPENCER GORDON,
Attorney.

SPENCER GORDON,
WM. MERRICK PARKER,
WM. DUBOSE SHELDON,
COVINGTON, BURLING, RUBLEE,
ACHESON & SHORB,
Union Trust Building,
Washington, D. C.,
Attorneys for Petitioners.

K DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA) ss.

Spencer Gordon, being duly sworn, says that he is one of the attorneys for the petitioners and that he makes this affidavit in their behalf because the petitioners are non-residents of the District of Columbia, that he has prepared the foregoing petition from information obtained from the records of the Securities and Exchange Commission and that he verily believes that the statements therein contained are true.

SPENCER GORDON.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22nd day of October, 1941.

S. WILLIAM MILLER,
Notary Public, D. C.

* * * * *

EXCERPTS FROM TENTATIVE FINDINGS OF COMMISSION.

(June 29, 1940)

3417 The present plan of reorganization, like the previous ones which have been filed with us over the past several years, was formulated by the management of Federal Water Service Corporation, and discussions regarding the reorganization of this corporation have been taking place between the management and the staff of this Commission over the past several years. Such management has been entrenched in its position of management by virtue of the voting power of the otherwise worthless class B stock,¹⁴ and the extended discussions which have taken place between the management and the staff of this Commission have been largely concerned with the question of what treatment could be accorded the class B stock in the light of the standards of the Public Utility Holding Company Act

¹⁴ As we have seen, substantially all of the outstanding stock of Utility Operators Company, which owns all of the class B stock of Federal Water Service Corporation, is owned or controlled by officers and employees of Federal Water Service Corporation and its subsidiaries. C. T. Chenery and other officers and directors of Federal Water Service Corporation own or control about 23.8% of the stock of Utility Operators Company.

of 1935. Under these circumstances we think it appropriate to note that of the 8,082 shares of preferred stock as of March 31, 1940 owned or controlled by C. T. Chenery 5,918 shares, or 73.2% thereof, were acquired by Mr. Chenery or by Chenery Corporation, which he controls, since November 8, 1937 and 3,864 shares, or 47.81% thereof, were so acquired since May 12, 1939. These purchases (which we presume were made in the open market although the record does not so show) were made at prices ranging from 16½

to 36½. Very few of the shares were purchased at a price higher than 30 and substantial quantities were acquired at prices in the lower twenties. Other officers and directors of Federal Water Service Corporation have acquired 2,379 shares, or 86.7% of their present holdings of preferred stock since November 8, 1937. Persons who are officers and directors of subsidiaries, but not of Federal Water Service Corporation, have acquired all their present holdings of the latter's preferred stock, amounting to 1,605 shares, since March 30, 1937.

The following table shows the preferred stock holdings as of March 30, 1940 of C. T. Chenery, other officers and directors of Federal Water Service Corporation and its subsidiaries, and Utility Operators Company:

TABLE VI.

	Total Preferred Shares	Shares of Each Issue of Preferred			
		\$7.00	\$6.50	\$6.00	\$4.00
C. T. Chenery *	8,082	1,080	2,933	3,970	99
Other officers and directors of Federal Water Service Corporation and its sub- sidiary companies	4,350	415	3,203	732	—
Utility Operators Company	6,536	941	2,248	3,316	31
Totals	18,968	2,436	8,384	8,018	130
Per cent of total now out- standing	11.91%	15.93%	12.00%	11.18%	5.46%

3419 Based upon principles recently expounded by the Supreme Court of the United States¹⁵ the Circuit

* Including preferred owned by Chenery Corporation, a personal holding company.

¹⁵ "Pepper v. Litton", 60 S. Ct. 238.

Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, in a recent decision¹⁶ has held that the principal stockholder and officer of a corporation, which was in reorganization under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, sustained such a fiduciary relation as precluded him from purchasing claims of creditors at a small fraction of their face value, and using them as the foundation for a claim in excess of that actually paid therefor. Such principal stockholder and officer was permitted to maintain a claim only to the extent of the consideration actually paid by him.

While it may be that the facts in the present case differ sufficiently from those in the Norcor case, *supra*, to render inapplicable here the principles there applied, we do not regard the question as entirely free from doubt.¹⁷

* * * * *

EXCERPTS FROM TESTIMONY.

Testimony of Christopher T. Chenery, July 22 and 23, 1940.

2755 Q. Mr. Chenery, before the plan now before the Commission, which was filed on March 30, 1940, was filed were you advised by Mr. Culin that he had been advised by Mr. Kennedy that the Commission had approved the filing of that plan?

Mr. Baldy: Let's put Mr. Culin on, Mr. Hubbard.

Mr. Hubbard: I withdraw the question.

Q. Now, Mr. Chenery, during the pendency of these plans before the Commission did the Chenery Corporation purchase preferred stock of the Federal Water Service Corporation? A. Yes.

Q. I show you a schedule purporting to show the purchases of preferred stock of Federal Water Service Corporation by officers and directors of Federal and Utility

¹⁶ "In re Norcor Mfg. Co.", 109 F. 2d 407.

¹⁷ It should be borne in mind that here, as is frequently the case, the discretion and judgment of the management is, as a practical matter, largely determinative not only of what kind of a plan of voluntary reorganization shall be proposed but of when it shall be proposed.

Operators Company from November 8, 1937, to June 30, 1940, and ask you if that was prepared at your request or suggestion. A. It was.

Q. And it is accurate according to the records of the company and in accordance with your best knowledge and belief? A. It is.

Mr. Hubbard: I offer it in evidence.

The Examiner: Admitted.

(The schedule referred to was received in evidence as Applicant's Exhibit No. 33.)

Q. Now, Mr. Chenery, I ask you to turn to page 3 of this Exhibit No. 33, and I ask you to describe the Chenery Corporation. A. The Chenery Corporation is a family investment corporation formed in 1926. Stockholders are my three brothers, my sister, my wife, my three children, and myself.

Q. What percentage of the stock of Chenery Corporation do you own? A. I own approximately 10,000 shares of approximately 23,000 shares.

Q. Now, Mr. Chenery, why did you purchase this preferred stock? A. I purchased it—(interrupted)

2757 Q. (Interposing) Why did the Chenery Corporation purchase the preferred stock? A. Chenery Corporation purchased it on my advice. I have felt, have testified, and have told everyone who has asked me over the past years that I thought that preferred stock of Federal Water Service Corporation, over a long period of time, was sufficiently sound so that it would again pay dividends and that this would be true whether any plan of reclassification was consummated or not, that there were inherent values in the Corporation which would be reflected in the stock and that if no plan of reclassification were put through, that the accumulation of the earnings over a period of time would be sufficient to cure the deficit and dividends would again be resumed.

Also, the officers and employees of this Corporation bought the B Stock in 1932 at my suggestion and on my advice and paid approximately \$600,000 for it, contracted to pay more. The situation of the Corporation since that time has improved substantially. This B Stock was bought by all classes of employees. I think more than 99 percent of officers and employees bought it and paid for it by deductions from their salaries over a three or four-year period.

The original plans for reclassification contemplated that the B stockholders would be given an opportunity to buy their way back in the Corporation, first by giving 2758 them a special stock which was convertible into new common stock upon the payment of cash and which maintained their voting power over a period of years; second, by giving them options so that it was all the time contemplated that these people who held this Corporation together by contributions from their salaries and wages should not be thrown out. I have always regarded the ownership of this stock by the employees of the Corporation as one of the great assets of the Corporation.

Then the view shifted and apparently the feeling was that little consideration should be given to the B Stock and finally that none should be given to it. The voting control of the B Stock was thrown into the open market for anybody to pick up who desired it. I had knowledge first that the preferred stock was freely traded on the market, that there were any number of investment bankers buying and selling it constantly and secondly, that strong financial interests were accumulating substantial blocks of this stock.

As long as we thought that a plan would be worked out which would give the B Stock an opportunity to come back in the future, my suggestion was to those stockholders and I think I testified to this effect at the first hearing here in 1937 that they should save so that at the expiration or at the end of the period, they would be in a position to exercise the option and acquire that stock. Then when it be-

came apparent that this was not to be, a meeting was
2759 held of the B stockholders and it was their decision
that they would contest any plan which worked them
out completely and the suggestion was made that it would
be wise to purchase such preferred stock as they reasonably
could so that in the event that there was litigation and the
plan was not worked out and that finally it should be held
that the B stock was not entitled to anything, that these men
who had held this Corporation together and who were its
loyal servants would still have some position in the Corpo-
ration, some voice.

It was that consideration, as well as the feeling that the
stock itself was inherently worth what was being paid for
it, which prompted me to advise Chenery Corporation as
well as to advise others who asked me I thought it was wise
for them to buy the preferred stock.

Q. The preferred stock is bought and sold on what is
known as the open market, is that true? A. That is true.

Q. Do you know whether quotations are published daily
in newspapers? A. They are so published.

Q. What are the newspapers in which the quotations are
published? A. The Tribune and, I am not sure, the Wall
Street Journal. I know the Tribune.

Q. Were your purchases made on the market? A.
2760 They were made through dealers in the stock pur-
chased on the open market, with one single exception,
and that was a transaction under which Chenery Corpora-
tion exchanged with an investment banking firm of Ingalls
& Snyder 100,000 principal amount of Federal Water Ser-
vice debentures for 2,700 shares of 6½ equivalent preferred
stock.

Q. That is the transaction referred to on Exhibit 33 in
the last three items, is it not? A. That is so. Ingalls &
Synder acted in part as a broker and part as principal there
in that they sold part of their own stock or stock of their
clients. They were one of the firms which I referred to
who had accumulated the stock and I was told that they

had purchased for the account of themselves and their clients with the idea that it might be potential control of approximately 12,000 shares of the stock.

Q. At any time, did you discuss with any person in the S. E. C. staff the question of the Corporation's possibly buying preferred stock? A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall when that was? A. I have a memorandum on the subject.

Q. Will you refresh your recollection by looking at 2761 the memorandum? A. It was a meeting on April 26, 1939.

Q. What was the situation at that time and how did you happen to discuss it? A. We had first a meeting in Judge Healy's office; present—Judge Healy, Mr. Spencer, Mr. Levy and Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Hubbard, Mr. McHenry and Mr. Chenery.

At that time, plans were apparently stalemated. This meeting later adjourned to Mr. Spencer's office. I had never discussed any plan for the purchase of preferred stock as a method of working out a reclassification plan until this time because the plans, up until that time, had contemplated an all-common stock plan. If we had an all-common stock plan, there is no reason to sell your assets, to buy and retire preferred stock. Apparently we were stalemated on the plans which we thought were practicable at this time and I made the suggestion that we might be able to work out a reclassification plan by the purchasing and retiring of preferred stock which would involve the buying of large blocks of preferred stock. I think I had 60,000 shares in mind at that time and later suggested 30,000 shares.

I asked Mr. Spencer what he would think of such a plan and Mr. Spencer said he thought it was terrible. The Corporation prior to that time had had excellent use for its funds. Such spare funds as it had, such spare earnings as it had, it was using to buy its own indebtedness at 2762 the fraction—not as a fraction, somewhere in the 70's. It was buying preferred stock of Scranton-Spring-

brook in the 20's and had full and adequate use for its earnings.

I might correct that statement by saying we had discussed in the early days, 1937, a possible plan which would have involved as a part, a purchase of preferred stock owned by Utility Operators Company but that was not presented as a straight raising of the issue. The first time that I have either a memorandum or a clear recollection of the issue being raised was at this conference with Mr. Spencer and I think Mr. Spencer at that time added that the use of corporate funds to retire preferred stock at a fraction of its value and thereby to sweeten the position of the securities, the stocks junior to it, was entirely contrary to his thinking.

Q. Now, Mr. Chenery, during the period that the company has been a registered holding company, you had filed from time to time, in accordance with the Act, the reports of purchases and sales of any securities of the Federal Water Service Corporation? A. Made either by myself or by Chenery Corporation.

Mr. Hubbard: I call upon the Commission to produce the reports of the purchases filed by the Chenery Corporation.

(The reports were handed to Mr. Hubbard.)

Mr. Hubbard: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

2763 Mr. Hubbard: I now offer in evidence the reports that have been filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on Form U17-2 by Chenery Corporation and the individuals named upon Exhibit 33. I suggest that it be stipulated that it is unnecessary to have these forms physically marked in evidence but that, being a part of the Commission's files, they be considered part of the record in this case.

The Examiner: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Hubbard: If your Honor please, I am going to offer in evidence the Form U17 reports as received by the Securities and Exchange Commission covering purchases made by officers and directors of the Federal Water Service Corporation and we will work out a stipulation between Mr. Baldy and myself so that it will be unnecessary to have these records physically incorporated into the record of this hearing.

The Examiner: If it is to be stipulated, there is no need of having an exhibit number now.

Mr. Baldy: All right, your Honor.

By Mr. Hubbard:

Q. Now, Mr. Chenery, in the tentative findings and conclusions of the Commission, the statement is made:

“It should be borne in mind that, here, as is frequently the case, the discretion and judgment of the management is as a practical matter, largely determined what kind of
2764 a plan of voluntary reorganization shall be proposed but when it shall be proposed.”

* * * * *

What have you to say with respect to that statement?

A. I would say it just is not so.

Q. And as an illustration of the correctness of your statement, you cite this case? A. I cite this case. The management cannot suggest a plan at any time to stockholders—it can only file one with this Commission—unless and until this Commission permits it to be presented to the stockholders with its consent. So far as the plan, we have had plans held without action for two years at a time.

* * * * *

2799 Q. Now on November 8, 1937, you filed the second plan, did you not, Mr. Chenery? A. The special stock plan?

Q. No, no, I am leaving the special stock plan. Now that is the first one you formally filed. Coming now to the

second you formally filed— A. The first one is November 8, 1937. The second one was in May.

Q. Then on May 19, 1938, you filed an amendment which provided a plan as an alternative to the special stock plan, did you not? A. That is true.

Q. That plan called for a mere reduction of the capital represented by the outstanding shares of the several classes, did it not? A. Several classes of stock, yes, sir.

Q. What you were going to do was just reduce the capital represented by the several shares of otherwise leave them alone? A. Without any change of rights or preferences of the stock, all of its—each stock retaining all of its characteristics with the single modification of stated value applicable thereto.

Q. That would have cured the impediment to the 2800 payment of dividends? A. That would.

Q. And otherwise wouldn't have changed the shares? A. Changed any rates or preferences—would not have.

* * * * *

2806 Q. Now the thing that is not clear to me, Mr. Chenery, is that when you later came along with the next plan, which is the one presently before the Commission, you departed from the terms and provisions of the plan we were last discussing. The present plan is an all common stock plan and the one which you had pending when the Havender case difficulty came along called for different terms and provisions.

In order that the record may show what led from one plan to another, would you explain how the present plan evolved? A. It is summarized in Answer 6, to Question 6, in the application, which I should like to read as being my answer:

(Reading) "The file with the Commission (File No. 34-9) shows that Applicant has desired for some time to
2807 reduce its capital in order that it might pay dividends. The file also shows that Applicant has for some time desired to reorganize in a manner permitted by

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2806 Q. Now the thing that is not clear to me, Mr. Chenery, is that when you later came along with the next plan, which is the one presently before the Commission, you departed from the terms and provisions of the plan we were last discussing. The present plan is an all common stock plan and the one which you had pending when the Havender case difficulty came along called for different terms and provisions.

In order that the record may show what led from one plan to another, would you explain how the present plan evolved?

A. It is summarized in Answer 6, to Question 6, in the application, which I should like to read as being my answer:

(Reading) "The file with the Commission (File No. 34-9) shows that Applicant has desired for some time to
2807 reduce its capital in order that it might pay dividends. The file also shows that Applicant has for some time desired to reorganize in a manner permitted by

the Delaware Corporation Law. The recent decision of the Supreme Court of Delaware in *Havender v. Federal United Corporation* shows that this can be done by merger proceedings under Section 59 of the Delaware Corporation Law. Promptly after this decision was rendered by the Supreme Court of Delaware, Applicant's officers took up with the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission a plan of reorganization through merger with Utility Operators Company and Federal Water and Gas Corporation, and this plan is the result."

Q. Well, I wasn't addressing my question to the mechanics of carrying out the plan. I just wanted to bring out why it was that the substantive provisions of the plan were changed; in other words, why the switch over to an all common stock plan. The plan that was pending, that was blocked by the *Havender* case, so far as being carried out in the way your counsel would like to have it carried out, as you said, wasn't in its substance the same as the present plan? A. No.

Q. And I want to bring out the reasons for the change. A. Well, it had always been the desire of the management to have an all common stock plan, and before this was a registered holding company the corporation had proposed to stockholders in October, 1936, an all common stock plan. In the meantime these legal difficulties had arisen. When they were cleared by this Supreme Court decision referred to, and the way apparently was open to an all common stock plan again, that was the plan which the management considered preferable, and which it suggested, and which we thought also was in harmony with the desires often expressed by the staff of the Commission.

* * * * *

2809 Christopher T. Chenery, the witness on the stand at the hour of recess, resumed the stand for further examination, as follows:

Cross Examination (Continued)

By Mr. Baldy:

Q. Mr. Chenery, I think we have covered, after a fashion, the history of the discussions that you had with the staff regarding these various plans. All of the plans which you have filed contained some recognition for the B stock, did they not? A. Yes.

Q. In the plan presently before the Commission, the recognition takes the form of a staggered board of directors, is that true? A. Yes; it is quite attenuated consideration.

Q. Yes. That is the only consideration in the present plan? A. That is the only consideration.

Q. All of the others contained considerations somewhat more substantial, than that? A. Yes—substantially more.

Q. And is this decrease or this diminishing consideration for the Class B stock, as evidenced by the succession of plans filed, due to views expressed by the staff? A. Yes.

Q. And is it true to say that the question of what treatment should be accorded the Class B stock under the applicable standards of law has been one of the major topics of consideration between you and others connected with Federal and the staff? A. One of the major topics, yes.

Q. Would you say it would be in your judgment the chief topic? A. Well, I think the consideration to the A and the B were the chief topics.

I will add to that, if I may, that in a voluntary plan you had to have a plan which the stockholders would vote for, and until—so a great deal of consideration was given to what treatment, what was the minimum treatment that the stockholders would approve, the A and B stockholders.

Q. Well, do you think if you and the staff had been able to see eye to eye on the treatment that should be accorded the B stock under the applicable standards of law that the length of time that has elapsed during which you have been trying to get plans through here would be materially less?

A. Well, Mr. Baldy, since the last action of the Commission I am not sure that would have had any effect at all.
2811 I think it is entirely unpredictable.

Q. What do you mean, "the last action of the Commission"? A. Well, in the tentative findings which they have handed down.

Q. Well now, if one of the chief points of difference between yourself and the staff has been the treatment that should be accorded these two classes of stock, hadn't been a point of difference isn't it reasonable to suppose that the length of time that has elapsed would not be so great? A. Well, I don't know whether they would have found something else if that hadn't been the point, because in these tentative findings they bring up the question of the purchase of the stock as being something else which they would have to consider, and when that has been before them for years and when the ownership of this stock by us had been used by Mr. Weiner as one reason why we didn't need a staggered board, then to bring it up at this time, it seems to me we just couldn't predict what would happen under any circumstances until a final order came down in writing.

Mr. Baldy: Will you read the last answer?

(The answer was read by the reporter.)

Q. Well now, how could the stock holdings be before the Commission for years, Mr. Chenery, when a great deal of your stock has been fairly recently acquired? A.
2812 Well, this stock has been purchased over a substantial period of years. In the first hearing it was commented on, there was testimony about it. Reports have been filed monthly with the Commission showing each and every purchase. The staff has had full knowledge of it, and has used it in the arguments with us as to why we didn't need a staggered board.

Q. You mean that Mr. Weiner indicated that he thought the staggered board was not very important from your

standpoint in view of your holdings of preferred stock? A. Holdings of preferred stock of the group, yes.

Q. Yes. Did any member of the staff ever express any views to you about the propriety of your accumulating stock during the pendency of the plans of reorganization?

A. I have no record of any member of the staff making any such comment to me.

Q. It is just a thing that didn't come up for discussion at all, isn't that right? A. Just a thing that didn't come up for discussion at all. It was full knowledge of all concerned.

Q. Is it true to say that your motive in purchasing the stock that you have purchased while plans were pending before this Commission was the combined motive of increasing voting power plus the expectation that it would prove a financially desirable investment? A. Yes, I think
2813 that is true. I think there is more stress on the voting power than on the investment, however.

Q. You mean from the standpoint of what motivated you? A. Yes.

Q. That was your primary motive? A. Yes, that was true.

Q. The other motive, however, was present to some extent? A. The other motive was present to some extent, yes.

Q. Now did you at any time request or recommend to any other officers or directors of Federal or the subsidiaries that they accumulate preferred stock? A. Yes.

Q. Will you describe, please, the nature of those recommendations? A. I think it was after we had been advised by the staff in 1938 that the Commission would not approve the plan, the plan then before it, the special stock plan, I thought that we were headed in for litigation with the Commission on the capital reduction plan. I contemplated the possibility that we might lose. I thought we would win, but I thought we might lose, and these officers and employees had bought this B stock on my urging and they had paid for it with deductions from their salary over a three-or

four-year period, and I did not want to see a situation in which the control of this company would be thrown
 2814 in the open market and anybody with a few hundred thousand dollars can step in and pick it up. I wanted the employees if they lost the B stock to have some secondary line of defense, which I thought would be in the ownership of the preferred stock, and I said it was my view that it was sound policy for every person in the employ of the company who could spare the money to buy such preferred stock as they could carry, and that I would buy all that I could, through the Chenery Corporation.

Many of them did buy such preferred stock. In some cases groups got together and borrowed money from the bank to be paid over a period of time with which to buy this preferred stock.

In the case of Chenery Corporation, we liquidated dividend-paying securities at a loss in order to buy this stock.

The pendency of the plan, the time of the plan, had nothing to do with it. When we could sell this stock and buy up Federal preferred on pre-determined ratios, the orders to the brokers were to sell the other stock and buy Federal preferred.

Now I take full responsibility for the purchase of stock by officers and employees. I not only thought it was a sound thing for them to do, I thought it was highly desirable, not
 2815 only from their viewpoint but from the viewpoint of the corporation, and I so expressed that opinion. I

also said that I thought that the stock was inherently sound; that over a period of time, whether we had a plan or did not have a plan, that they wouldn't have any loss in the stock.

Q. It was your expectation they would have a good profit?

A. It was my hope they would have a good profit.

Q. Wasn't it your expectation? A. At some time in the future. Whether that time was one or X years I didn't know, but I thought if this present economic system rocked

along on the present basis that some time in the future that stock would be good.

Q. Particularly if and when you succeeded in getting the capital deficit cured? A. It couldn't pay dividends until the capital deficit was cured, but it didn't require a plan to cure the capital deficit. The processes of time will do that itself.

Q. But it was your expectation that in all probability the preferred stock would have a substantial rise in market price if and when the capital deficit was cured? A. And it again paid dividends, yes; but I hadn't the foggiest idea when that would be, whether it was six months or six years, and so stated.

Q. That was because you didn't know how long it was going to take you to get through down here, was that 2816 it? A. Whether we would ever get through down here or not.

Q. Well, to what do you ascribe the fact that it's taking so long to get through down here? A. Well, I ascribe it to the changing viewpoints of the Commission. I think it is a perfectly reasonable explanation that this Commission has been, in the last year, in a constant state of flux. There have been people coming in, people going out. Each new group have had their own views of the law and what was permitted and what was prohibited. The law itself, as interpreted by the legal division of the Commission, I think has changed during the period of this thing. I think that for the first time since we got a community plan through you make a flat statement that voting power can't be recognized. I don't think they thought that was the law before; if so, the memorandums which we had are inexplicable.

I think the thing has been—it is your Commission and its conception of its law, of the law in which it operates, and its duties under that law, which have been in a state of flux and are now beginning to crystallize, and that we happened to come along with one of your first cases, one of

your most involved cases, which presented a great many problems which would be applicable to other situations, and they considered our case—not only considered how it affected us but how it might affect other companies 2817 which were either before you or which might come before you, and you are making new grounds on the trial, took your time to look at it. By the time you had come to a conclusion there would be something new developed and you would stand off and look at it again.

Now I am not critical of that. I think it's been hard on the Federal preferred stockholders. I think but for the action of this Commission that they would have had more than a million dollars disbursed to them in the last two or three years, which they were reasonably entitled to and which we could have paid, and I doubt very much that any minor changes which you make in this plan will recompense these preferred stockholders for the million dollars they didn't get—and the million dollars is an under-estimate, rather than an over-estimate.

Q. But you have at no time deemed the situation of the preferred stockholders such as to warrant you in abandoning the idea that you should get something for the Class B stock? A. No. I see no—

Q. (Interposing) That is all right. That is the answer. A. I would like to amplify it, if I may, if you really want to know what I think.

Q. I think you have answered the question. A. All right.

* * * * *

Testimony of Walter A. Culin, July 23, 1940.

2848 Q. Now, Mr. Culin, according to your Exhibit No. 33, you apparently are one of the purchasers of preferred stock of Federal Water Service Corporation. Will you state the circumstances under which you purchased that preferred stock and why you made the purchase? A. I recall that during the summer of 1938 after we had

had discussions with the staff of the Commission about reorganization plans, and in particular the reduction of the capital plans, we had discussions in our office as to the advisability of the individuals, officers and some of the employees buying preferred stock of the company.

I was in agreement with that thought both from the standpoint of wanting to strengthen our position as the management group in our voice in the company and also I believed that ultimately the stock would be of value in excess of what I would probably have to pay for it at that time.

I bought 50 shares in September 1938, ten shares in November 1938, making a bank loan to buy some of it and later on when I paid that loan I made another loan and bought some more in 1939 and January 1940.

Q. Do you have any information with respect to the pendency of the plans which you considered not available to other stockholders at that time? A. I certainly
2849 did not. I always advocated the policy that if at any time we had discussions pending before the Commission it was not the time for us to buy any stock because we might later be criticized and we were always careful when we were in the midst of what we considered to be important conversations with the Commission or the staff of the Commission, that it was not the time for us to buy the stock, that we might be criticized later. We have always been very free in giving information to everybody who asked us for it.

Q. And at various times requests were made for information from you with respect to the status of a plan? A. I have had many requests from stockholders, security dealers, and newspapers for information of the plan, and excepting at certain periods when we were right in the very midst of the discussions we have always given out all the information that was available, everything we knew about it.

Q. You have never purchased any stock at any time where information wasn't entirely available to everybody? A. I have not.

Q. What sources of information did people have with respect to securities of the Federal Water Service Corporation and their value? A. The statistical agencies carried pretty full information about the plans. Since 1937 we have had on file a great amount of detail in the S.E.C. We have always given information to various brokers and investment dealers and they have published and distributed a number of memoranda about the plan and about the company, and at various times the newspapers have asked us for a release or have asked us to give them a story as to the company and its position, its finances and the status of the plan.

Q. And from time to time the Commission issued releases, did it not, with respect to plans? A. When we filed plans with the Commission they then published a release.

Mr. Hubbard: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

By Mr. Hubbard:

Q. Mr. Culin, do you have something to do with the preparation of annual reports to stockholders? A. I do.

Q. And you endeavor to give stockholders all the information about the company? A. Yes.

Q. And quarterly earning statements are published in the financial pages of the newspapers, are they not? A. That is right.

Q. Newspapers carry reports of various plans from time to time, plans that are before the Securities and Exchange Commission, do they not? A. They do.

2851 Q. I think you testified that Standard Statistics give periodic reports with respect to the position of stocks? A. Yes.

Q. And from time to time various investment houses also give information and advice with respect to stock? A. Yes.

Q. The stock of the Federal Water Service Corporation? A. Yes.

Mr. Hubbard: That is all, Mr. Culin.

Cross-examination

By Mr. Baldy:

Q. Mr. Culin, will you identify the conversations that were of such character that you did not feel it would be proper to purchase stock while they were in progress? Will you give dates? A. There were discussions in the latter part of December 1937, December 16 and December 22, 1937. I would like to withdraw that answer.

I was present in discussions on December 5, December 21, and December 29, 1938.

Q. December? A. December 5, 21, and 28, 1938, and a telephone conversation on December 29.

Q. Were those conversations of the kind referred to in your direct testimony as being of such kind that
2852 you didn't consider it proper to purchase preferred stock while they were going on? A. No, because at that time there wasn't anything definite coming out of the questions.

Q. Well, my question is addressed to conversations of the kind you referred to in your direct testimony. I am asking you to identify which they were. A. On March 29, 1939, I had a telephone call from Mr. Spencer telling me that there had been informal approval by the Commission of the new plan.

Q. What date was that? A. March 29, 1939.

Q. March—what? A. March 29.

Q. Pardon me. I don't want to interrupt your answer. Just continue your answer. A. It seemed at that time that we probably would have a new plan but shortly after that further discussions with the staff indicated that we were still far apart on the plan. I refer particularly to telephone conversations of April 13, 1939.

Q. What do you mean by the plan? You said you were still pretty far apart on the plan. A. That was the preliminary discussions which ultimately led up to the plan which was filed in May 1939, which was upset by that

2853 Havender decision. The other time that I was having discussions with members of the staff, during which period I thought it would be improper to buy preferred stock, was March 1940.

I received a telephone call on March 25, 1940, from Mr. Kennedy, explaining that the Commission thought we should go ahead and file the plan. That plan was then filed and became public information on March 30, 1940.

Q. Well now, how did you determine how long this disability to purchase that you felt you were under should continue? A. Until the information I had became public.

Q. I see. I have nothing more to ask Mr. Culin at this time.

Re-direct examination

By Mr. Hubbard:

Q. Mr. Culin, taking these conversations you just testified about to Mr. Baldy, will you state for the record what information you had at that time from the staff of the Commission? A. The information which I had from the staff of the Commission was that the matter had been discussed in the Commission and that they thought the plan was sufficiently meritorious to go ahead and file it. There was a short period in there when I knew something that wasn't public information. When the plan was filed it became public information.

Mr. Baldy: I think it would be worth while to be specific if you can, about dates, that on such and such a
2854 date you felt it would not be proper to purchase, et cetera.

The Witness: I did.

By Mr. Hubbard:

Q. And you have selected from these dates which you have a record of, the particular dates which you testified about in answer to Mr. Baldy's question? A. That is right.

Q. And this policy which you testified about is applicable

to the purchases by other officers and directors of the system? A. I think it is pretty generally true of the other officers and directors of the system.

Mr. Baldy: Wait a minute—all right, I will let it stand. Do you, in fact, know whether that policy was followed by the other officers and directors?

The Witness: I know it was followed by the other officers and directors prior to 1937. There was some purchasing of preferred stock at that time, more with the idea of preventing the market from just going to pieces at that time than anything else, insofar as those few purchases could help.

By Mr. Hubbard:

Q. And those purchases were criticized, were they, by a stockholder? A. In December of 1937, yes. It was after that that we talked about it and felt that we should not make any purchases which might be criticized.

I think there were very few exceptions—I think that with very few exceptions that policy was adhered to.

Mr. Baldy: You think so?

The Witness: I have studied the record and there were very few purchases that were made at any time except when full information was in the hands of the public and any purchases which might have been made, so far as I can determine, were of very small quantities and would be for some reason which doesn't appear in the information which I have.

(Witness Culin excused.)

Mr. Baldy: Will you take the stand, Mr. Chenery?

Whereupon, **Christopher Chenery**, resumed the stand and testified further as follows:

Recross-Examination

By Mr. Baldy:

Q. Mr. Chenery, have you heard Mr. Culin's testimony?

A. Yes.

Q. You heard the portion of it relating to his feeling disqualified or feeling that it might be improper to make purchases of Federal stock at certain periods of time? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you have any policy corresponding to his in that regard? A. I had nothing to do with it at the time 2856 we were purchasing Chenery Corporation stock other than to agree in advance that a certain long-range policy would be pursued; in other words, that we would sell "X" shares of Alabama Water Service Corporation when we could buy three shares of Federal with the proceeds of the sale of one Alabama.

We gave general instruction to liquidate 700,000 or 800,000 shares of one and buy the other as those ratios of market prices came on the market. That was true, I think, with all of the substantial purchases of Chenery Corporation. The orders were given to brokers to buy when those ratios obtained.

I had no knowledge of when that was bought or sold after the decision was made to liquidate one security and buy this preferred.

Q. Now, with regard to the placing of instructions with the brokers, was there any period of time in which you felt that it would have been proper to give instructions to brokers or cancel instructions previously given? A. I think that you would not give instructions at any time unless you had special information, but my feeling has been that if there is one corporation that has ever operated in the full glare of publicity, that this one is it. It was one of the first corporations to start and give full and complete details of every transaction.

2857 Standard Statistics has given reports at three-months intervals. There have been a dozen brokerage houses which have circularized preferred stockholders consistently, telling them of every development and plan and advising them what to do.

Our own policy has been not to refuse any stockholder

any information at any time. There is no record since we have been in control of the company since March 14, 1932, of our having refused any stockholder any information on any subject.

Q. Well, can you identify for the record in a manner similar to that Mr. Culin did, periods of time in which you think it would not have been proper for you to give instructions to brokers? A. I hadn't thought of it in that light because at the time it was not in connection with any plan but over a long-term period and the plan would have little to do with it.

Q. Have you any record of the instructions which you gave brokers? A. I could identify it only by the time at which they started to liquidate substantial blocks of stocks.

Q. The record as to purchases, as I understand it, is already in? A. That is true.

Q. I don't think that the record of your instructions to brokers is in. A. I don't think that we have written 2858 instructions to brokers. I think we would have told them to sell "X" shares of Alabama as you can buy three for one in Federal preferred.

Q. You think they would have been oral? A. Pardon?

Q. You think they would have been oral? A. I think they would have been oral. We may have had some written orders to sell but after the decision was made I did not follow it.

Q. Was there any publicity given to the instructions that you gave brokers? A. No.

Mr. Baldy: That is all.

Redirect Examination

By Mr. Hubbard:

Q. Do you recall what those instructions were? A. To brokers?

Q. Yes, with respect to the sale of securities and the purchase of securities, other than you have testified to. A. I don't remember any other circumstance.

Q. At any time did you feel that you had any confidential information which was not available? A. I have never felt that after the first debacle, let us say, when I have testified on the stand, I never considered a plan imminent and I don't now consider one imminent.

Mr. Baldy: I don't quite get this last testimony in 2859 conjunction with what you previously said. Am I to understand now that you have never felt that you had any special knowledge that would make it improper for you to buy and sell stock?

The Witness: I never felt that the plan was imminent.

The Examiner: And therefore did it have any effect on your purchases or sales? That is your question. The question is whether you had any such expectation of a plan going through as to affect your own buying and selling of the stock?

Mr. Hubbard: You have never sold any?

The Witness: I have never sold any preferred stock.

The Examiner: Well, all right, buying.

The Witness: I don't think in any discussions which we have had with brokers the question has come up.

The Examiner: Has it affected your buying?

The Witness: It hasn't affected my buying because so far as I know, I have never had anything to do with the timing of the buying. The buying would take place over a long period of time. The broker would liquidate a block over a period of months and buy over a period of months.

The Examiner: All right.

The Witness: I expect though, if you would examine the record of our purchases, you would find that there were very few made at any controversial times.

Mr. Baldy: Has this practice of yours about leaving general instructions with brokers been a long continued practice on your part? 2860

The Witness: Over a period of several years.

* * * * *

Testimony of Roscoe C. Ingalls, July 23, 1940.

2877 Q. Now, Mr. Ingalls, did you have anything to do with the sale to the Chenery Corporation of 2700 shares of preferred stock in June, 1940, for \$100,000 debentures? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Just describe what you did and the circumstances of that transaction so far as you know them. A. The idea of an exchange of those securities had been spoken
2878 over the telephone between Mr. Erskine and myself I imagine about a month previous, at which time we were not interested in making any exchange, but not only market price but events abroad led us to believe that it might be an advantageous thing for us to make an exchange, and particularly in view of the fact that another firm, Gilbert J. Postley & Company, were anxious to make a similar exchange if we would go along with them.

The first offer I believe had been for 2800 shares of stock of the Federal Water Service 5½'s; and about June 1 or 2, throwing the thing over again, we made a counter-offer to Mr. Erskine in which we offered 2500 shares of the various preferred, 6, 6½, and 7, in exchange for a hundred debentures, but the majority of it would have been 6½ and 7% preferred stock.

This was not of interest to them, and nothing further happened until the 10th day of June, at which time we talked again with Mr. Erskine, and, as you recollect, that is the day that Italy declared war against France and England, and Mr. Erskine told me, he said, "Well, I would much prefer to have you talk directly to Mr. Chenery and not have me as the go-between on this. You two fellows might just as well talk the thing over, and probably could come to a basis of trade quicker than if it was done through myself as a third party."

So that afternoon about 3:30 I went over to Mr.
2879 Chenery's office and talked the whole thing over, as to how far the plan was before the SEC and as to what the effect would be if France capitulated, and all the

various other factors that you can think of regarding that trade and the possible future market value.

We finally came to a basis of making it 2700 shares of an average of 6½% preferred stock for a hundred of the bonds. Knowing full well—and after having answered many questions regarding the company and the prospects of the SEC's approval, which looked as though it might be handed down just almost any day, I felt in view of the serious state abroad I would much prefer to have the bonds at that time than the preferred, even though I might lose somewhat in market value if the plan was approved immediately by the SEC in the next two or three days, or if, for instance, France and England were able to make a victorious battle between Germany and Italy. And today I am very much delighted we made the trade. It was a toss-up as to which it was going to benefit the most. So far I believe—I know as far as we are concerned it's been a most satisfactory trade.

Q. Now do you recall a transaction in which Green, Ellis & Anderson were interested at one time? A. Yes. As I recollect, it was some time just after war had been declared in September—it may have been 30 or 45 days after 1914—that—that Mr. Erskine called me up and said that Mr. Nosworthy of Green, Ellis & Anderson had asked him if he could make a bid on a little block of Federal preferred that was held by one of their correspondents abroad, and we called up—

Mr. Hubbard: (Interposing) May I have the name stricken out? Mr. Erskine suggests the possibility that people there in New York might not want to have their names used, so I suggest instead of—could we substitute “a brokerage firm” for “Green, Ellis & Anderson”?

Mr. Baldy: No, I think we ought to have the names. If it is going to be talked about at all, we ought to know who it is they are talking about.

Mr. Hubbard: All right.

A. (Continuing) We—or I called up Mr. Nosworthy and

told him that Mr. Erskine had mentioned that they were interested in a bid for a block of the stock and that we would be very glad to make a bid for it. Subsequently, I think it turned out to be, instead of 700 shares turned out to be nearly 1500 shares of stock that we purchased from them and then we distributed.

Q. Did they tell you where the stock was owned? A. Just it was held abroad.

Q. And you made the transaction under those circumstances? A. That is right.

2881 Q. Now, Mr. Ingalls, one of the questions that has been raised in this case is with respect to purchases by officers and directors of the company of the company stock. Have you any views with respect to that question?

A. Well, I am a great believer in officers and directors owning stock in their own companies. I, frankly, always am impressed in my own mind when I see a company whose officers hold very little, if any, of the stock of their companies; and those who have enough confidence in their company to purchase their securities and hold them and retain them I believe are instilling confidence not only with brokers but also with investors.

Q. Did you know during the past three or four years that the officers and directors of Federal Water Service Corporation were purchasing preferred stock of Federal Water Service Corporation? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you see any impropriety in that? A. No, sir.

* * * * *

Testimony of Christopher T. Chenery, July 23, 1940.

2893 Re-direct examination.

By Mr. Hubbard:

Q. Mr. Chenery, at the close of the last hearing you were being questioned with respect to the purchases by the Chenery Corporation. A. Yes.

Q. And these purchases are shown upon Applicant's Exhibit No. 33? A. Yes.

Q. Now I would like to take up these purchases with you and ask you as to the status of the plan at the time that these purchases were made.

Will you turn to Exhibit 33? Now according to this sheet, Chenery Corporation purchased 100 shares of stock on April 29, 1938. What was the status of the plan 2894 at that time? A. The first plan had been filed with the Commission, public hearings had been held; a complete disclosure of the position of the company, its earning position, its assets, its forecast of earnings, and everything in connection with it was on file with the SEC. There had been newspaper publicity, releases by the Commission, and complete information available to anybody who wanted it.

Q. And on April 8, 1938, you had a conference down here in Washington and had been told that the SEC would not recommend the plan? A. That is true.

Q. Now you purchased 50 shares of preferred stock—Chenery Corporation purchased 50 shares of Federal Water Service preferred stock, on May 3, 1938? A. Yes.

Q. Was the status of the plan the same? A. It was.

Q. May 6, 1938, 50 shares. Was the status of the plan the same? A. Yes.

Q. Now on August 18 you purchased—the Chenery Corporation purchased 30 shares of Federal Water Service Corporation preferred stock. What was the status of the plan at that time? A. The capital reduction plan 2895 had been filed, but we had been told that it was the opinion of the staff that the prospects of its favorable reception were remote.

Q. A hearing had been held, had it not, on the capital reduction plan? A. Yes.

Q. As an alternative plan to the one filed on November 8, 1937? A. That is true.

Q. Now was the status of the two plans the same on August 19, 1938, when the Chenery Corporation purchased 20 shares? A. Yes.

Q. August 20, 1938, when the corporation purchased 13 shares? A. Yes.

Q. August 29, 1938, when the corporation purchased 9 shares? A. Yes.

Q. And September 1, 1938, the corporation purchased 188 shares. A. Yes. No change.

Q. The status of the plan was unchanged? A. No change.

Q. And on September 12, 1938, when the corporation purchased 100 shares? A. No change.

Q. And through the rest of September, 1938, there was no change? A. No change.

Q. Now on November 15, 1938, the corporation purchased 100 shares? A. Yes.

Q. What was the situation in November, 1938? I call your attention to the fact that the letter from Mr. Riter is dated November 28, 1938. A. Yes. There was no change in the situation.

Q. November 16, 1938? A. No change.

Q. November 18, 1938? A. No change.

Q. November 21, 1938? A. No change.

Q. December 2, 1938? A. We had had a conference with the staff, in a preliminary fashion, but quite inconclusive.

Q. The conference, I call your attention, did not take place until December 5. A. December 5?

Q. 1938. The conference had been arranged at that time. A. No change on that date.

Q. December 6, 1938, the corporation purchased 25 shares. That was the day after the conference in Washington, at which you were handed the memorandum by Mr. Fortas. A. Yes, and we were quite far apart.

Mr. Baldy: There were 35 shares purchased on that day.

Q. And then there was another 10 shares purchased on December 6, 1938, making 35 shares on December 6, 1938? A. Yes.

Q. Now on March 20, 1939, the corporation, the Chenery Corporation, purchased 600 shares. A. That is true.

Q. Now prior to that purchase had any publicity been given out with respect to the filing of a new plan? A. The

Wall Street Journal on February 15 had published a full and complete outline of the plan which was to be proposed.

Q. I show you a clipping from the Wall Street Journal as of February 15, 1939, and ask you if that is the statement to which you refer. A. That is the statement to which I refer.

Mr. Hubbard: I offer it in evidence.

(The Examiner: Admitted.)

(The document referred to was received in evidence as Applicant's Exhibit No. 38.)

2898 Q. At that time had any agreement been reached with the staff or with the Commission as to the approval of that plan which was referred to in the Wall Street Journal? A. No.

Q. Now on May 2, 1939, Chenery Corporation purchased 84 shares. A. Yes.

Q. What was the status of the plan at that time? A. Mr. Culin—I find I asked him to give me the dates of the conferences which he considered vital and which he testified might have an effect, and he thought that between the period April 28 and May 11 that the officers might have had special information which wasn't generally public. Now I would like to say in that that I don't think that the officers ever had information which wasn't generally available to stockholders. In fact, one of the dissenting stockholders, Mr. Russo, has always had much better information than I have and he could tell us in advance what the situation would be, much more clearly and much more accurately than were our own views of it. Where he got it or how he got it, I have no knowledge. All I know is that he could and would and did on several occasions forecast correctly the action of the Commission, saying he could get information to that point.

Q. Now I call your attention to the fact that there was a conference here in Washington on April 26, 1939. I

2899 show you what purports to be a memorandum of that conference and ask you what the situation was with respect to the plan and the attitude of the Commission at that time.

The Witness: Will you read the question?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Q. Do you recall having a conference with Judge Healy?

A. I do.

Q. Do you recall whether or not it was suggested to Judge Healy as a possible procedure that the Commission turn down both plans, if that was the view of the Commission, and in its order state what plan would be satisfactory to the Commission? A. Yes.

Q. And judge Healy thought that—or expressed himself, did he not, as thinking that that was worthy of consideration? A. Yes.

Q. Now was any tentative procedure with respect to plans discussed with the Commission at that conference on April 26, 1939? A. The procedure was discussed that the Commission could, in a report, if it denied two alternative plans which were then before it becoming effective, could suggest a third alternative plan. That was—

Q. (Interposing) Did you know on April 26, 1939, that the Commission was favorably disposed to the plan 2900 which was filed in May, 1939? A. No, I certainly did not.

Q. At that conference the possibility of purchasing preferred stock by the corporation was referred to, was it not? A. It was.

Q. And that was the conference at which Mr. Spencer expressed himself as thinking that the suggestion was terrible? A. That is true.

Q. Now two days later what happened? A. I see by this list that Chenery Corporation bought—

Q. (Interposing) I meant with respect to the plans. A. Oh, with respect to the plan. Very much to my surprise, Mr. Spencer called me on the telephone.

Q. And advised you in substance as you have testified heretofore? A. That is correct.

Q. Now have you caused an investigation to be made as to the instructions which were given with respect to the purchase of the 84 shares of preferred stock on May 2, 1939? A. I have.

Q. Will you state what those instructions were? A. On April 26, 1939, two days before this, the corporation wrote a letter to Gilbert J. Postley.

Q. By "the corporation" you mean Chenery Corporation? A. The Chenery Corporation—which stated: "This will authorize you to sell for our account 250 shares of Alabama Water Service \$6 preferred stock, and to purchase with the funds from this sale Federal Water Service Corporation preferred stock on the basis of about four shares of Federal for one share of Alabama. Yours very truly, Chenery Corporation, Jacqueline Sanford, assistant secretary."

Q. And the 84 shares that were purchased were in pursuance of those instructions? A. Pursuance of those instructions.

Q. Now the next plan was filed on May 11, 1939, was it not? A. Yes.

Q. And on May 19, 1939, Chenery Corporation purchased 244 shares of preferred stock? A. That is right.

Q. Have you a record showing when publicity was given to that, to the filing of that plan? A. I have here Securities and Exchange Commission Holding Company Act Release No. 1536, dated May 16, 1939, covering the details of the plan.

Q. Chenery Corporation made purchases June 6, 1939, and June 29, 1939? A. That is true.

Q. And the status of the plan was that it was pending before the Commission at that time. A. That is true.

Q. The Havender decision in the Chancery Court of Delaware came down in the early part of June, 1939, did it

not? A. That is my recollection. I haven't the definite date before me.

Q. I show you a memorandum of a conference held with the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission on June 20, 1939, and ask you if that refreshes your recollection as to whether the decision in the Havender case in the Chancery Court had come down before that date. A. It had come down before June 20.

Q. I show you a memorandum of a conference in the office of the SEC on June 28, 1939, and ask you if that refreshes your recollection as to the status of plans at that time. A. It does.

Q. And what was the status at that time? A. The Havender decision had made the plan filed inapplicable, and the Commission staff was discussing with us filing under 11(e), isn't it?

Q. That was the first suggestion that you had received for reorganization of Federal Water Service Corporation under the Holding Company Act in the manner now permitted by Delaware corporation law? A. That is true. I

modify that this way: that a day or two prior to 2903 this, suggestion had been made by telephone, but this was the first meeting of which I have a record at which we discussed it down here.

Q. Then on June 29, 1939, the status of the situation was that the plan before the Commission had been interfered with by the decision of the Delaware Court in the Havender case and a suggestion had been made by the staff of the SEC for reorganization under Section 11(e)? A. That is true.

Q. And state whether or not it looked as if you were about as far away from a plan as ever. A. It did. It did so look. The opinion of our counsel was that the plan under 11(e) was in conflict with Delaware law, and his advice to us was not to file such a plan.

Q. Now was that the status of the plan in July, 1939? A. That was the status—

Q. (Interposing) I am not overlooking the fact that

there were various conferences with the SEC during that period—— A. Yes.

Q. (Continuing)—but was anything conclusive reached?
A. We had no thought of being able to agree with the SEC on the plan at that time. We seemed very far apart.

Q. But during that period you were attempting
2904 to work something out? A. We were attempting earnestly to work something out.

Q. Along the lines of the common stock plan? A. That is true.

Q. Either under 11(e) or some other procedure? A. That is true.

Q. And was that the situation generally in August, 1939?
A. August, 1939, we reinstated the capital reduction plan, because we could not agree with the staff of the Commission on the filing under 11(e) plan, and because they insisted on our going to hearing on plans which were then pending, so their dockets could be closed.

Q. And you had a hearing on the capital reduction plan on August 29 and August 30, 1939? A. Yes. We had no reason to believe that the Commission would—

Q. (Interposing) Approve the plan? A. (Continuing)—approve the plan.

Q. But publicity had been given to the capital reduction plan through notice of hearing, had it not? A. Well, this was merely a reinstatement of the capital reduction plan which had been filed the year before, and publicity had been given at that time, about a month after the plan had been originally filed with the Commission.

Q. Now was the situation approximately the same
2905 in September, 1939? A. Yes.

Q. And November, 1939? A. Yes.

Q. And in January, 1940, on January 3, 1940? A. Up until the reversal of the Havender case in January, 1940.

Mr. Hubbard: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Q. Mr. Chenery, there appears on Exhibit 33 that Chenery Corporation made a purchase of 2700 shares of Federal Water Service preferred stock in exchange for \$100,000 par value of Federal Water debentures. You have heard Mr. Ingalls' testimony this morning with respect to that transaction? A. Yes.

Q. Will you state the circumstances of that transaction?

A. My recollection of it doesn't differ in any substantial particular from Mr. Ingalls'.

Ingalls & Snyder had acquired a large block of preferred stock, some in their own hands, some in the hands of their clients. Postley had a substantial block of preferred stock, some in his own hands and some in the hands of his clients. The suggestion had been made that that block might be used as a basis of control and sold to some group who might desire control and that it might be a profitable thing
2906 to the holders of that stock if they so did.

They asked what we thought about it, and I expressed the opinion that it was their own stock, they bought it and paid for it and could do as they pleased, but if they asked me whether I would consider it a friendly thing to attempt to go out and sell control of the company that I wouldn't regard it as a friendly action.

Well, they said our position was very weak and that we ought to have more stock, which I agreed. We discussed the purchase with them—or the exchange, rather, of a hundred thousand Federal debentures for this stock.

I thought the market was pretty jittery and would get more so and that they wouldn't want to hold very large blocks of stock for which there was no market, wouldn't want to be tied up with it, especially with Italy heading for war, and that it was to the advantage of our group to buy this stock, buy it not for quick profits, because that was never inherent in the purchase at any time—no one who wanted quick profits would tie up large sums of money in Federal Water Service preferred stock, especially if he was

an officer and director and would be prohibited from getting out in a six-months' period. The purchase obviously had to be to strengthen the position.

I think on one jittery day I suggested to Mr. Erskine that he tell them to exchange the debentures for 3000 2907 shares, and they thought that they would exchange for 2500 shares, and conversations jockeyed back and forth. Each time the market would go up a little bit, they would go down a few shares and each time it would go down we would want more. And then finally the day Italy declared war nobody knew what was going to happen; we came to an agreement on 2700 shares of $6\frac{1}{2}$ equivalent preferred stock for the hundred thousand debentures.

Q. Now, Mr. Chenery, after these tentative findings and conclusions of law came down, request was made in behalf of the SEC, was it not, for opportunity to examine the broker's confirmation slips and all other memoranda with respect to the purchases by Chenery Corporation? A. It was.

Q. And representatives of the SEC came to New York to make the investigation? A. They did.

Q. Did you give them every facility? A. I think they will so testify.

Q. And you so testify? A. And I so testify.

Q. Just so the answer is complete: you gave them every facility to make any investigation they wanted to with respect to those purchases? A. I gave them—I did.

2908 Q. And how long were they in New York? A. I don't know. I saw them on two separate days. Whether they were there longer than that, I don't know.

Q. How many men? A. Three, I think.

Q. Now, Mr. Chenery, do you recall back in October, 1937, purchases of preferred stock at a market break? A. Very clearly.

Q. Did you consider there was any impropriety in making those purchases? A. I thought that we were rendering a real service to stockholders.

Q. In making the purchases? A. In making the purchases. The market dropped away. There were no bids. People had to sell the stock. Anybody who came in the market during that period with a bid for stock was rendering a service to the stockholder in that he was making a market which didn't then exist.

Q. Now after those purchases there was a hearing in Washington with respect to the plan filed on November 8, 1937? A. That is true.

Q. And the Class A stockholders were represented at that hearing by Mr. Levin? A. That is true.

Q. And Mr. Levin questioned you about those purchases? A. That is true.

Q. And undertook to criticize the purchases, is that correct. A. That is true.

Q. What did you think about that criticism? A. I thought it was unjust and unfair, and it rankled a great deal, and a plan had been filed, but it seemed to me that it was hitting a minor thing and giving it major importance. Plans are filed and are withdrawn, or something happens or doesn't happen, but the world goes on, wars are declared, markets break, earnings go up or earnings go down, and those are the things which affect your values, not the imminence of a plan.

I thought that this imminence—I knew a plan was to be filed in October, but I thought the filing of a plan in October, with a market break and values crashing all around, had nothing to do with the price of the stock, the price of the stock was reflecting the general break in the market, and that by purchasing at that time we were rendering a service to stockholders and we were also buying stock at a level which I considered cheap, but we were criticized.

Now I read this testimony again last night and it refreshed my recollection a good deal. I remember—

Q. (Interrupting) You mean you considered the testimony; you didn't read it, did you? A. I read the
2910 testimony last night.

Q. The testimony of the original hearing? A. 1937

hearing, yes. And it refreshed my recollection a good deal.

I think when that hearing was over and after that criticism had been made, which we considered unjust, we had a meeting in our offices, attended by our executives, and at that time we agreed that from then on we would not purchase stock or let stock be purchased at any time at which we could be criticized, even unfairly. That criticism had rankled enough so that we did not want to be in that position again.

The Examiner: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Q. What was the conference which you had at that office?

A. The conference was one of the executives of the corporation. I can't place the date of it; I was vague about it yesterday. Reading this testimony refreshed my recollection last night, and the effect of the conference was an understanding among all officers that no stock would be purchased at any time at which it could be said, fairly or unfairly, that we had more information than the general public.

Q. I think you testified yesterday that the details of these purchases were not handled by you. A. They were
2911 not handled by me, and I had no knowledge of the timing of the purchases.

Mr. Hubbard: I have no further questions.

Re-Cross Examination

By Mr. Baldy:

Q. Mr. Chenery, that conference to which you refer, at which you determined a policy to avoid purchases which might be criticized, what were the criteria that you determined upon by which you would judge whether a purchase was open to criticism or not? A. Whether we had information not generally available which would or could substantially affect the market price of the stock.

Q. What do you mean by "generally available"? You

mean if somebody came down, if it was a matter of public record in the files of the SEC, then you were free to purchase? A. If it was a matter of public record in the files of the SEC and if there had been public announcement.

Q. And if there had been a public announcement? A. If there had been a public announcement, yes.

Q. Then you felt that it was entirely proper under those circumstances for you to avail yourself of information which had been given that degree of publicity? A. Yes, because that same information was available to anybody else who wanted it.

* * * * *

Testimony of Howard M. Erskine, July 23, 1940.

2916 Q. Mr. Erskine, you are an officer of Federal Water Service Corporation? A. I am.

2917 Q. What position do you hold? A. My particular duties are that relating to securities of the corporation itself, under the various subsidiary companies, the financing of all of the subsidiary companies, and in general the bonds and stocks of all subsidiary companies—that is, anything to do with refunding and refinancing is all in my department.

Q. You are vice-president of the company, are you not? A. Yes, sir.

Q. And when did you become vice-president of Federal Water Service Corporation? A. I think in the spring of 1939.

Q. You are a director of Federal Water Service Corporation? A. I am now—pardon me: you said officer or director?

Q. I said vice-president. A. I became vice-president January 1, 1937. I am sorry.

Q. When did you become a director? A. I think in the spring of 1939.

Q. Now, Mr. Erskine, as part of your duties do you keep in touch with market conditions of Federal Water Service Corporation preferred stock and stocks of the subsidiaries, bonds of the corporation, and bonds of the subsidiaries?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Will you state the number of dealers, in your 2918 judgment, who are interested in Federal Water Service Corporation stock? A. Well, I can only answer that very generally. I would say that from three or four or five in an inactive market to probably fifty in an active market. It would fluctuate, the number of dealers interested in the trading of those stocks would fluctuate with the activity in the market.

Q. What do these dealers do in connection with purchases and sales of Federal Water Service Corporation preferred stock? A. Well, the Federal Water being an unlisted security, it is included in a list called the National Quotation Sheets, which list all of the securities of corporations where they are not listed on the New York Stock Exchange or on the New York Curb, and those are distributed very widely, I understand, throughout the whole country.

In addition to that, the National Association of Security Dealers I believe give to the various newspapers throughout the country quotations on over-the-counter securities, and among those Federal Water Service preferred stocks are invariably quoted.

Q. During the period from November 8, 1937, down to date, in your judgment was there plenty of preferred stock available to anyone who wanted to buy it? A. Yes, sir.

2919 Q. At the present time about how long do you think it would take to acquire 10,000 shares of Federal Water Service Corporation preferred stock at about the market price? A. It is a very difficult guess. I would guess from three to six months, but that would be governed by market conditions and many, many things.

Q. Now you from time to time were requested by the

Chenery Corporation and other officers of Federal Water Service Corporation and its subsidiary companies to take some action with respect to purchases of preferred stock, were you not? A. That is true.

Q. And what did you do? A. Invariably, Mr. Hubbard—a typical example would be an officer or employee coming to me and asking what the market is on the stock. I would telephone or get for him the market on the stock, and he would indicate his desire to buy 10 shares or 50 shares or whatever it happened to be, and I would say, "That stock can be obtained from such-and-such a broker", and contacted the broker and the individual who wanted to buy the stock, and thereafter—

Q. (Interposing) Thereafter the negotiations were between the broker— A. (Interposing) Thereafter the confirmation, and so forth, would be between the broker and the individual.

2920 Q. How much time do you suppose this service, if we may call it such, took you in the course of a day? A. Oh, probably a couple of telephone calls, Mr. Hubbard—a very few minutes. I didn't devote any time to it particularly.

Q. Now you have heard Mr. Ingalls testify with respect to his almost daily calls to you. What was the nature of those telephone calls? A. Mainly to give me various quotations. I have an early morning, as soon as the market opens, several brokers who call me, probably four or five, who will call me on quotations on various securities as applied to the Federal Water Service System. We are always interested in where our bonds of subsidiary companies, our Federal bonds, our stocks of subsidiary companies are selling; and I receive those quotations, jot it on a piece of paper on my desk.

That is the prime motive for the conversations. There might be a few seconds of general conversation—sometimes, in the case of Mr. Ingalls, a few questions whether there

is anything new in the situation, the Federal situation, and we have general conversation—

Q. Is the contact which you have with Mr. Ingalls in this regard any different from that with a number of other brokers? A. Oh, no. No, no.

2921 Q. How many houses do you suppose you have such connections with? Is it practically all of those who are actively engaged in making a market for Federal Water Service Corporation preferred stock. A. Yes, sir. The calls from dealers will probably fluctuate with the market activity, or with any publicity that is given earnings of the various subsidiary companies, or publicity as to the plan, if you will.

Q. Is it general practice in New York City for banks and brokerage houses and investment companies to call you up and ask you questions about the company? A. Yes; not only New York City, but out of town, also.

Q. Can you give us a typical example of the way that thing works? A. Well, a typical example would be that a firm in Portland, Maine, will call and say, "I have an inquiry from a customer who owns some—or wants to buy some New York Water preferred stock. Is there anything new in that situation, or anything that I can tell him?"

I say—well, if there is, I will probably tell him; if there isn't, I probably won't, if there is nothing new in the situation. If earnings have been published and if he hasn't the latest earnings, I will send them to him.

Q. Have you ever suppressed any information from any stockholder or investment house or broker or any-
2922 body who asked you for information? A. Certainly not, knowingly.

Q. You endeavor to give him as accurate a picture of the situation as you know? A. I usually tell him what I know, Mr. Hubbard, entering no opinion one way or the other on the purchase or sale of securities.

Q. Well, do you always do it?

The Witness: Will you read my last answer?

(The answer was read by the reporter.)

A. Always tell him—I correct that to “always”.

Q. You don’t know of any time when you had information and you were asked about it that you didn’t give it, do you? A. No, sir.

Q. It is a policy of the company, and has been since you have been connected with it— A. (Interposing) Yes, sir.

Q. (Continuing) —to give absolutely all information which the officers and directors have to an inquiring person? A. That is correct.

Q. Now, Mr. Erskine, do you recall a conversation as to the officers and directors purchasing preferred stock at times when they might have information which was not known to other people with respect to plans or other circumstances? A. Yes, sir.

2923 Q. What was said at that conference? A. The first conference was held, as has been testified, after the hearing of 1937, in which the purchases by officers was criticized, and we simply decided that we would not be subject to criticism and that we would not purchase securities when the public did not have full—the same information that we had regarding the plan or any other situation.

Q. And there was another conference, was there, at some subsequent time? A. Yes, sir. I have a memorandum of another conference held in January, 1939, which memorandum shows that such conference was held with Mr. Chenery, Mr. Culin, and Mr. McHenry and myself, regarding the purchase of preferred stock at that particular time, and it was decided at that time that we should continue to follow our policy of not purchasing stock so long as the public did not have the same information that we did, and at that particular conference there was a—the proposition under discussion was released, I find, on February 15, in the Wall Street Journal; that was the green light, was February 15, after the publicity was in the Wall Street Journal.

Q. According to Exhibit No. 33, Mr. Erskine, you pur-

chased 50 shares of Federal Water Service Corporation preferred stock on September 7, 1938, and 25 shares 2924 on September 27, 1938. A. That is correct.

Q. Do you know of any impropriety in connection with that purchase? A. I felt no such impropriety, no, sir.

Q. Why did you make the purchase? A. Briefly, I thought the stock was cheap, and I was interested in being a member of the group who owned the stock in order that we should all have a continuing voice in the management of the business.

Q. Have you made a comparison between the prices of Federal Water Service Corporation preferred stock as quoted in the market and the Dow-Jones averages? A. I did.

Q. What did that comparison show. A. Comparison shows me that the price of the Federal preferred stock followed very closely the Dow-Jones averages up until December, January—December, 1939—January, 1940.

The Examiner: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

The Witness: They are called Dow-Jones averages. Whether they are only industrial averages or not, I don't know. They are contained in a chart published by the Institute of Applied Econometrics, of New York City. And also in this chart, I might add, there is another line 2925 entitled "Major Business Trend", which is a scientific curve of the trend of business as it is and as it has been over a period of years, and in December, 1939—January, 1940, it appears that the price of the Federal stock went against the market. It went up and the market stayed steady until May, but during that period all utility stocks and bonds were very strong—it was a utility market, in other words, when all utilities went against the market, so that Federal Water Service in that instance followed closely all utilities.

Q. What conclusion do you draw from that comparison?

A. I conclude that, first, that the purchase of preferred stock by the officers, directors, and employees of the corporation had no effect whatever upon the market. It leads me to the conclusion that there was a slight flurry in the market—saw-toothed, in other words, in the chart.

* * * * *

2950 Mr. Hubbard: It is hereby stipulated between counsel for the applicant and counsel for the Commission that there be incorporated in the record the Commission's File No. 39-1-1, being reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on form U17-1 and U17-2, by officers and directors, Federal Water Service Corporation and Utility Operators Company.

It is not, however, necessary to copy this file into the transcript of the record.

APPLICANT'S EXHIBIT NO. 33 (DOCKET NO. 81).

PREFERRED STOCK OF FEDERAL WATER SERVICE CORPORATION
PURCHASED BY OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS OF
FEDERAL AND UTILITY OPERATORS COMPANY
FROM NOVEMBER 8, 1937 TO JUNE 30, 1940

	Div. Rate <u>Paid</u>	Date of <u>Purchase</u>	Number of <u>Shares</u>	Price per Share	Total Cost
J. H. Greene	\$6.00	2/1/39	45	\$21.25	\$ 956.25
W. R. Edwards	6.00	10/4/38	100	19.25	1,925.00
G. H. Chenery*	6.50	9/13/38	25	19.75	493.75
	6.50	9/26/38	25	19.00	475.00
	6.50	10/3/38	25	18.50	462.50
	6.00	10/4/38	25	18.75	468.75
	6.50	11/9/38	25	23.50	587.50
	6.00	11/18/38	25	21.25	531.25
	6.00	11/23/38	10	19.50	195.00
	6.00	11/29/38	20	19.50	390.00
	6.50	12/5/38	25	19.50	487.50
	6.50	5/3/39	25	25.25	631.25
	6.00	1/9/40	70	34.00	2,380.00
			<u>300</u>	Av. 23.475	<u>7,102.50</u>
H. G. Calder	6.50	9/12/38	40	21.50	860.00
O. G. Herren	6.50	9/12/38	10	21.50	215.00
G. P. Rathar	6.50	9/7/38	200	21.50	4,300.00
	6.50	11/16/38	100	21.50	2,150.00
	6.00	1/25/40	100	34.00	3,400.00
	6.50	5/14/40	10	36.50	365.00
	6.00	5/14/40	10	35.50	355.00
			<u>420</u>	Av. 25.167	<u>10,570.00</u>
R. H. Neilson	6.00	10/26/38	10	22.25	222.50
Wm. E. Matthews, III	6.50	9/8/38	65	21.50	1,397.50
H. T. Ellwood	6.50	9/30/38	38	18.50	703.00
	6.50	10/3/38	12	19.75	237.00
	6.00	1/3/40	30	34.00	1,020.00
			<u>80</u>	Av. 24.50	<u>1,960.00</u>
Watson Bark	6.50	9/1/38	5	21.50	107.50
	6.00	10/24/38	5	22.25	111.25
	6.50	11/21/38	5	20.50	102.50
	6.50	4/14/39	15	21.75	326.25
	6.50	4/14/39	10	21.25	212.50
	6.50	4/24/39	25	21.50	537.50
	6.50	5/2/39	25	23.25	581.25
	6.50	5/2/39	25	23.50	587.50
	6.50	9/19/39	50	21.50	1,075.00
	7.00	10/3/39	60	27.00	1,620.00
			<u>225</u>	Av. 23.38-1/3	<u>5,261.25</u>
E. C. Deal	6.00	10/4/38	10	19.25	192.50
	6.00	11/23/38	25	20.00	500.00
	6.00	2/6/40	50	35.25	1,762.50
			<u>85</u>	Av. 28.888	<u>2,455.00</u>

*Mr. G. H. Chenery also has a beneficial interest in the securities owned by Chenery Corporation.

	<u>Div. Rate Pfd.</u>	<u>Date of Purchase</u>	<u>Number of Shares</u>	<u>Price per Share</u>	<u>Total Cost</u>
H. M. Erskine	\$6.50	9/7/38	50	\$21.50	\$ 1,075.00
	6.00	9/27/38	25	16.50	412.50
			75	Av. 19.833	1,487.50
F. T. Tansill	6.50	9/1/38	50	21.50	1,075.00
	6.50	11/28/39	15	26.00	390.00
			65	Av. 22.538	1,465.00
Loren Fitch	6.00	11/23/38	1	20.00	20.00
F. R. Harris	6.00	1/31/39	40	22.25	890.00
	6.00	2/1/39	90	22.75	2,047.50
	6.50	1/31/39	18	23.25	418.50
	6.50	2/1/39	155	23.75	3,681.25
	7.00	1/31/39	25	24.75	618.75
	7.00	2/1/39	15	25.25	378.75
			343	Av. 23.425	8,034.75
W. A. Gulin	6.50	9/1/38	50	21.50	1,075.00
	6.50	11/9/38	10	23.50	235.00
	6.50	11/28/39	50	26.00	1,300.00
	6.00	1/4/40	50	33.00	1,650.00
			160	Av. 26.625	4,260.00
H. D. McHenry	6.50	9/7/38	50	21.50	1,075.00
	6.50	11/6/39	25	25.00	625.00
	7.00	1/10/40	15	36.50	547.50
			90	Av. 24.972	2,247.50
G. van den Berg, Jr.	6.50	12/13/37	203	23.87 1/2	4,846.63
	6.50	12/15/37	45	21.25	956.25
	6.50	12/17/37	120	22.64-7/12	2,717.50
	6.50	12/28/37	20	21.50	430.00
	6.50	1/5/38	25	21.50	537.50
	6.50	3/2/38	50	23.00	1,150.00
	6.50	3/3/38	33	23.00	759.00
	6.50	3/4/38	17	23.00	391.00
	7.00	5/10/38	28	21.25	595.00
	7.00	5/12/38	87	22.75	1,979.25
	6.50	5/10/38	47	20.00	940.00
	6.50	7/20/38	20	20.25	405.00
	6.50	7/25/38	40	20.25	810.00
	6.50	10/25/38	100	22.75	2,275.00
	6.50	10/28/38	250	22.90	5,725.00
	6.50	10/31/38	3	20.75	62.25
	7.00	11/3/38	25	25.25	631.25
	6.50	11/3/38	100	24.00	2,400.00
	6.50	11/9/38	100	23.50	2,350.00
	6.50	11/21/38	75	20.25	1,518.75
	6.50	11/30/38	50	19.75	987.50
	6.50	12/1/38	43	19.697-2/3	847.00
	6.50	12/5/38	94	19.6303	1,845.25
	6.50	11/28/39	100	26.00	2,600.00
			1,675	Av. 22.543	37,759.13

	Div. Rate Pfd.	Date of Purchase	Number of Shares	Price per Share	Total Cost
Owned by Chenery Corporation, a corporation wholly owned by C. T. Chenery and members of his family (in- cluding Mr. C. M. Chenery)	\$6.00	4/29/38	30	\$16.50	\$ 495.00
	7.00	4/29/38	30	19.00	570.00
	7.00	4/29/38	40	18.50	740.00
	7.00	5/3/38	25	18.00	450.00
	7.00	5/3/38	25	18.00	450.00
	6.00	5/6/38	50	18.50	925.00
	6.50	8/18/38	20	20.75	415.00
	6.50	8/18/38	10	20.75	207.50
	6.50	8/19/38	20	20.75	415.00
	6.50	8/20/38	13	20.75	269.75
	6.50	8/29/38	9	20.50	184.50
	6.00	9/1/38	188	20.00	3,760.00
	6.50	9/12/38	100	21.125	2,112.50
	6.50	9/15/38	50	20.50	1,025.00
	6.50	9/15/38	70	19.25	1,347.50
	6.50	9/23/38	170	19.00	3,230.00
	6.50	9/28/38	25	18.50	462.50
	6.50	9/30/38	35	19.00	665.00
	6.00	11/15/38	100	21.125	2,112.50
	6.50	11/16/38	100	21.00	2,100.00
	6.00	11/18/38	100	20.50	2,050.00
	6.00	11/21/38	75	20.50	1,537.50
	6.00	12/2/38	50	19.00	950.00
	6.50	12/6/38	25	21.75	543.75
	6.50	12/6/38	10	22.75	227.50
	6.50	3/20/39	450	23.00	10,350.00
	7.00	3/20/39	150	23.00	3,450.00
	6.50	5/2/39	84	21.1607	1,777.50
	6.50	5/19/39	244	24.3196	5,933.98
	6.50	6/6/39	84	23.988	2,015.00
	6.50	6/29/39	12	20.665	247.98
	6.50	6/29/39	120	20.665	2,479.80
	6.00	7/5/39	115	21.5174	2,474.50
	6.00	7/6/39	25	22.00	550.00
	6.50	7/6/39	25	22.25	556.25
	6.50	7/6/39	30	23.25	697.50
	6.00	7/21/39	40	24.75	990.00
	6.00	7/21/39	50	24.75	1,237.50
	6.00	7/21/39	20	24.75	495.00
	6.00	7/25/39	100	24.75	2,475.00
	6.00	7/25/39	67	25.00	1,675.00
	6.00	7/25/39	50	24.75	1,237.50
	6.50	7/25/39	75	25.25	1,893.75
	6.50	7/26/39	12	25.25	303.00
	6.00	7/26/39	33	24.50	808.50
	6.50	7/27/39	30	25.00	750.00
	6.50	7/29/39	15	24.25	363.75
	6.50	7/31/39	35	24.75	866.25
	6.00	8/1/39	80	24.25	1,940.00
	6.00	8/1/39	20	24.00	480.00
	6.00	8/1/39	25	24.50	612.50
	6.00	8/2/39	50	25.00	1,250.00
	6.00	8/2/39	10	24.75	247.50
	6.50	8/2/39	15	25.25	378.75
	6.50	8/3/39	6	26.50	159.00
	6.00	8/3/39	8	25.50	204.00
	6.00	8/3/39	16	25.75	412.00
	6.00	8/3/39	25	26.00	650.00
	6.00	8/7/39	200	25.50	5,100.00
	6.00	8/11/39	175	25.50	4,462.50

APPLICANT'S EXHIBIT NO. 36 (DOCKET NO. 84).

TRANSFERS OF FEDERAL PREFERRED DURING 1936 - 1940

	<u>1936</u>	<u>1937</u>	<u>1938</u>	<u>1939</u>	<u>6 mos. 1940</u>
\$6	55,946	33,755	17,755	31,138	20,685
\$6.50	54,345	36,505	18,171	27,818	15,596
\$7	11,068	7,365	3,961	5,875	3,083
\$4	<u>430</u>	<u>350</u>	<u>251</u>	<u>189</u>	<u>95</u>
Total transfers	121,789	77,975	40,138	65,020	39,459
Purchases by officers and directors of Federal and Utility Opera- tors Company					
	170	1,465	3,653	5,023	3,343
Traded by Gilbert J. Postley & Co.					
		5,820	14,468	28,458	22,529 (to 7/18/40)

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. EXHIBIT NO. 36

IN REPLY TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

DATE 6-23-40 BY Carl

RECEIVED REPORTER, INC. OFFICIAL REPORTERS

BY 75

**Exerpts from Findings and Opinion of Commission,
March 24, 1941.**

* * * * *

3933 Securities and Exchange Commission
 Washington

In the Matter of

FEDERAL WATER SERVICE CORPORATION
UTILITY OPERATORS COMPANY
FEDERAL WATER AND GAS CORPORATION

File Nos. 34- 9

34-41

70-28

(Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935)

Findings and Opinion of the Commission

* * * * *

3935 The applications and declarations¹ underlying
 this case have as their primary objective the reor-
 ganization of Federal Water Service Corporation
3936 (hereinafter called "Federal") pursuant to a plan
 of merger proposed by its management. The con-
 templated reorganization is to be effectuated by a merger
 of Utility Operators Company, the parent of Federal, and
 Federal Water and Gas Corporation, a wholly owned sub-
 subsidiary of Federal, into Federal.² Utility Operators Com-

¹ Federal Water Service Corporation has filed (File No. 34-9) an applica-
tion pursuant to Rule U-12E-4, for a report on a plan for its reorganization,
and a declaration pursuant to Rule U-12E-5, with respect to solicitation of
consents to this plan. Utility Operators Company has filed (File No. 34-41) a
similar application and declaration. Federal Water Service Corporation and
Utility Operators Company have jointly filed (File No. 70-28) a declaration
pursuant to Section 7 with respect to the alteration of rights of their security
holders and the issuance of new securities incident to the proposed merger.
Federal Water and Gas Corporation has filed (File No. 34-9) a declaration
pursuant to Section 7 with respect to alteration of rights of the holder of its
securities incident to the proposed merger. This declaration adopts the ap-
plication and declaration filed by Federal Water Service Corporation and
Utility Operators Company and asks that Federal Water and Gas Corporation
be made a party thereto.

² Federal Water Service Corporation, the surviving corporation, will change
its name to Federal Water and Gas Corporation (the name now borne by its
subsidiary).

pany and Federal are registered holding companies. All three corporations are organized under the laws of Delaware.

Utility Operators Company, the top company of what is commonly known as the Federal Water Service system, is solely a holding company. Its only assets are all of the outstanding shares of Federal's Class B common stock, 6,536 shares of the same company's preferred stock, \$3,000 principal amount of its debentures, and about \$600 worth of miscellaneous assets. Its only outstanding securities are shares of common stock, all owned by officers, directors, and present and former employees of Federal. The company owes no debt.

Federal Water and Gas Corporation has never actively engaged in any business, and its assets are unimportant. All of its outstanding securities, ten shares of common stock of the par value of \$100, are owned by Federal. Although not required to register under the Act, Federal Water and Gas Corporation is subject to it in certain respects as a subsidiary of a registered holding company.

Financial Condition of Federal Water Service Corporation

Federal is solely a holding company controlling many subsidiaries which operate water, gas, electric, and other properties in thirteen states and in one foreign country. The following is a table of its outstanding securities:³

³ Here, as throughout, unless otherwise stated, figures are as of December 31, 1940.

Type of Security	Amount
5½% Gold Debentures due 1954	\$5,222,000
Preferred stocks (stated values*)	
\$7.00 series, 15,296 shares	\$1,529,600
arrearages	990,416
\$6.50 series, 69,888 shares	6,699,282
arrearages	4,202,016
\$6.00 series, 71,706 shares	6,812,070
arrearages	3,979,683
\$4.00 series, 2,379 shares	148,688
arrearages	88,023
Total preferred stocks	24,449,778
Type of Security	Amount
Class A Stocks**, 568,775 shares	
(exclusive of 1,420 held in the treasury)	\$13,666,733
arrearages	10,617,133
	24,283,866
Class B stock, 542,450 shares	2,500,000
	\$56,455,644

3937 On the balance sheet of Federal Water Service Corporation of December 31, 1939, total assets are stated at \$29,915,729, but the investments owned by the corporation are carried at \$23,836,361, a figure which the management itself regards as excessive. There are in addition intangible assets which it is proposed to write off in the reorganization.

With total assets stated at an admittedly high figure, there is nevertheless a capital surplus deficit of \$3,848,865. In addition, there is a deficit in earned surplus account of \$3,865,070. These deficits, totalling \$7,713,935, have provided the primary incentive to reorganization, for so long as they impair the capital represented by stock having a preference on the distribution of assets, the payment of dividends on any class of stock will be illegal under Delaware law.⁴

* Involuntary liquidating value is \$100 per share plus accrued dividends for all classes of preferred except the \$4 series which has an involuntary liquidating value of \$62.50 per share plus accrued dividends. Voluntary liquidating value is \$110 per share plus accrued dividends for all classes of preferred except the \$4 series which has a voluntary liquidating preference of \$68.75 per share plus accrued dividends.

** In the event of liquidation the Class A stock is entitled to receive, subject to the prior rights of the preferred stock, \$50 per share plus accumulated dividends, and thereafter to share equally with the Class B stock in any remaining assets.

⁴ General Corporation Law of Delaware, Section 34 (1935).

There are other factors. The heavy arrearages on the preferred and Class A stocks and the revision in stated value of assets are two others that have already been adverted to. Finally, there are the requirements of Section 11 (b) (2) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.

Under this section, it is the duty of the Commission to require, among other things, that each registered holding company and its subsidiaries take such steps as the Commission shall find necessary to insure that their corporate structures do not unfairly or inequitably distribute voting power among security holders. No elaborate demonstration is necessary to establish that the distribution of voting power in Federal violates the statutory standard. Normally, the entire voting power of the company is vested in the Class B stock, but because of dividend arrearages on the preferred and Class A, these stocks have now acquired a majority of the voting rights. The 42.73% of total voting power which still rests in the hand of the B stockholders is clearly unfair and inequitable in view of the fact that the capital deficit entirely wipes out the book value of the Class B stock, and that it has no actual value whatsoever, as we shall show below.

It is also the duty of the Commission, under Section 11 (b) (2), to require each registered holding company to take steps to insure that its corporate structure does not unduly or unnecessarily complicate the structure of the holding company system. The deficits in both capital surplus and earned surplus accounts of Federal, its inability to pay dividends even on its stocks having prior rights, and its large arrearages, provide a combination of complexities which clearly falls within the scope of this section of the Act. For this reason as well as its existing distribution of voting power, Federal was confronted with the prospect of compulsory simplification under Section 11 (b) (2) unless it could succeed in thoroughly revamping its structure by some other permissible method.

3938 *Prior Attempts to Effectuate Reorganization*

The management has recognized the need for reorganization for several years. Even before Federal registered under the Act, discussion between its representatives and members of the Commission's staff had begun, and when Federal registered on November 8, 1937, it immediately filed a plan for reorganization under Section 7 of the Act. The plan now before us is the fourth to be filed by the company, the three previous plans all having been withdrawn, in each case after hearing had been held thereon before a Trial Examiner of the Commission. With respect to none of the earlier plans have there been findings and opinions of the Commission. The record indicates, however, that one of the principal obstacles to the earlier consummation of a reorganization was the issue of allocation of new securities to the Class B stockholders. Each of the plans prior to the present one provided for participation in the equity of the reorganized company by the Class B stockholders (either immediately or upon the exercise of purchase warrants for additional stock).

The present plan, the first to involve the merger of Utility Operators Company and Federal Water and Gas Corporation with Federal, was filed on March 30, 1940. The application states that the merger device was used in view of a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Delaware in *Havender v. Federal United Corporation*,⁵ which established the propriety under Delaware law of directly affecting accrued dividends on preferred stocks in a merger, in contrast to the position taken by the Delaware courts with respect to similar action by charter amendment.⁶

After due notice hearings were held on the applications and declarations herein before a trial examiner of the Commission.⁷ Tentative findings and opinion were prepared by

⁵ 11 A. 2d 331 (Del. 1940).

⁶ Cf. *Keller v. Wilson & Co.*, 190 A. 115 (Del. 1936); *Consolidated Film Industries, Inc. v. Johnson*, 197 Atl. 489 (Del. 1937).

⁷ William S. Fox and Louis Russo, representing themselves and other holders of Class A stock appeared and were heard. A brief was filed by counsel to Mr. Russo.

the Commission (in which Commissioner Healy did not participate) and distributed to the parties. Thereafter, counsel to Federal and counsel to the Commission filed briefs and were heard in oral argument before the Commission.

Outline of Present Plan

As already pointed out, Utility Operators Company and Federal Water and Gas Corporation are to be merged into Federal.⁸

The Proposed Participation by Present Holders of Securities

The debentures of Federal Water Service Corporation are to remain undisturbed by the plan except for a small change in amount.⁹ The present stockholders of Federal Water Service Corporation and the common stockholders of Utility Operators Company¹⁰ are to receive new common stock, which the declaration states will have a par value of \$12 per share, as indicated in the following table:

TABLE.

	Shares to be Converted	Rate	Shares Number	New Common Par Value (at \$12 per Share)	Per Cent
Federal Water Service Corporation:					
\$7.00 Preferred	14,355	7	100,485	\$1,205,820	9.50
\$6.50 Preferred	67,640	6½	439,660	5,275,920	41.54
\$6.00 Preferred	68,390	6	410,340	4,924,080	38.77
\$4.00 Preferred	2,348	4	9,392	112,704	.89
Total Preferred	152,733		959,877	\$11,518,524	90.70%
Class A	568,775	1/10	56,877	682,524	5.38
Utility Operators Company:					
Common	56,428	9/10 .7357*	41,514	498,168	3.92
			1,058,268	\$12,699,216	100.00%

⁸ Upon consummation of the merger, Federal Water Service Corporation is to change its name to Federal Water and Gas Corporation.

⁹ The face amount of debentures outstanding of the reorganized corporation will be \$5,259,000 instead of \$5,262,000. (These figures should be reduced by \$40,000 for debentures purchased in 1940). \$3,000 of debentures now owned by Utility Operators Company will be cancelled.

¹⁰ The ten outstanding shares of Federal Water and Gas common, all owned by Federal, are to be cancelled; so are the 1420 shares of its own Class A which Federal holds in its treasury; so, too, are all of the shares of Federal of all classes held by Utility Operators Company (including all of the Class B stock, entirely owned by Utility Operators Co.).

*This ratio is explained immediately below in the text.

None of the new common stock allocated to Utility Operators is allotted in recognition of its own stock or its ownership of all of Federal's Class B stock, which it is to surrender for cancellation. The allocation to Utility Operators of 3.92% of the new common stock is based almost¹¹ entirely upon its holdings of 6,536 shares of Federal preferred and the application of the same conversion rates, set forth in the above table, which were applied to other holdings of preferred. Hence, except for the 5.38% of new common allocated to the present holders of Class A stock, substantially all of the equity of the reorganized company will be given to the present preferred stockholders.

The declaration states that the new stock is to have a par value of \$12 per share, and that 1,500,000 shares are to be authorized, of which it is contemplated that 1,058,268 will be issued, as shown in the above table.¹²

3940 Under the plan the intangible items, "commission on capital stock" and "organization expense", which are presently carried on the books at \$1,444,221.16 and \$424,732.50 respectively, will be written off the books, and the assets of the surviving corporation will be recorded on the books at their reasonable value as determined by the board as of the date of the merger,¹³ and such capital surplus as the recorded value of assets permits will be re-

¹¹ 300 shares of the new common represent consideration for the \$3,000 in debentures of Federal, which are being cancelled, and \$600 of other assets.

¹² Section 61 of the General Corporation Law of Delaware provides that a stockholder who objects to a merger and complies with applicable statutory provisions may receive the value of his stock from the surviving corporation. To the extent that this privilege is exercised in the present case the number of shares of new common to be issued will be reduced. If holders of 3,000 or more shares of Federal Preferred, irrespective of series, object to the merger, the boards of directors of both Federal and Utility Operators Company reserve the right to abandon the proposed plan.

¹³ A write-down of approximately six million dollars in the value of investments is contemplated.

corded. The following table shows the balance sheets of Federal Water Service Corporation and Utility Operators Company as at December 31, 1939, and a pro forma balance sheet of the surviving company as of the same date,¹⁴ giving effect to the merger:

	Federal Water Service Corporation	Utility Operators Company	Pro Forma * Federal Water and Gas Corporation (surviving company)
Investments	\$24,406,757	\$ 187	\$17,607,808
Less—Reserve	570,396		
Net investments	\$23,836,361	\$ 187	\$17,607,808
Investment in Federal Special Funds	 262,238	690,320	 262,238
Current assets:			
Cash	3,660,437	1,012	3,661,449
Other	258,023	28	258,022
Commission on capital stock	1,444,221		
Organization expense	424,733		
Office furniture and fixtures	29,716		29,716
Total assets	<u>\$29,915,729</u>	<u>\$691,547</u>	<u>\$21,819,233</u>
Liabilities			
5½% unsecured debentures	\$ 5,262,000		\$ 5,259,000
Current liabilities	502,967	428	503,367
Miscellaneous reserves	508,323		508,323
Capital stock:			
Preferred	15,189,640		
Class A	13,666,734		
Class B	2,500,000		
Common		282,145	12,699,216
Capital surplus	(3,848,865)	409,967	2,849,327
Earned surplus	(3,865,070)	(993)	
Total liabilities	<u>\$29,915,729</u>	<u>\$691,547</u>	<u>\$21,819,233</u>

3941 The plan also provides that the present directors of Federal Water Service Corporation shall be the first directors of the surviving corporation, and that the election of new directors shall be "staggered" as follows: of the seven present directors, two shall remain in office

¹⁴ The record is not complete enough to present this comparison as of December 31, 1940.

* Assuming no holders of stock now outstanding avail themselves of statutory provisions entitling objecting stockholders to require purchase of their shares.

until the next annual meeting of stockholders following the effective date of the merger agreement; two others, for one year thereafter; and the remaining three, for two years thereafter. The present board was chosen by the Class B stockholders. Under the proposed arrangement, the holders of new common will not be able to elect a majority of directors for approximately two years, control in the meantime continuing in the remaining members of the present board.

* * * * *

Preferred Stock Purchases by Directors and Officers.

3952 A further question as to the fairness of the plan arises with respect to the participation to be accorded to preferred stock held by members of the management of Federal. The plan of reorganization herein considered, like previous plans filed with us over the past several years, was formulated by the management of Federal, and discussions concerning the reorganization of this corporation have taken place between the management and the staff of the Commission over the past several years. C. T. Chenery, president of the debtor, and a corporation owned by his family purchased 8,618 shares of Federal preferred stock between November 8, 1937, when the first plan was filed with us, and June 30, 1940. These purchases were made on the over-the-counter market through brokers at prices ranging from 16½ to 34 for the \$6.00 preferred. Very few of the shares were bought at prices higher than 30 and a substantial portion of them was purchased at prices in the low 20's. Other officers and directors of Federal and of Utility Operators Company acquired 3,789 shares during the same period at prices at the same general level.

The following table shows the purchases made between November 8, 1937, and June 30, 1940, the amount paid and the book value of the new common shares for which this preferred would be exchanged:

						No. of Common Shares	Book Value of the Common to be Received In Merger
C. T. Chenery	\$7.00	\$6.50	\$6.00	Total	Cost		
Other Officers	1,211	3,547	3,860	8,618	\$240,148.01	54,692	\$803,972.40
and Directors							
of Federal							
Utility Opera-							
tors Company	255	2,793	741	3,789	88,198.88	24,385	358,459.50
	<u>1,466</u>	<u>6,340</u>	<u>4,601</u>	<u>12,407</u>	<u>\$328,346.89</u>	<u>79,077</u>	<u>\$1,162,431.90</u>

Under the proposed plan, the preferred shares so purchased would participate in the plan on a parity with all other shares of preferred stock of the same series. We have come to the conclusion that this feature of the plan cannot be approved.

In reaching this conclusion, we have not failed to take into consideration the fact that after individual stockholders had made complaint of the management's purchases, the officers and directors agreed upon a policy of deferring individual purchases while particular plans were in contemplation but had not been made public. An honest effort

appears to have been made to adhere to this policy.

3953 But we do not think that this fact was enough.

Corporate directors are fiduciaries—their powers are powers in trust. *Pepper v. Litton*, 308 U. S. 295. We hold further that in the process of formulation of a "voluntary" reorganization plan, the management of a corporation occupies a fiduciary position toward all of the security holders to be affected, and that it is subjected to the same standards as other fiduciaries with respect to dealing with the property which is the subject matter of the trust. Of course, the management does not hold title to the securities, but its duty of fair dealing with the persons for whom it acts is as great as if that of a trustee who holds title to a *res* for the benefit of his beneficiaries.³⁶ A trustee

³⁶ *In re Standard Commercial Tobacco Co., Inc.*, 34 F. Supp. 304, 310 (S. D. N. Y. 1940) and cases cited. Compare Berle and Means, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property* 1 (1932) c. VII, *Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust*. Compare also sec. 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and sec. 17 (b) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, which recognize the fiduciary character of the management—officers, directors, and principal stockholders—and its opportunity to use inside information, by providing that any profits made on purchases and sales, or sales and purchase, within six months should inure to the benefit of the corporation.

may not "become the purchaser of the property which he represents or any portion of it though he has done so for a fair price without fraud at a public sale." *Michoud v. Girod*, 4 How. 502, 557 (1846). Accordingly, honesty, full disclosure and purchase at a fair price do not take the case outside the rule. The need for an inflexible rule was recognized in *Michoud v. Girod, supra*:

"Is it not better that the cause of the evil shall be prohibited, than that courts of equity shall be relied upon to apply the remedy in particular cases, by inquiring into all the circumstances of a case, whether there has or has not been fraud in fact?" (At 557.)

Or, as the Supreme Court later stated in *Magruder v. Drury*, 235 U. S. 106, 119, 120 (1914):

"The rule in such cases springs from his duty to protect the interests of the estate, and not to permit his personal interest to in any wise conflict with his duty in that respect. The intention is to provide against any possible selfish interest exercising an influence which can interfere with the faithful discharge of the duty which is owing in a fiduciary capacity. . . . It makes no difference that the estate was not a loser in the transaction or that the commission was no more than the services were reasonably worth."

In *Meinhard v. Salmon*, 249 N. Y. 458, Chief Justice Cardozo said:

"Many forms of conduct, permissible in a work-a-day world for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morale of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this, there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the 'disintegrating erosion' of particular exceptions. Only thus, has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher

than that trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by any judgment of this court."

These principles have been applied to persons whose fiduciary position arises from the fact that they act for others in the formulation of a reorganization plan. The principles have been codified in Section 249 of the Bankruptcy Act, but the application of the principle does not depend on the existence of a statute. It depends on the broad equitable principles enunciated in the cases heretofore cited. See *Woods v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago*, Supreme Court of the United States, decided February 3, 1941. Indeed, Section 249 of the Bankruptcy Act is merely declaratory of the position taken by the federal courts under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act as applied to dealings by reorganization committee members in the securities of the corporation being reorganized. See *In the Matter of Mountain States Power Co.* (C. C. A. 3d, March 5, 1941), *aff'g.* 35 Supp. 307 (D. Del. 1940); *Otis & Co. v. Insurance Bldg. Corp.*, 110 F. (2d) 333 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940); *In re Paramount Publix Corporation*, 12 F. Supp. 823, 828 (S. D. N. Y. 1935), cited with approval in *American United Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park Florida*, 61 S. Ct. 157, decided Nov. 25, 1940; *In re Republic Gas Corporation*, 35 F. Supp. 300 (S. D. N. Y. 1936). The result of these cases does not depend on dishonesty or unfair dealing, for it was conceded in the *Otis* case, *supra*, that the brokerage house which acted as committee had lost money in the transactions, that it had acted in good faith, that the sellers of the bonds knew that the house was representing the bondholders, and that it had entered into the transactions "for the accommodation" of its customers. Similar facts appeared in the *Mountain States* case. In the *Republic* case Judge Caffey said:

"Because of the inconsistent positions which are an unavoidable incident, it is a fraud in law for a trustee to purchase property which is the subject matter of his trust and the making of such a purchase is misconduct."

* * * * *

“There is no blinking the fact that the ground on which the court denounces as a fraud the purchase by a trustee of trust property is that it inevitably brings about conflict of interest between himself personally and the beneficiaries of his trust; or at least that it incites a motive, *or affords opportunity for a motive*, on the part of the trustee to take advantage of his superior knowledge acquired in his trust capacity, which may induce him to conceal his information from the beneficiaries or not to employ it exclusively for their benefit, while they are relying on him scrupulously to devote himself to the furtherance of their welfare (*Michoud v. Girod, supra*, pp. 554, 555, 559).”

* * * * *

“I believe that only by rigid enforcement of that duty can the continuance or reinstatement of old evils, which were of general knowledge, be prevented or, if prevention prove impossible, be minimized.”

* * * * *

“... Furthermore, if, as I deem it established, the misconduct amounts to a fraud in law, I conceive of no good reason why the penalty for the fraud should not be denial of any compensation whatever for those services. Indeed, I feel that the only available device for promoting, if not assuring, justice to depositing bondholders in the management of their affairs, and thus of restoring or attempting to restore faith in deposit agreements, is strict application to committeemen of the ancient equity rules governing the conduct of trustees, including deprivation of compensation where there is a departure from those rules.”

* * * * *

“It may well be that there are some who, without veering away from the utmost faithfulness, could safely be left free to trade in bonds which are the subject matter of their trusts. Nevertheless, the danger of the contrary is so manifest, the bondholders themselves generally are so helpless and the hurt to them is or may be so serious that, in order to protect against the evil, or the possibility of the evil,

from which bondholders have suffered so grievously in the past, and which Congress intended to bring to an end, the court should inflexibly enforce the rule that members of committees shall not trade in the securities with respect to which they are acting or undertaking to act in behalf of the owners."

We think that the authorities heretofore cited are fully applicable to the position of the management of a corporation trading in the securities which will be affected by a voluntary plan of reorganization upon which the management is working. We, no more than a court of equity, should undertake to decide case by case whether the management's trading has in fact operated to the detriment of the persons whom it represents. As the Supreme Court said in *Woods v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago*, *supra*:

"... It is no answer to say that fraud or unfairness were not shown to have resulted. Cf. *Jackson v. Smith*, 254 U. S. 586, 589. The principle enunciated by Chief Justice Taft in a case involving a contract to split fees in violation of the bankruptcy rules, is apposite here: 'What is struck at in the refusal to enforce contracts of this kind is not only actual evil result but this tendency to evil in other cases.' *Weil v. Neary*, 278 U. S. 160, 173 . . ."

The remedies to be applied in particular cases may be chosen with utmost flexibility. In the *Otis & Company*, *Mountain States Power*, *Paramount Publix and Republic Gas* cases, *supra*, the questions arose on the applications of fiduciaries for fees and in all cases the fees were disallowed.³⁷ In this case no application for fees is presented to

³⁷ This treatment demonstrates that no attempt is made to apportion the remedy to the injury done, but the standard of fiduciary conduct is enforced by denying all opportunity for profit to fiduciaries who trade in the securities with respect to which they have the fiduciary duty. Compare section 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and section 17 (b) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, which, for the purpose of preventing the unfair use of inside information by directors, officers, and other insiders, provide that any profit made by them on purchases and sales, or sales and purchases, within six months, shall inure to the benefit of the corporation, regardless of the existence of overreaching or the amount thereof in the particular case.

us, but other remedies may be appropriate. As Mr. Justice Douglas said in *American United Mutual Life Insurance Company v. City of Avon Park, Florida* (61 S. Ct. 157), decided November 25, 1940:

3956 "... Where such investigation discloses the existence of unfair dealing, a breach of fiduciary obligations, profiting from a trust, special benefits for the reorganizers, or the need for protection of investors against an inside few or one class of investors from the encroachment of another, the court has ample power to adjust the remedy to meet the need. The requirement of full, *unequivocal disclosure; the limitation of the vote to the amount paid for the securities* (*In re McEwen's Laundry, Inc.*, 90 F. (2d) 872); the separate classification of claimants (see *First National Bank v. Poland Union*, 109 F. (2d) 54, 55); the complete subordination of some claims (*Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co.*, 306 U. S. 307; *Pepper v. Litton, supra*), indicate the range and type of the power which a court of bankruptcy may exercise in these proceedings. That power is ample for the exigencies of varying situations. *It is not dependent on express statutory provisions.* It inheres in the jurisdiction of a court of bankruptcy. The necessity for its exercise (*Pepper v. Litton, supra*, p. 308) is based on the responsibility of the court before entering an order of confirmation to be satisfied that the plan in its practical incidence embodies a fair and equitable bargain openly arrived at and devoid of overreaching, however subtle. . . ." (Italics supplied.)

Similarly, deciding whether the terms of issuance of the new common stock are fair and equitable or are detrimental to the interests of investors, we must find that they are unfair, inequitable, and detrimental, so long as the preferred stock purchased by the management at low prices is to be permitted to share on a parity with other preferred stock. In this respect this case closely resembles the *Avon Park* case itself. That case involved a municipal composition under Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act. R. E. Crum-

mer & Co., the city's fiscal agent, purchased obligations of the city at about 50 cents on the dollar, both before and after execution of the fiscal agency contract. In holding that the plan had been improperly confirmed, the Supreme Court ruled not only that all of the benefit to be obtained by the fiscal agent from the securities purchased had to be considered in determining whether its aggregate compensation was reasonable, but also that any excess benefits accruing to the fiscal agent would make the plan unfair and inequitable because it would discriminate in his favor as a creditor. See also *In re Norcor Mfg. Co.*, 109 F. (2d) 407 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940); *In re McCrory Stores Corp.*, 12 F. Supp. 267 (S. D. N. Y. 1935).³⁸

3957 We believe that a formula should be devised which will limit the participation of the preferred stock purchased by the management to an amount which takes into account the purchase prices paid, plus accumulated dividends since the dates of the respective purchases. We do not now attempt to indicate what that formula should be, since the matter is complicated by the fact that the apportionment of stock among the several series of preferred stocks is to be based upon their respective dividend rates and dividend accumulations rather than upon their liqui-

³⁸ Compare sec 77B (b) of the Bankruptcy Act, which provided that "the judge . . . may limit any claims filed by such committee member or agent, to the actual consideration paid therefor" and sec. 212 of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, which provides that "the judge . . . may limit any claim or stock acquired by any such person or committee in contemplation or in the course of the proceeding under this chapter to the actual consideration paid therefor."

We do not read the *Avon Park* case or the other cases cited as holding that in no case may a claimant receive parity treatment for securities purchased at a discount during the reorganization. Such parity treatment is the usual rule. *Security-First National Bank of Los Angeles v. Rindge Land & Navigation Co.*, 85 F. (2d) 557 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936), rehrg. denied, 86 F. (2d) 3, certiorari denied, 299 U. S. 613, rhrg. denied, 300 U. S. 686; *Texas Hotel Securities Corporation v. Waco Development Co.*, 87 F. (2d) 395 (C. C. A. 5th), certiorari denied, 300 U. S. 679, rhrg. denied, 301 U. S. 713; *In re Utilities Power & Light Corporation*, 29 F. Supp. 763, 770 (N. D. Ill.), app. dism., C. C. A. 7th on March 9, 1940; *In re Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corporation*, 106 F. (2d) 22, 27 (C. C. A. 2d). Cf. *In re Tennessee Publishing Co.*, 81 F. (2d) 463, 466 (C. C. A. 6th), aff'd, 299 U. S. 18; *Cromwell v. County of Sac*, 96 U. S. 51, 60; and *Wade v. Chicago, Springfield & St. Louis R. R. Co.*, 149 U. S. 327, 343. We think the principle involved in the *Avon Park* case is limited to purchase during reorganization in violation of fiduciary duty. Compare the provisions of sec. 77B (b) and sec. 212 of the Bankruptcy Act, *supra*, which are limited to persons acting in a fiduciary capacity.

dation values. Our staff will be available for consultation with Federal with respect to this matter, and we shall give further consideration to this question if and when Federal files amendments to its proposal.

For the present we deny effectiveness to these declarations because we must enter adverse findings under sections 7 (d) (1) and 7 (d) (2) so long as the par value of the proposed common stock is fixed as high as \$12 per share; because we find that the provisions with respect to the board of directors of the surviving company would result in an unfair distribution of voting power; and because we find that the provisions for participation by the preferred stock held by the management result in the terms of issuance of the new securities being detrimental to the interests of investors and the plan being unfair and inequitable. We shall withhold entry of an order refusing to permit the declarations to become effective for a period of 30 days. If during that time Federal files amendments to its proposal designed to cure the defects in its plan which we have pointed out, we shall give further consideration to the matter. If within such time amendments are not filed, we shall enter an order refusing to permit the declarations to become effective.

By the Commission (Chairman Frank and Commissioners Eicher and Pike), Commissioner Healy dissenting (see separate opinion below) and Commissioner Henderson being absent and not participating.

(S) FRANCIS P. BRASSOR,
Secretary.

* * * * *

Excerpts from amendment No. 15 to application pursuant to rule U-12 E-4 for a report on a plan of reorganization and declaration (Docket No. 18).

(filed August 12, 1941)

1066 **FEDERAL WATER SERVICE
CORPORATION**

90 Broad Street
New York, N. Y.

September —, 1941.

To the Stockholders of
Federal Water Service Corporation:

There is enclosed herewith a notice of a special meeting of stockholders which has been called to consider and act on a plan for the readjustment and simplification of the capital structure of Federal Water Service Corporation by means of and in connection with a merger between Federal Water Service Corporation, Utility Operators Company and Federal Water and Gas Corporation. The plan is embodied in a merger agreement which has been executed on behalf of the three corporations by their respective boards of directors, and copy of which is annexed hereto, marked "Exhibit A."

* * * * *

1071 *Decision of the Securities and Exchange Commission
as to Preferred Stock Purchased by Officers and
Directors*

Certain of the officers and directors of Federal Water Service Corporation and Utility Operators Company purchased Preferred stock of Federal Water Service Corporation in the market during the period from November 8, 1937 (the date when the first plan for the reorganization of Federal Water Service Corporation was filed with the Se-

curities and Exchange Commission), and June 10, 1940 (the date of the last purchase by any officer or director).

On June 29, 1940, the Securities and Exchange Commission handed down tentative findings and opinion with respect to the merger plan in which the question was raised whether such Preferred stock was entitled to participate in the reorganization on the same basis as Preferred stock owned by others. Hearings held in July, 1940, at which full testimony was given as to these purchases. It was undisputed that the stock had been purchased in the over-the-counter market at prevailing prices, with the exception of one instance where stock had been purchased directly by negotiation, as to which the person conducting the negotiations on behalf of the owners testified that he was fully acquainted with the facts with respect to the value of the stock; that he was entirely satisfied with the sale, and that he believed strongly in the management. On March 24, 1941, the Commission handed down its findings and opinion and held that a plan could not be approved, if it treated the stock purchased by officers or directors of the corporation and of Utility Operators Company after November 8, 1937 on a parity with the Preferred stock held by others. The Commission's opinion suggested that its staff was available for consultation with the management as to the formula which should be applied to deal with such stock. After consultation with the staff it appeared that the Commission would approve a plan which required all persons who, after November 8, 1937, purchased Preferred stock of Federal Water Service Corporation at a time when they were directors or officers of Federal Water Service Corporation or Utility Operators Company to surrender the stock so purchased to the Corporation on payment by it to them of the cost of the stock to them, plus interest on this cost at 4% per annum. Paragraph Fourth (d) of the merger agreement provides for such acquisition. The Commission's staff also requested that each person affected by the Commission's decision execute an agreement obligating him to hold

the Preferred stock purchased since November 8, 1937 so that if the merger agreement became effective before that time it would operate upon this stock. Although strongly believing that the decision of the Commission with respect to their stock was unfair and unauthorized by the Public Utility Holding Company Act, the directors and officers affected have given such agreements in form satisfactory to the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission, obligating them to hold such stock and not sell or otherwise dispose of the same until November 1, 1941 unless prior to that date the merger agreement becomes effective or is abandoned.

Two of the officers who purchased Preferred stock after November 8, 1937, sold part of this Preferred stock in the market. Paragraph Fourth (d) of the merger agreement requires those officers to turn over to the surviving corporation the profits realized upon these sales by providing for the acquisition of their remaining stock purchased after November 8, 1937 at a price which is determined by subtracting from the cost of all stock purchased after November 8, 1937, plus interest at 4%, the proceeds of sale of any stock theretofore sold, plus interest from the sale date to the effective date of the merger agreement. One officer of Utility Operators Company who had sold all of the Preferred stock purchased by him after November 8, 1937 after he became an officer of such company (30 shares) has given his check for the amount of the profit on such sale (\$94.35) to be cashed if the merger agreement becomes effective before November 1, 1941. He has also agreed to pay to the surviving corporation interest at 4% on this amount from the date of the sale to the date the merger agreement becomes effective.

1072 The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, Section 17, contains an express provision with respect to purchases and sales by officers and directors of securities of a holding company or a subsidiary, and provides that profits realized within six months after the purchase

of the security may be recovered for the benefit of the corporation. It also provides for reports to be made to the Securities and Exchange Commission as to all purchases and sales. Reports were made from time to time to the Securities and Exchange Commission in pursuance of the Act and the rules of the Commission. No objection was raised to any of the purchases by anyone on behalf of the Securities and Exchange Commission until, as above stated, the question was raised in the tentative findings and opinion of the Commission on June 29, 1940.

One of the provisions of the agreements which have been executed by officers and directors purchasing this stock is as follows:

“That this instrument shall not be construed as a waiver of any right that I may have to review in the manner provided by law any decision of the Securities and Exchange Commission or to take such action as I may be advised to protect my rights as they may be established on such review.”

It is probable that one or more of those purchasing Preferred stock after November 8, 1937, and whose stock so purchased has been required by the plan to be surrendered to the surviving corporation, will bring proceedings to review the decision of the Securities and Exchange Commission directing this treatment of their stock. The pendency of any such proceedings will not, however, affect the consummation of the plan. If, on appeal by such officers or directors, it should be held that the Securities and Exchange Commission has acted illegally and beyond its authority in this matter, it is believed that such Preferred stock should be permitted to participate in the reorganization on the same basis as other Preferred stock.

The total number of shares of Preferred stock of officers and directors to be acquired by the surviving corporation pursuant to the merger agreement aggregates 11,598 and

the purchase price of these shares, computed pursuant to paragraph Fourth (d) of the merger agreement, with interest to October 31, 1941, is estimated by the corporation at \$313,091.99.

Exhibit A, Federal Water Service Corporation, Merger Agreement.

Fourth: * * * *

1083 (d) No shares of comon stock of the surviving
 corporation shall be issued in lieu of the shares of
 preferred stock of Federal Water Service Corporation pur-
 chased since November 8, 1937 by Chenery Corporation, or
 since November 8, 1937 by the following persons when they
 were officers or directors of Federal Water Service
 1084 Corporation or Utility Operators Company and
 which are owned by them on the effective date of the
 merger agreement: J. N. Greene, W. R. Edwards, C. M.
 Chenery, H. G. Calder, C. P. Rather, R. H. Neilson, Wm. E.
 Matthews, III, Watson Dark, E. C. Deal, H. M. Erskine, F.
 T. Tansill, F. R. Harris, W. A. Culin, H. D. McHenry, T.
 H. Wiggin, E. C. Elliott and C. van den Berg, Jr. Each
 such holder shall be entitled to receive and the surviving
 corporation shall be obligated to pay, upon the surrender
 of the certificates of such stock to the surviving corporation,
 the actual cost of such stock to such holder, together with
 interest thereon at four per cent per annum from the dates
 of its or his purchase of such stock to the effective date of
 the merger agreement In ascertaining cost of preferred
 stock acquired by exchange of other securities for purposes
 of this provision, the fair market value at the date of ex-
 change of the securities given in exchange shall be deemed
 to be the cost of such preferred stock. In the event any
 shares of preferred stock of Federal Water Service Cor-
 poration purchased by Chenery Corporation or by the said
 officers or directors of Federal Water Service Corporation
 or Utility Operators Company since November 8, 1937,

shall have been sold by such corporation or individual prior to the effective date of the merger agreement, the surviving corporation shall, upon the surrender of the remaining such shares owned by such corporation or individual, be obligated to pay to such corporation or individual a sum equal to the actual cost of all preferred stock of Federal Water Service Corporation purchased by it or him since November 8, 1937, together with interest thereon at four per cent per annum from the dates of its or his purchase of such stock to the effective date of the merger agreement minus the proceeds of the sale by it or him of any such shares together with interest thereon at four per cent per annum from the dates of its or his sale of such stock to the effective date of the merger agreement. The shares of preferred stock to be acquired by the surviving corporation pursuant to this subdivision (d) of the merger agreement consist of 4,522 shares of preferred stock of Federal Water Service Corporation of the \$6 series, 5,610 shares of the \$6.50 series and 1,466 shares of the \$7 series.

* * * * *

3977 Application by Chenery Corporation, et al. for Leave to Intervene, and Request for Reconsideration and Relief.

(filed August 15, 1941)

Now come Chenery Corporation, H. M. Erskine, R. H. Neilson, W. A. Culin, F. T. Tansill, H. D. McHenry, T. H. Wiggin, C. M. Chenery, J. N. Greene, H. G. Calder, C. P. Rather, William E. Matthews, III, C. van den Berg, Jr., W. R. Edwards, Watson Dark, E. C. Deal, F. R. Harris, and E. C. Elliott, hereinafter called "interveners", and make application for permission to intervene in the above entitled proceeding, and as reason therefor state:

1. Chenery Corporation is a corporation organized under the laws of Delaware with offices at 1 Exchange Place, Jer-

sey City, New Jersey, and is a stockholder in Federal Water Service Corporation (hereinafter called 3978 "Federal"). The President of Chenery Corporation is C. T. Chenery, who is also the President and a director of Federal and of Utility Operators Company (hereinafter called "UOC"). Chenery Corporation has outstanding 22,937 shares of stock of which 9,637 shares are owned by C. T. Chenery, 1,100 shares are owned by C. M. by William L. Chenery, 1,100 shares are owned by Alan J. Chenery, 1,100 shares are owned by Blanche B. Perrin, 600 shares are owned by Hollis Burnley Chenery, 600 shares are owned by Margaret Emily Chenery, 600 shares are owned by Helen Bates Chenery (Jr.), and 7,100 shares are owned by Helen Bates Chenery. The stockholders of Chenery Corporation other than C. T. Chenery and C. M. Chenery are not officers or directors of Federal, of UOC or of Federal Water and Gas Corporation (hereinafter called "FW & G").

2. The interveners other than Chenery Corporation are officers or directors of Federal, UOC, and FW & G, as follows: H. M. Erskine is Vice President and a director of Federal. R. H. Neilson is a director and Vice President of UOC. W. A. Culin is Vice President, Treasurer, and a director of Federal, a director of UOC, and the President and a director of FW & G. F. T. Tansill is Vice President and Secretary of Federal, Secretary and Treasurer and a director of UOC, and Secretary and Treasurer and a 3979 director of FW & G. H. D. McHenry is a Vice President of Federal and a Vice President and director of FW & G. T. H. Wiggin is a former director of UOC. C. M. Chenery is a director of UOC. The address of the seven persons just named is 90 Broad Street, New York City. J. N. Greene is a director and Vice President of UOC. H. G. Calder is a director of UOC. C. P. Rather is a director and Vice President of UOC. William E. Matthews, III is a director and Vice President of UOC. C. van den Berg,

Jr. is a former Vice President and director of Federal and a former Vice President and director of UOC. The address of the five persons just named is Watts Building, Birmingham, Alabama. W. R. Edwards is a director of UOC, address Triangle Building, Rochester, New York. Watson Dark is a director of UOC, address Miami Beach, Florida. E. C. Deal is a Vice President and director of UOC, address 135 Jefferson Avenue, Scranton, Pennsylvania. F. R. Harris is a former director of Federal, address 27 William Street, New York City. E. C. Elliott is a former director of UOC, address San Francisco, California.

3. These proceedings involve applications and declarations having as their primary object the reorganization of Federal pursuant to a plan contemplating the merger of UOC, the parent of Federal, and FW & G, a wholly owned subsidiary of Federal, into Federal. In the above entitled proceeding Federal filed (File No. 34-9) an application pursuant to Rule U-12E-4 for a report on a plan for its reorganization, and a declaration pursuant to Rule U-12E-5 with respect to solicitation of consents to this plan. UOC filed (File No. 34-41) a similar application and declaration. Federal and UOC jointly filed (File No. 79-28) a declaration pursuant to Section 7 with respect to the alteration of rights of their security holders and the issuance of new securities incident to the proposed merger. FW & G filed (File 34-9) a declaration pursuant to Section 7 with respect to alteration of rights of the holder of its securities incident to the proposed merger. This declaration adopts the application and declaration filed by Federal and UOC and asks that FW & G be made a party thereto. The first plan was filed in these proceedings November 8, 1937. Successive amendments have been filed to the application and declarations, and the proceedings are still pending, no final order having been entered therein.

4. During the period from November 8, 1937, to June 30, 1940, these interveners purchased preferred stock in Federal in amounts as follows:

Name	Shares		
	\$6.00 Preferred	\$6.50 Preferred	\$7.00 Preferred
J. N. Greene	45	..	..
W. R. Edwards	100	..	..
H. G. Calder	..	40	..
C. P. Rather	110	310	..
R. H. Neilson	10	..	..
Wm. E. Matthews III	..	65	..
Watson Dark	5	160	60
E. C. Deal	85	..	..
H. M. Erskine	25	50	..
F. T. Tansill	..	65	..
F. R. Harris	130	173	40
W. A. Culin	50	110	..
H. D. McHenry	..	75	15
Chenery Corporation	3860	3547	1211
T. H. Wiggin	50	30	..
E. C. Elliott	27	..	..
C. M. Chenery	150	170	..
C. van den Berg, Jr.	25	1535	140

C. M. Chenery has sold 125 shares of the \$6.00 preferred stock and 20 shares of the \$6.50 preferred stock, C. van den Berg, Jr. has sold 25 shares of the \$6.00 preferred stock and 700 shares of the \$6.50 preferred stock.

5. These proceedings have been pending before the Commission since November 8, 1937, and numerous hearings have been had thereon. March 24, 1941, the Commission filed its findings and opinion therein (Holding Company Act Release No. 2635). The plan then under consideration had contemplated, among other features, the conversion of Federal \$7 preferred, \$6.50 preferred, \$6.00 preferred and

\$4.00 preferred into new common stock. In its findings and opinion filed March 24, 1941, the Commission stated that the plan of reorganization could not be approved in so far as it provided for participation of preferred shares purchased by officers or directors of Federal or UOC, or by the Chenery Corporation after November 8, 1937, on a parity with other shares of preferred stock of the same series. The Commission found that "the provisions for participation by the preferred stock held by the management result in the terms of issuance of new securities being detrimental to the interest of investors and the plan being unfair and inequitable". Entry of an order was deferred, and it was stated that further consideration would be given to the matter if Federal filed amendments to its proposed plan designed to cure this and other alleged defects therein.

6. Thereafter amendments to the declarations and applications setting for the plan of reorganization were filed by the corporations involved in order to comply with the said findings and Opinion of the Commission as interpreted by the staff of the Commission. Paragraph Fourth (a) of the proposed merger agreement as set forth in the last amendments (see No. 15) reads as follows:

FOURTH: The manner of converting the shares of capital stock of each of the constituent corporations into share of stock of the surviving corporation shall be as follows:

* * * * *

(d) No shares of common stock of the surviving corporation shall be issued in lieu of the shares of preferred stock of Federal Water Service Corporation purchased since November 8, 1937 by Chenery Corporation, or since November 8, 1937 by the following persons when they were officers or directors of Federal Water Service Corporation or Utility Operators Company and which are owned by them on the effective date of the merger agreement: J. N.

Greene, W. R. Edwards, C. M. Chenery, H. G. Calder, C. P. Rather, R. H. Neilson, Wm. E. Matthews, III, Watson Dark, E. C. Deal, H. M. Erskine, F. T. Tansill, F. R. Harris, W. A. Culin, H. D. McHenry, T. H. Wiggin, E. C. Elliott and C. van den Berg, Jr. Each such holder shall be entitled to receive and the surviving corporation shall be obligated to pay, upon the surrender of the certificates of such stock to the surviving corporation, the actual cost of such stock to such holder, together with interest thereon at four per cent per annum from the dates of its or his purchase of such stock to the effective date of the merger agreement. In ascertaining cost of preferred stock acquired by exchange of other securities for purposes of this provision, the fair market value at the date of exchange of the securities given in exchange shall be deemed to be the cost of such preferred stock. In the event any shares of preferred stock of Federal Water Service Corporation purchased by Chenery Corporation or by the said officers or directors of Federal Water Service Corporation or Utility Operators Company since November 8, 1937, shall have been sold by such corporation or individual prior to the effective date of the merger agreement, the surviving corporation shall, upon the surrender of the remaining such shares owned by such corporation or individual, be obligated to pay to such corporation or individual a sum equal to the actual cost of all preferred stock of Federal Water Service Corporation purchased by it or him since November 8, 1937, together with interest thereon at four per cent per annum from the dates of its or his purchase of such stock to the effective date of the merger agreement minus the proceeds of the sale

3984 by it or him of any such shares together with interest thereon at four per cent per annum from the dates of its or his sale of such stock to the effective date of the merger agreement. The shares of preferred stock to be acquired by the surviving corporation pursuant to this subdivision (d) of the merger agreement consists of 4,522 shares of preferred stock of Federal Water Service Corporation of the \$6 series, 5,610 shares of the \$6.50 series and 1,466 shares of the \$7 series.

Upon being informed by the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission in April, 1941, that in its opinion the persons who are now interveners should execute agreements obligating them to hold the preferred stock purchased by them after November 8, 1937, for a reasonable time so that such stock would not be sold in the market, the intervener executed agreements in form satisfactory to the staff of the Commission, which provide that the intervener should hold such stock and should not sell the same until November 1, 1941, unless prior to that time the merger agreement should become effective or be abandoned. The agreements contain the express statements that they should not at any time be construed as or deemed an admission that such stock was in any way different from or entitled to any different or other rights than the preferred stock of the same series owned by any other holder and each agreement provides:

“3. That this instrument shall not be construed as a waiver of any right I may have to review in the manner provided by law any decision of the securities and Exchange Commission or to take such action as I may be advised to protect my rights as they may be established on such review.”

The proceedings are now pending before the Commission on the plan of reorganization as so amended. A further hearing thereon was held August 12, 1941, and no final decision has been made.

7. The interveners are advised that the findings and opinion of the Commission of March 24, 1941, above described are erroneous, and that the preferred stock purchased by them should be treated in the reorganization on the same basis as preferred stock held by other stockholders. An argument to that effect was made by counsel for the corporations who are parties to these proceedings prior to the said findings and opinion of March 24, 1941, but after said findings and opinion were filed the corporations filed amendments to the proposed plan of reorganization, as set forth in Paragraph 6 hereof, and their counsel are now ad-

vocating the approval of the plan as so amended. At this time there is no one representing the interest of the interveners. The interveners are advised that they possess a legitimate interest which is inadequately represented, within the meaning of Rule 17 of the Rules of Practice of the Commission, and they desire to intervene herein.

3986 At the hearing on August 12, 1941, C. T. Chenery appeared as President of the Chenery Corporation, and W. A. Culin, F. T. Tansill and H. M. Erskine appeared personally. Mr. Chenery then stated that he had made arrangements for a lawyer to appear on his behalf and on behalf of the other persons referred to in Paragraph Fourth (d) of the proposed merger agreement, who are the present interveners, in order that they might object to that paragraph, ask for a rehearing with respect to the propriety of that paragraph, and if necessary have any order of the Commission approving the paragraph reviewed in the manner provided by the Act. Mr. Chenery stated that he had been informed on August 8, 1941, that the lawyer in question could not appear because of a possible conflict of interest, and that there had not been sufficient time before the hearing to obtain other counsel. Mr. Chenery stated that as President of Chenery Corporation he objected to Paragraph Fourth (d) of the proposed merger agreement and asked for reconsideration by the Commission and he requested that he be given an opportunity to retain counsel. Mr. Tansill, Mr. Culin and Mr. Erskine individually joined in Mr. Chenery's objection on behalf of the Chenery Corporation. The examiner then announced that the case would be kept open until August 16, 1941, in order to allow the

Chenery Corporation and other preferred stockholders in the same class to file a petition for intervention and a petition for rehearing. Thereafter on August 12, 1941, said preferred stockholders retained the firm of Covington, Burling, Rublee, Acheson & Shorb, of Washington, D. C., who theretofore had taken no part in the proceedings and who had no knowledge of the facts involved.

8. The interveners object to the approval of any plan of reorganization containing a provision similar to that of Paragraph Fourth (d) of the proposed merger agreement set forth in Paragraph 6 hereof, or in accordance with the opinion of the Commission expressed March 24, 1941, to the effect that the preferred stock purchased by the interveners should be treated on a less favorable basis than other preferred stock. They respectfully represent that the entry of an order approving a plan containing such a discriminatory provision would be unfair, inequitable, and detrimental to the interests of investors and would be erroneous and illegal. These interveners state that they have duly reported to the Commission all purchases of the preferred stock in question while they were directors or officers of the corporations in question. They state that Section 17 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 provides that directors and officers shall report to the Commission their

purchases of stock in registered holding companies 3988 and shall account for profits on sales made within six months of the purchase thereof, but such Act contains no prohibition of the purchase of stock by officers or directors and imposes no liability in regard to stock purchased and held for more than six months. They are advised and therefore allege that no principle of common or statutory law or equity forbids directors or officers of a corporation from purchasing stock therein, whether or not an application contemplating reorganization is under submission to the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Wherefore the interveners pray:

1. That this application to intervene be allowed, and that the interveners be made parties to the above entitled proceeding.

2. That counsel for the interveners be allowed a reasonable time to file briefs in support of the contentions made by the interveners herein and that oral argument thereon be allowed before the Commission, but no request is made for leave to take additional testimony.

3. That the case be reconsidered by the Commission to the extent that the present holding treats stock held by these applicants on a different basis from other preferred stock.

3989 4. That the Commission enter findings and opinion to the effect that the plan should be modified so that these interveners shall be treated in the same manner as other holders of preferred stock, and that the Commission deny effectiveness to the declarations herein unless they are so modified.

5. And for such other and further relief as may be appropriate.

Respectfully submitted,

COVINGTON, BURLING, RUBLEE,
ACHESON & SHORB,

Union Trust Building, Washington, D. C.,
Attorneys for

Chenery Corporation, H. M. Erskine,
R. H. Neilson, W. A. Culin, F. T. Tansill,
H. D. McHenry, T. H. Wiggin,
C. M. Chenery, H. N. Greene, H. G. Calder,
C. P. Rather, Wm. E. Matthews III, C. van den Berg, Jr.,
W. R. Edwards, Watson Dark, E. C. Deal,
F. R. Harris, and E. C. Elliott.

SPENCER GORDON,
WM. MERRICK PARKER,

Union Trust Building,
Washington, D. C.,

Of Counsel.

3990 District of Columbia: ss.

W. A. Culin being duly sworn says that he is one of the interveners and that he makes this affidavit in his own behalf, as a preferred stockholder in Federal Water Service Corporation, and on behalf of the other preferred stockholders thereof who are named as interveners in the application for leave to intervene to which this affidavit is attached. He makes this affidavit on behalf of the other interveners because they are absent from the District of Columbia.

The interest of the interveners arises by reason of the fact that the merger agreement as now proposed contemplates the sale to Federal Water Service Corporation of certain preferred stock held by the interveners therein, all as more fully set forth in the application for leave to intervene to which this affidavit is attached. The position which this affiant and the other interveners propose to take with respect to the pending matter has heretofore been taken by the corporations, but at the present time said corporations are taking a position which is adverse to the interests of this affiant and the other interveners all as more fully set forth in said application for leave to intervene and there is no one in the case representing the interveners.

3991 This affiant, W. A. Culin, has read the application for leave to intervene to which this affidavit is attached, he states that he verily believes that the facts stated in said application are true and he makes said application a part of this affidavit without repeating the same herein.

W. A. CULIN.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15th day of August, 1941.

MARJORY E. WOOD,
Notary Public, D. C.

My commission expires July 15, 1944.

Order Granting Application to Intervene.

(filed August 18, 1941)

3992

United States of America

Before the Securities and Exchange Commission

At a regular session of the Securities and Exchange Commission, held at its office in the City of Washington, D. C., on the 18th day of August, A. D. 1941.

In the Matter of

FEDERAL WATER SERVICE CORPORATION
UTILITY OPERATORS COMPANY
FEDERAL WATER AND GAS CORPORATION

File Nos. 34-9

34-41

70-28

(Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935)

Chenery Corporation, H. M. Erskine, R. H. Neilson, W. A. Culin, F. T. Tansill, H. D. McHenry, T. H. Wiggin, C M. Chenery, J. N. Greene, H. G. Calder, C. P. Rather, William E. Matthews, III, C. van den Berg, Jr., W. R. Edwards, Watson Dark, E C. Deal, F. R. Harris, and E. C. Elliott having on August 15, 1941, filed an application to intervene and become parties to the above entitled proceeding;

It appearing from said application that said applicants do not desire to take additional testimony but wish to file briefs in support of their contentions and make oral argument thereon;

It is ordered that subject to all of the proceedings heretofore had said applicants be and hereby are permitted to intervene and become parties to the proceeding; and

It is further ordered that said intervenors have leave to file briefs in support of their contentions provided the same shall be filed on or before August 28, 1941; and

It is further ordered that leave to make oral argument be and hereby is denied, subject, however, to such further or-

der, if any, as the Commission shall deem it appropriate to make in that regard after consideration of said briefs.

By the Commission.

FRANCIS P. BRASSOR,
Secretary.

* * * * *

Report of the Commission on a Plan of Reorganization.

(September 24, 1941)

4000 Securities and Exchange Commission

Washington

In the Matter of

FEDERAL WATER SERVICE CORPORATION
UTILITY OPERATORS COMPANY
FEDERAL WATER AND GAS CORPORATION

File Nos. 34- 9

34-41

70-28

(Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935)

This is a report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on a plan for the reorganization, or readjustment and simplification of the capital structure of, Federal Water Service Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "Federal"). The company's letter refers to a merger of certain affiliated companies into Federal. This is primarily a matter of legal mechanics and we will describe the transaction as one for the reorganization of Federal.¹

This report is made because the Public Utility Holding Company Act requires that such a report be supplied in order to assist stockholders in determining whether to vote for or against the plan. Stockholders are urged to carefully consider the report and the other material furnished them. Under the laws of Delaware the approval of the holders of two-thirds of the outstanding stock is necessary before the plan can be consummated.

¹ In connection with the reorganization the name is to be changed to "Federal Water and Gas Corporation."

Reasons for Effecting a Reorganization of Federal

The existing corporate structure of Federal is complicated and highly unrealistic. The aggregate dividend requirements of the preferred stock and the Class A stock are far in excess of the company's ability to earn, and large arrearages of dividends on both the preferred and Class A stocks exist. Although the company is presently earning enough to meet a portion of the dividend requirements on the preferred stock, it is not lawful, under Delaware law, to pay any dividends by reason of the extent to which the capital of the company is impaired. Voting power, sufficient for practical purposes to control the company, is vested in the class B stock which, from the standpoint of both assets and earnings, is utterly worthless. The plan is designed to correct this unsatisfactory condition.

4001 *The Present Capitalization of Federal*

Federal's outstanding securities consist of debentures, preferred stock, Class A stock and Class B stock. The preferred stock is divided into several series having dividend preferences of \$7, \$6.50, \$6 and \$4, respectively. The \$7, \$6.50 and \$6 series have voluntary liquidation preferences of \$110 per share and involuntary liquidation preferences of \$100 per share. The \$4 series has voluntary and involuntary liquidation preferences of \$68.75 and \$62.50, respectively. The Class A stock is in the nature of a second preferred stock: it is junior to the preferred stock of all series both as to dividends and as to the distribution of assets upon liquidation; but it is superior to the Class B stock as to the distribution of assets and it has dividend preferences over the Class B stock plus participation with that stock in any additional earnings. The Class B stock has no preference of any kind but holds the sole voting power of the company unless, as is now the case, there are dividends in arrears on preferred or Class A stocks. Even now the Class B stock has 42.73% of the voting power.

Scope of the Plan

The plan of reorganization does not affect the outstanding debentures of Federal. It substitutes a single class of common stock for the various existing stocks of Federal.

It is especially appropriate for the reorganized corporation to have no class of stock other than common, for not only does the company have debentures outstanding but the greater part of its assets consist of common stocks of subsidiary companies. The common stock of the subsidiaries is subject to the prior claims of debt and preferred stocks of the subsidiaries. This new common stock is to be divided among the existing holders of the preferred and Class A stocks of Federal. The Class B stock is to be cancelled and no new securities issued to the Class B stockholders. The Commission concluded that this was fair since from the standpoint of both assets and earnings the Class B stock is utterly worthless.

Approximately 94% of the new common stock, which as we have seen will be the only class of stock outstanding, is in effect allocated by the plan to the holders of the preferred stock² and will be distributed among them upon the basis of the dividend preferences of the several series—the holder of a share of \$7 preferred receiving seven shares of new common, the holder of a share of \$6.50 preferred receiving six and one-half shares of new common, and so forth. The present ratios among the several series as to participation in earnings will thus be preserved by the plan. The present ratios among the several series as to participation in assets in the event of liquida-

² Some shares of preferred stock held by the management receive less favorable treatment as explained in the latter portion of this report.

Holders of stock of Utility Operators Company are to receive 4.21% of the new common. Since this allocation is based primarily upon Utility Operators Company's ownership of 6,536 shares of Federal's preferred stock it is treated as an allocation to a preferred stockholder, and the 4.21% is included in the 94% referred to in the text of this report. A minor part of the allocation of new common stock to the holders of stock of Utility Operators Company is predicated upon that company's ownership of \$2,000 principal amount of Federal's debentures and about \$600 worth of miscellaneous assets.

tion, which as we have seen vary from the dividend preference ratios, are being disregarded.

The Class A stockholders will receive the balance (approximately 6%) of the new common stock, the holder of one share of Class A stock receiving 1/10 of a share of new common stock.

Fairness of the Plan to Preferred and Class A Stockholders

The fairness of the allocation of the new common stock as between the preferred stock, on the one hand, and the Class A stock, on the other hand, is dependent upon the position of the Class A stock with respect to the earnings and assets of the company. If the proposed plan had been consummated on June 30, 1941, the net assets of the reorganized corporation would have been valued upon its books at approximately \$20,700,000. As against this amount, which represents the management's opinion of the fair value of the net assets on June 30, 1941, Federal has outstanding debentures in the principal amount of approximately \$5,200,000 and on June 30, 1941 Federal's preferred stockholders had prior claims totaling approximately \$25,600,000.³ It is apparent that asset values would have to increase by approximately \$10,100,000 for any assets to be available for the Class A stock in the event of a dissolution.

With regard to earnings it should be noted that numerous changes have taken place in the past in the holding company system of Federal on account of disposals and acquisitions of property, and it seems likely that such changes will occur in the future. The record of past earnings is therefore less reliable as an indication of what the future in fact holds than is often the case. It is nevertheless apparent that any hopes for dividends on the Class A stock must be limited to some time in the very remote future.

The following table shows the corporate net income of

³ This amount is computed on the basis of the involuntary liquidating preferences and the arrearages of dividends.

Federal and the consolidated net income of the entire Federal system, including its subsidiaries, as reported for the years 1935 to 1940 inclusive, and for the twelve months ended June 30, 1941:

Year	Net Income	
	Corporate	Consolidated
1935	\$(237,629)	\$ 491,494
1936	292,952	1,033,165
1937	419,794	1,166,945
1938	446,470	987,763*
1939	425,155	1,498,046
1940	377,595	1,706,066
Year ended June 30, 1941	507,352	1,997,032

() Denotes loss.

* Consolidated net income for 1938 would have been \$1,214,089 had it not been for an extraordinary deduction of \$226,326 representing cost and expenses of natural gas exploration by Southern Natural Gas Company, a subsidiary.

4003 It will be noted that the corporate earnings shown in the table are substantially less than the \$1,001,096 annual dividend requirements of the preferred stock. Although the average of the consolidated earnings for the six years 1935 to 1940 inclusive amounts to \$146,150 more than the annual dividend requirements of the preferred stock, and although the consolidated earnings for the year ended June 30, 1941 was \$995,936 in excess of such requirements, this does not indicate any possibility of dividends on the Class A stock in the near future. The dividend arrearages on the preferred stock, all of which would have to be paid before anything could be paid on the Class A stock, amounted to \$9,760,686 on June 30, 1941. Also, the consolidated net income for the year ended June 30, 1941, shown on the above table at \$1,997.032, would have been \$345,000 less except for certain reductions in Federal income and excess profits taxes which were of a non-recurring nature. Moreover, because of various restrictions upon the payment of dividends by certain of the subsidiaries, Federal apparently could not realize \$365,240 of the consolidated net income for the year ended June 30, 1941. Furthermore, seldom if ever can all of the earnings of subsidiaries be taken up by a parent corporation. Construction and

other requirements of the subsidiaries and restrictions imposed by regulatory bodies often make necessary the retention by them of part of their earnings.

It is thus apparent that no dividends could be paid on the Class A stock for many years. However, a majority of the Commission, believing that this stock had a reasonable prospect of benefiting at some remote future time from its existing rights in the corporation, held that it was entitled to participate in the reorganization and found that the present plan was fair and equitable in allocating approximately 6% of the new common stock to the old Class A stock. One of the Commissioners dissented from this conclusion and expressed the opinion that the preferred stockholders of Federal should have received the entire issue of new common stock.

Under the plan about 11,600 shares of preferred stock by officers and directors of Federal and Utility Operators Company during the pendency of reorganization are treated differently from the other shares of preferred stock. The Commission felt that because of the circumstances under which the shares were purchased, these holders could not equitably be permitted to realize any benefit by their acquisition. The plan accordingly provides that these shares will be purchased for cancellation by the reorganized corporation at cost, which amounts to about \$285,000, plus 4% interest from the dates of acquisition by the present holders to the date of the merger. The company's letter states that an appeal is anticipated as to this feature of the plan and that it is believed that if the Commission's decision is reversed, the preferred stock held by the management should be permitted to participate in the reorganization on the same basis as the other preferred stock.

Procedure to Make Plan Effective.

As we have previously noted, the laws of Delaware require that the plan be approved by the holders of two-thirds of the outstanding stock. Stockholders who make

objection in writing to the plan, and, furthermore, within twenty days after the merger make written demand, are entitled to have their stock purchased by the surviving corporation. Any stockholder deciding to follow this course should inform himself of the provisions of Section 61 of the General Corporation Law of Delaware in that regard, and carefully follow the procedure there prescribed. Under the proposed plan the directors of Utility Operators Company and Federal have the right to abandon the plan if stockholders holding 3,000 or more shares of Federal's preferred stock duly object to the merger at or prior to stockholders meetings at which the merger agreement is submitted to a vote.

Requirement of Holding Company Act.

The existing stock structure of Federal Water Service Corporation is repugnant to the standards of Section 11 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act. Unless voluntarily brought into compliance with the Act, it would be the duty of the Commission to institute a proceeding to require such action. In the opinion of the Commission the proposed plan would bring the stock structure of Federal into conformity with the standards of Section 11. A majority of the Commission considers the proposed plan fair to all concerned and has entered an order which will permit its consummation prior to November 1, 1941, if it is approved by the stockholders.

More Detailed Information on Plan Available.

This report has stated briefly only the important effects of the plan. In the interest of simplicity some features have not been discussed. The plan is dealt with in more detail in Holding Company Act Releases Nos. 2635 and 3023, being the Commission's Findings and Opinion (including the dissenting opinion referred to above), and Supplemental Findings and Opinion in this matter. Copies of these releases may be obtained by request made to the Sec-

retary of the Commission, 1778 Pennsylvania Avenue,
N. W., Washington, D. C.

By the Commission.

(Seal) FRANCIS P. BRASSOR,
Secretary.

September 24, 1941.

Supplemental Findings and Opinion of the Commission.

(September 24, 1941)

4005 Securities and Exchange Commission
Washington

In the Matter of

FEDERAL WATER SERVICE CORPORATION
UTILITY OPERATORS COMPANY
FEDERAL WATER AND GAS CORPORATION

File Nos. 34-9
34-41
70-28

(Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935)

In our Findings and Opinion herein¹ we pointed out the respects in which we deemed the plan of reorganization, which is the subject of this proceeding, repugnant to the standards of the Holding Company Act. However, we withheld entry of an order so that amendments might be filed revising the plan. Subsequently, further proceedings have been had, amendments have been filed and certain additional evidence has been received.

Th persons affected by that portion of the original opinion entitled "Preferred Stock Purchases by Directors and Officers" applied for leave to intervene and become parties to the proceeding. Their application was granted and they have filed briefs herein. They also asked leave to argue

¹ Holding Company Act Release No. 2635.

orally, and in our order of August 18, 1941 granting intervention we denied leave to make oral argument, subject, however, to such further order as we should deem it appropriate to make in that regard. Earlier in the proceeding we heard oral argument and considered contentions set forth in a brief by counsel for Federal Water Service Corporation. After careful consideration of the briefs filed by counsel for the intervenors we are satisfied no useful purpose would be served by oral argument thereon.

The additional evidence which has been received includes financial data of more recent date than some used in our original opinion. The following table shows the condensed balance sheets of Federal Water Service Corporation and Utility Operators Company and a pro forma balance sheet of the reorganized company as of June 30, 1941, giving effect to the proposed merger:

4006

TABLE I

	Federal Water Service Corp.	Utility Operators Company	Pro Forma Reorganized Company
Assets and Other Debits			
Investments	\$27,751,394	\$689,463	\$19,210,420
Special funds	1,636,763 ²		1,636,763
Current Assets:			
Cash	926,807	863	515,330
Other	13,107	18	13,098
Commission on capital stock	1,444,221		
Organization expense	424,733		
Office furniture and fixtures	26,851		26,851
	<u>\$32,223,876</u>	<u>\$690,344</u>	<u>\$21,402,462</u>
Liabilities, Capital and Surplus			
5½% Debentures due 1954	\$ 5,222,000		\$ 5,220,000
Current liabilities	371,071	270	371,313
Deferred credits to income	44,228		44,228
Reserves:			
Possible losses in investments	570,396		
Miscellaneous	390,963		290,963
Capital stock	31,356,373	282,144	4,921,655
Capital surplus	(3,847,290)	409,967	10,554,303
Earned surplus	(1,883,865)	(2,037)	
	<u>\$32,223,876</u>	<u>\$690,344</u>	<u>\$21,402,462</u>

() Denotes deficit.

² This item includes \$1,397,525 which represents deposits to guarantee purchase of common stock of Southern Natural Gas Company not subscribed for by holders of warrants prior to September 15, 1941.

It should be noted that while certain investments will be written up in the aggregate by about \$2,700,000, the net write-down will be in excess of \$8,500,000. Substantially all of the increase results from an increase in the amount at which the investment in Southern Natural Gas Company is to be carried. The amount at which Federal proposes to carry this investment is less than its market value, its underlying book value and the amount at which shares of this stock were recently sold on subscription, and appears reasonable on the basis of capitalized earnings. Under the particular circumstances of this readjustment in which there is also a substantial change in proprietorship interests, it does not seem improper to us for the reorganized company to recognize, in the course of a net write down, increases as well as decreases in investment values, if as here there appears sufficient reason to believe that such increases in value are real and not fictitious.

In order to insure that future profits or losses from sales of investments of Federal, based on the amounts stated in reorganization, do not improperly affect the payment of dividends by the company, we shall condition our order so as to require, with respect to any sales of these investments within three years, that profits be credited to capital surplus and that losses be charged to income or earned surplus unless upon application the Commission shall approve some other disposition.

We also believe that the capital surplus which will be created in the reorganization, amounting to approximately \$10,500,000 should not be used to absorb losses arising from subsequent operations. We shall therefore reserve jurisdiction to regulate charges made to this capital surplus.

4007 Since our original opinion Utility Operators Company has disposed of \$1,000 principal amount of its holdings in Federal's debentures and has used the proceeds for expenses. As a result, the stockholders of Utility Operators Company will receive 83 less shares of the common stock of the surviving corporation. This fact, together with

the treatment which the plan now accords to the preferred stock purchased by officers and directors since November 8, 1937, has necessitated certain minor changes in the total amount of the new common stock which will be issued and in the percentage of stock which will be issued to the various classes of stockholders of Federal. The following table shows the proposed distribution of the new common stock:

TABLE II

Federal Water Service Corporation:
Preferred (Held by Public):

	Present Stocks	Rate of Exchange	New Common Stock	
\$7.00 Series	12,889	7 for 1	90,223	
\$6.50 Series	62,030	6½ for 1	403,195	
\$6.00 Series	63,868	6 for 1	383,208	
\$4.00 Series	2,348	4 for 1	9,392	
	141,135		886,018	90.01%
Class A	568,775	1/10 for 1	56,877	5.78%
Utility Operators Company: Common Stock	56,428.9	.7343 for 1	41,436	4.21%
Total New Common Shares			984,331	100.00%

We think that the above allocation among security holders is fair under the reasoning of our original opinion. The financial aspects of the new securities, as indicated by the amendments, meet the requirements set forth therein. The par value of the 1,500,000 authorized shares of common stock of the surviving corporation has been reduced from \$12 to \$5, so that now no adverse findings are required under Section 7 (d) (1) and 7 (d) (2) of the Act. The provisions for a "staggered" board of directors which, under the circumstances of this case, would have resulted in an unfair distribution of voting power, have been eliminated. The plan now contemplates that the incumbent directors shall remain in office only until a special stockholders' meeting is held at which time the new stockholders will have the opportunity to vote on the election of a new board, and that such meeting shall be called within ninety days following the reorganization.

The revised plan also denies equal participation to the preferred stock of Federal Water Service Corporation pur-

chased by C. T. Chenery,³ and others, since November 8, 1937. It is now provided that the surviving corporation shall purchase this stock at its cost to the management plus 4% interest from the dates of purchase by the management to the date of the merger. The intervenors have filed a brief asking that we enter findings and an opinion to the effect that the plan should be modified so that they shall be treated in the same manner as other holders of preferred stock and that we deny effectiveness to the declaration unless it is so modified. After consideration of the brief we adhere to the views expressed in our original opinion.

It appearing that some of the shares of stock purchased by these officers and directors have been sold, arrangements have been made to secure to the corporation the profits realized on these sales. These arrangements take the form of agreements entered into between officers and directors and the corporation. They are so worded as to expire on November 1, 1941, and we must, therefore, issue our order subject to the condition that the merger be effected prior to that date.

Declarants state that the fees and expenses in connection with the proposed plan will be approximately \$90,318.14,⁴ itemized as follows: attorneys' fees and expenses, \$44,270.38; valuation reports, \$13,531.29; auditor's fees, \$986.80; printing, \$3,000; postage, \$7,000; engraving new stock certificates, \$3,000; fees of transfer agents and registrars, \$10,500; advertising and miscellaneous, \$8,029.67. In view of the fact that this case has been pending for over four years, during which time many proposed plans of reorganization have been submitted and many conferences and hearings have been held, the amounts do not appear to be unreasonable or excessive and will be approved.

The revised plan of reorganization seems to meet the requirements of Section 7 of the Act set out in our original

³ Including Chenery Corporation, wholly owned by C. T. Chenery and members of his family.

⁴ If the new common stock is listed on the New York Stock Exchange, listing fees will be approximately \$12,000 additional.

opinion. The solicitation material which has now been filed with us is satisfactory.

The applications will be granted and the declarations will be permitted to become effective subject, however, to the following conditions:

(1) That the proposed merger agreement be adopted and the reorganization and merger effected prior to November 1, 1941.

(2) That within ten days of the consummation of the reorganization and merger the applicants and declarants shall certify to the Commission that the transactions have been carried out in accordance with the terms and conditions of and for the purposes represented by the applications and declarations now on file with the Commission.

(3) That profits from sales, within three years, of investments held by the reorganized corporation upon completion of the reorganization be credited to capital surplus and that losses be charged to income or earned surplus unless upon application the Commission shall approve some other disposition of such profits and losses.

4009 (4) That no charge shall be made to capital surplus unless (a) such charge has previously been authorized by appropriate resolution of declarant's board of directors, and (b) subsequent to such resolution of the board of directors, thirty days prior notice of the making of such charge be given to this Commission. The Commission reserves jurisdiction, on receipt of such notice, in and as part of the proceedings herein, after notice given within such thirty days and opportunity for hearing, to disapprove such charge on the basis of the record herein and any additional evidence that may be adduced by any interested party; and in the event that the Commission shall notify declarant to show cause why such charge should not be disapproved, the charge in question shall not be made until expressly authorized by order of this Commission.

(5) That the Commission reserves jurisdiction to entertain, at the request of the applicants and declarants or any of them, such further proceedings and such further action

as may be appropriate regarding any step which may be taken to consummate the proposed reorganization and merger.

An appropriate order will issue

By the Commission (Chairman Eicher and Commissioners Pike and Burke), Commissioner Healy filing a dissenting statement (see below) and Commissioner Purcell being absent and not participating.

/s/ FRANCIS P. BRASSOR,

(Seal)

Secretary.

4010 Healy, C., dissenting.

The Report, which we have today issued to security holders pursuant to Section 11 (g) of the Act, states on page 3: "It is apparent that asset values would have to be increased by approximately \$10,100,000 for any assets to be available regard to earnings, the Report states, on page 3: "It is for the Class A stock in the event of dissolution." With nevertheless apparent that any hopes for dividends on the Class A stock must be limited to some time in the very remote future." Furthermore, it should be noted that it was found necessary under the majority opinion of March 24, 1941¹ to reduce the par value of the 1,500,000 authorized shares of common stock of the surviving corporation from \$12 to \$5.

The pro forma balance sheet shows net assets at about \$20,700,000. Deducting from this the outstanding debentures of \$5,220,000, leaves about \$15,480,000 with which to satisfy preferred stock claims of approximately \$25,600,000, a deficiency of approximately \$10,120,000. There can be no pretense that the common stock to be issued in exchange for the old preferred will have, within any reasonable future period of time, a market value of anything like approximately \$25,600,000.

All of this to my mind demonstrates, as I tried to demonstrate in my dissent of March 24, 1941,² that there is no

¹ Holding Company Act Release No. 2635.

² *Id.*

basis here, under applicable principles which I believe have been established by the courts, for the participation of the Class A stock.

Certified to be Commissioner Healy's dissenting statement herein.

/s/ FRANCIS P. BRASSOR,
Secretary.

**Order Permitting Declarations to Become Effective and
Granting Applications.**

4011 United States of America

Before the Securities and Exchange Commission

At a regular session of the Securities and Exchange Commission, held at its office in the City of Washington, D. C.,
on the 24th day of September, A. D., 1941.

In the Matter of

Federal Water Service Corporation
Utility Operators Company
Federal Water and Gas Corporation

File Nos. 34-9
34-41
70-28

(Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935)

Federal Water Service Corporation, Utility Operators Company and Federal Water and Gas Corporation having filed applications and declarations, and amendments thereto, pursuant to the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 and the Rules and Regulations promulgated thereunder with respect to a plan for the readjustment and simplification of the capital structure of Federal Water Service Corporation by means of and in connection with a merger between said corporations; and

A public hearing having been held after appropriate notice, and the Commission having considered the record and

having made and filed its findings and opinion and its supplemental findings and opinion herein;

It Is Hereby Ordered that said applications, as amended, be and the same hereby are granted forthwith, and that said declarations, as amended, be and the same hereby are permitted to become effective forthwith, subject, however, to the following conditions:

(1) That the proposed merger agreement be adopted and the reorganization and merger effected prior to November 1, 1941.

(2) That within ten days after the consummation of the reorganization and merger the applicants and declarants shall certify to the Commission that the transactions have been carried out in accordance with the terms and conditions of and for the purposes represented by the applications and declarations now on file with the Commission.

(3) That profits from sales, within three years, of 4012 investments held by the reorganized corporation upon completion of the reorganization be credited to capital surplus and that losses from such sales be charged to income or earned surplus unless upon application the Commission shall approve some other disposition of such profits and losses.

(4) That no charge shall be made to capital surplus unless (a) such charge has previously been authorized by appropriate resolution of declarant's board of directors, and (b) subsequent to such resolution of the board of directors, thirty days prior notice of the making of such charge be given to this Commission. The Commission reserves jurisdiction, on receipt of such notice, in and as part of the proceedings herein, after notice given within such thirty days and opportunity for hearing, to disapprove such charge on the basis of the record herein and any additional evidence that may be adduced by any interested party; and in the event that the Commission shall notify declarant to show cause why such charge should not be disapproved, the charge in question shall not be made until expressly authorized by order of this Commission.

(5) That the Commission reserves jurisdiction to entertain, at the request of the applicants and declarants or any of them, such further proceedings and such further action as may be appropriate regarding any step which may be taken to consummate the proposed reorganization and merger.

By the Commission.

(Seal)

/s/ FRANCIS P. BRASSOR,
Secretary.

FILED JAN 26 1942

Joseph W. Stewart

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF AND APPENDIX CLERK

**In the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia**

No. 8074

**CHENERY CORPORATION, H. M. ERSKINE, R. H. NELSON, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS**

v.

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, RESPONDENT

**ON PETITION TO REVIEW AN ORDER OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION**

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In the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

No. 8074

CHENERY CORPORATION, H. M. ERSKINE, R. H. NEILSON, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS

v.

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, RESPONDENT

ON PETITION TO REVIEW AN ORDER OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT¹

This case comes before the Court upon a petition to review an order of the Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter called "the Commission"), issued under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (hereinafter called "the Act," Act of August 26, 1935, c. 687, 49 Stat. 803, Tit. 15 U. S. C., Sec. 79a *et seq.*). The petition for review was filed pursuant to Section 24 (a) of the Act (49 Stat. 834, Tit. 15 U. S. C., Sec. 79x). The order complained of permits Federal Water Service Corporation (hereinafter called Federal), a registered holding company and a subsidiary of Utility Operators Company, also a registered holding company, to effect a readjustment of

¹ Throughout this brief, the abbreviations "B." or "Pet. B." refer to the petitioners' brief and the abbreviation "Pet. App." refers to the appendix to the petitioners' brief. "Res. App." refers to the appendix to respondent's brief. Reference to portions of the transcript not printed in the appendix to either brief is by document number and page as listed in the Commission's certification of the transcript, viz: "Tr. Doc. No. —, p. —."

the rights *inter sese* of its shareholders by means recognized in the law of the state of its incorporation.

The action of the Commission took the form of permitting to become effective a certain declaration filed by Federal and Utility Operators Company, and by their subsidiary, Federal Water and Gas Corporation, which, as ultimately amended, dealt with the manner and terms of a proposed merger of the three corporations.² The declaration was originally filed with the Commission on November 8, 1937. It was, however, thereafter amended fourteen times before the plan assumed its final form. The Commission permitted the declaration, as amended, to become effective on September 24, 1941.

Petitioners, except Chenery Corporation, are or were officers and/or directors of Utility Operators Company and/or Federal during all or part of the period between November 8, 1937, and September 24, 1941. Chenery Corporation is "a family investment corporation." Its stockholders are its president, C. T. Chenery, now and at all times since prior to November 8, 1937, the president and a director of Federal and of Utility Operators Company, who with his wife owns 16,737 of its 22,937 outstanding shares, Chenery's three children, his sister, and three of his brothers, one of whom, C. M. Chenery, a petitioner herein, owns an additional 1,100 shares, and is also a director of Utility Operators Company (Pet. App. 5, 13, 85, 86).

The primary objective of the proceedings voluntarily instituted by Federal before the Commission was to effect a recapitalization of the company through a readjustment of its stockholders' rights. The major incentive for undertaking such a project was that there had been such an impairment of Federal's capital that dividends could not be paid on any classes of Federal's stock after October 1, 1931 (Tr. Doc. No. 9, pp. 614-616). Thus by December 1, 1939, Federal had a capital surplus deficit of \$3,848,865 and an earned surplus deficit of \$3,865,070 (Tr. Doc. No. 12, p. 827). These deficits, aggregat-

² Hereafter referred to as "the declarants." The only assets of Utility Operators Company are securities of Federal. Federal Water and Gas Corporation has no assets and was organized merely for the purpose of holding its name, which, under the plan, is to be assumed by the surviving corporation.

ing \$7,713,935, existed despite a carrying figure of \$23,836,361 for investments, an amount which Federal itself considered excessive (Tr. Doc. No. 12, p. 826).

There were, however, other factors which impelled Federal to institute the proceedings before the Commission. Among these was the prospect of the compulsory simplification of Federal's corporate structure and the redistribution of the voting power among its security holders pursuant to the provisions of Section 11 (b) (2) of the Act (Tr. Doc. No. 9, p. 616). This prospect resulted from the fact that while Federal's preferred and Class A stocks were entitled to vote because of dividend arrearages, the Class B stock controlled 42.73 percent of the company's total voting strength, although Federal's capital was so impaired as to leave no equity for the Class B stock (Tr. Doc. No. 30, p. 1326; Tr. Doc. No. 12, pp. 783-785). The Class B stock, moreover, controlled Federal as a practical matter because, while the bulk of the preferred and Class A stocks was widely held, the Class B stock was all owned by one stockholder—Utility Operators Company, which C. T. Chenery and petitioners effectively controlled³ (Tr. Doc. No. 12, p. 786; Tr. Doc. No. 13, pp. 979-981; Tr. Doc. No. 22, pp. 1180-1181; Tr. Doc. No. 35, p. 1597). Obviously, the continued control of Federal by the Class B stock was the result of an unfair and inequitable distribution of voting power among Federal's security holders within the meaning of Section 11 (b) (2) of the Act. *In Re Community Power and Light Co.*, 33 F. Supp. 901, 914 (S. D. N. Y. 1940).

Fully cognizant of the problems created by its capital deficit, Federal instituted these proceedings before the Commission on November 8, 1937, the very day it registered as a holding company (Pet. App. 2; Tr. Doc. No. 2, pp. 1-16; Tr. Doc. No. 73-75, pp. 3254-3259), and thus became en-

³ Although C. T. Chenery and petitioners owned but one-third of the shares of Utility Operators Company, they were able, as a practical matter, to control it, since the balance of its shares was owned principally by officers and employes of Federal or its subsidiaries (Pet. App. 3, 4, 14-15; Tr. Doc. No. 18, p. 1133). The officers and directors of Utility Operators Company were also either officers or directors of Federal or its subsidiaries (Pet. App. 85, 86).

titled to the benefits of the Act. *Lawless v. S. E. C.*, 105 F. (2d) 574, 577 (C. C. A. 1st, 1939). But despite the absence of any equity for the Class B stock and the consequent unfairness and inequity to the other classes of Federal's stock of continuing the Class B shares as a factor of the company, none of the four plans proposed by Federal in the course of the four years that the proceedings were pending before the Commission, except the last as ultimately amended, contemplated the elimination of the Class B stock, which was petitioners' main interest in the enterprise (Tr. Doc. No. 2, pp. 5-6; Tr. Doc. No. 5, pp. 459-468; Tr. Doc. No. 7, pp. 487-574; Tr. Doc. No. 12, pp. 785-787; Tr. Doc. No. 16, pp. 1036-1037).

The first three plans were withdrawn after hearings before trial examiners of the Commission, but without the Commission's having issued any findings or entered any orders with respect thereto. The stock affected by the provision of the plan here under attack is preferred stock of Federal acquired by petitioners after the institution of the proceedings before the Commission and while the individual petitioners and C. T. Chenery were officers and/or directors of Federal and/or Utility Operators Company, its parent.

Petitioners' objection is that, whereas the plan which the Commission approved provides generally that each share of Federal's several classes of preferred stock is to be exchanged for common shares of the surviving corporation (in amounts varying with their dividend rates), under the plan, Chenery Corporation is entitled to receive for such of its Federal preferred stock as it purchased after November 8, 1937, and the other petitioners are entitled to receive for their Federal preferred holdings acquired after that date and while they were officers or directors of one or more of the declarants, only the cost thereof plus 4 percent interest, less any profits derived from the resale of any Federal preferred stock so acquired (Pet. App. 84, 85).

The plan of readjustment was voluntarily submitted by Federal to the Commission as a proposal to exercise a priv-

ilege or right to alter the priorities, preferences, and voting power of its outstanding classes of stock, within the meaning of Section 6 (a) (2) of the Act. The Commission considered the proposal as also embodying a plan to eliminate undue complexities in Federal's corporate structure and the unfair and inequitable distribution of voting power among its security holders, within the meaning of Section 11 (b) (2) of the Act. Consequently, in passing on the proposal the Commission considered it in the light of the standards of both Section 7 (e) and Section 11 (e) of the Act (Res. App. 37-38).

The extent to which petitioners' analysis of the case misses the mark is apparent from the fact that in setting forth the statute involved (Pet. B. 11, 12) petitioners make no reference to either Section 11 (e) or Section 11 (b) (2) of the Act. Furthermore, petitioners have omitted from the appendix to their brief the major portions of the Commission's findings and opinion, dated March 24, 1941, dealing with the pertinence of the standards of Section 11 (e) to the proposed plan.⁴

The applicability to the plan of the standards of Section 11 (e) of the Act was not challenged by the petitioners in the proceedings before the Commission, nor do they challenge it here. Consequently, petitioners' objection to the plan must be considered under Section 11 (e) as well as Section 7 (e).⁵ It should be noted, however, that in the Commission's view, the same result is reached, in this case, under the standards of either section (Res. App. 38), and that while one Commissioner dissented as to certain aspects of the plan not in issue here, the Commission was unanimous that it could not approve a plan that did not limit petitioners' participation in the manner embodied in the plan as approved (Res. App. 45-47).

⁴ A more complete text of the Commission's findings and opinion will be found in the appendix annexed to this brief.

⁵ Section 24 (a) of the Act in part provides: "No objection to the order of the Commission shall be considered by the court unless such objection shall have been urged before the Commission or unless there were reasonable grounds for failure so to do."

ADDITIONAL STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Section 11 of the Act in pertinent part provides:

SEC. 11. (a) * * *.

(b) It shall be the duty of the Commission, as soon as practicable after January 1, 1938:

* * * *

(2) To require by order, after notice and opportunity for hearing, that each registered holding company, and each subsidiary company thereof, shall take such steps as the Commission shall find necessary to ensure that the corporate structure or continued existence of any company in the holding-company system does not unduly or unnecessarily complicate the structure, or unfairly or inequitably distribute voting power among security holders, of such holding-company system. * * *.

* * * *

(e) * * * any registered holding company or any subsidiary company of a registered holding company may, at any time after January 1, 1936, submit a plan to the Commission for the divestment of control, securities, or other assets, or for other action by such company or any subsidiary company thereof for the purpose of enabling such company or any subsidiary company thereof to comply with the provisions of subsection (b). If, after notice and opportunity for hearing, the Commission shall find such plan, as submitted or as modified, necessary to effectuate the provisions of subsection (b) and fair and equitable to the persons affected by such plan, the Commission shall make an order approving such plan; and the Commission, at the request of the company, may apply to a court, in accordance with the provisions of subsection (f) of section 18, to enforce and carry out the terms and provisions of such plan. If, upon any such application, the court, after notice and opportunity for hearing, shall approve such plan as fair and equitable and as appropriate to effectuate the provisions of section 11, the court as a court of equity may, to such extent as it deems necessary for the purpose of carrying out the terms and provisions of such

plan, take exclusive jurisdiction and possession of the company or companies and the assets thereof, wherever located; * * *.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The petitioners acquired all of the stock in question after the institution of the proceedings before the Commission for the readjustment of the rights *inter sese* of Federal's shareholders. C. T. Chenery and the individual petitioners were officers and/or directors of Federal and/or of its parent, Utility Operators Company, at the time when such stock was purchased. Under the Act a plan for the readjustment of the rights of shareholders of a registered holding company or a subsidiary thereof may be filed and amended, and, if approved, may be consummated or abandoned, in the uncontrolled discretion of the company's management.

If, after the filing of such a plan, those with whom such uncontrolled discretion rests may freely trade in shares of the company's stock, neither the Commission nor the company's security holders can have any assurance that the filing of the plan or any amendment thereto, or its eventual consummation or abandonment, was not prompted by the expected effect thereof on the market price of the company's shares, rather than by the interests of the company and its security holders. In approving the plan as amended, the Commission recognized that the public interest and the interest of investors require that its procedures and jurisdiction be closed to every possibility of such abuse.

Those who undertake to formulate and secure approval of a plan for the readjustment of stockholders' rights thereby assume fiduciary obligations to the stockholders whose rights the plan proposes to affect, and their judgment and conduct in such an undertaking should not be open to influences arising from the possibility of personal profit through the purchase of securities subject to the plan. Consequently, they may not profit, in the consummation of the plan, through purchases made while such fiduciary obligations continue.

Federal's stockholders were entitled to the utmost good faith at the hands of C. T. Chenery and the individual petitioners,

at least while the proceedings were pending before the Commission, and while the discretion to amend the proposed plan, or to abandon it even if approved by the Commission, resided with Federal's management. It is incompatible with the *ul-tissima fides* thus due to the holders of Federal shares affected by the plan, and liable to be otherwise or further affected by amendments thereto, that petitioners should profit in the consummation of the plan through having purchased such securities while the proceedings were pending before the Commission and C. T. Chenery and the individual petitioners were officers and/or directors of Federal and/or its parent, Utility Operators Company.

The petitioner Chenery Corporation purchased the Federal preferred stock here in question on the advice of its president, C. T. Chenery (Pet. App. 13, 86), president both of Federal and Utility Operators Company as well. It thus had full knowledge of all the facts, and, consequently, must be deemed subject to the same disabilities as C. T. Chenery himself.

The plan, as amended and approved, is "fair and equitable to the persons affected thereby" within the meaning of Section 11 (e) of the Act and is not "detrimental to the public interest or the interest of investors" within the meaning of Section 7 (e). Any plan which permitted petitioners to profit in the consummation of the plan through purchases made while the proceedings were pending before the Commission and C. T. Chenery and the individual petitioners were officers and/or directors of Federal and/or Utility Operators Company, its parent, would have been unfair and inequitable and detrimental to the public interest and the interest of investors.

ARGUMENT

(1) *The Commission's action and the issue before this Court.*

Neither the Commission's refusal to permit Federal to effect a plan that did not contain the provision complained of, nor the Commission's subsequent approval of an amended plan that did, was predicated on any finding that petitioners defrauded, or failed to make the fullest disclosure to, the stockholders from whom they purchased the shares in ques-

tion. Nor was the Commission's determination based, as petitioners would imply (Pet. B. 14-19, 23-26), upon any theory that corporate officers and directors are not ordinarily free to purchase shares of their company's stock. Cf. *Ashman v. Miller*, 101 F. (2d) 85 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939).

On the contrary, the Commission's action was grounded on the salutary principle that those who undertake, by whatever means or procedures, to formulate and to effect a corporate reorganization by the readjustment of shareholders' rights, thereby assume a fiduciary relationship to all of the shareholders affected by the plan, and may not profit, in the consummation of the plan, from purchases of the company's shares made while the reorganization is pending. This prophylactic rule, which is intended to limit the possibility of abuse in the exercise of the powers assumed by those who function as reorganization managers, the Commission held to be applicable to proceedings before it. And the only issue before this Court is whether the Commission was right in so holding.

The Commission's action is squarely bottomed on the statutory standards by which the plan was necessarily to be gauged. As a proposal to exercise a privilege or right to alter the priorities, preferences, and voting power of Federal's shareholders, within the meaning of Section 6 (a) (2) of the Act, the plan had to meet the standard of Section 7 (e) of not being "detrimental to the public interest or the interest of investors." As a proposal to eliminate undue complexities in Federal's corporate structure and the unfair and inequitable distribution of voting power among its security holders, within the meaning of Section 11 (b) (2) of the Act, the plan was required by Section 11 (e) to meet the standard of being "fair and equitable to the persons affected" thereby.

Under Sections 6 (a) (2) and 11 (e) of the Act plans for the readjustment of the rights of a company's shareholders may be filed and amended or abandoned in the uncontrolled discretion of the company's management. And even if the plan is approved by the Commission, the management's discretion to abandon it is uncontrolled, for the Commission has no authority

to enforce or carry out a voluntary plan except at the request of the company.

The Commission's holding is that a plan for the readjustment of shareholders' rights is "fair and equitable to the persons affected" thereby and is not "detrimental to the public interest or the interest of investors" which by its terms prevents those with whom such uncontrolled discretion rests from profiting, in the consummation of the plan, through purchases of securities affected thereby while the proceedings on the plan were pending. Petitioners contend (Pet. B. 33) that unless such persons may personally profit in that manner, a plan is unfair and inequitable and detrimental to the public interest and the interest of investors. These are the fundamental contentions underlying the issue presented by this petition.

(2) *The plan is not "detrimental to the public interest or the interest of investors" within the meaning of Section 7 (e) of the Act. On the contrary, a plan which permitted petitioners personally to profit in the consummation of the plan through purchases of securities affected thereby made while the individual petitioners and C. T. Chenery were officers or directors of Federal or its parent and while the proceedings to readjust shareholders' rights were pending before the Commission, would have been detrimental to both the public interest and the interest of investors.*

Since under the Act a company's management may in its uncontrolled discretion formulate, file, and amend a plan for the readjustment of the rights of shareholders and even if it is approved, effect or abandon it, a company's officers and directors, and those of its parent, are vested with far-reaching power to affect the market price of its securities. This is so because the market price of shares of a given class will ordinarily be affected by the treatment proposed to be accorded to that class by a plan for the readjustment of shareholders' rights, and the amendments thereto, filed with the Commission. Consequently unless a plan may properly provide that a company's management shall not profit personally, in its consummation, through purchases of the company's securities made while the plan was pending before the Commission, there can be no assurance that the filing of the plan or any amendment thereto

was not prompted by the expected effect thereof on the market price of the shares subject to the plan, rather than by the best interests of the company and its investors.

It follows that unless a plan may, by the means here under attack, bar the company's management from profiting personally in the consummation of the plan by reason of having traded in its securities after the plan was submitted to the Commission, the Commission's jurisdiction and procedures will be open to the gravest abuses and subject to perversions that may render the Act an instrument to further the designs of the unscrupulous, rather than to defeat them. We submit, therefore, that the inclusion in a plan of a provision which limits the possibility of such abuse does not render the plan "detrimental to the public interest." On the contrary such a provision constitutes a necessary assurance that the plan is not detrimental to the public interest in an essential particular.

We do not mean to suggest that Federal's management filed the declaration or any amendment thereto for any ulterior purpose. More particularly we do not mean to suggest that the declaration or any amendment thereto was filed for the effect that it might have had on the market price of the securities affected thereby so that petitioners might personally profit in the consummation of the plan through having traded, while the proceedings were pending, in Federal's securities. We do urge, however, that if the provision of the plan here under attack were held to render the plan "detrimental to the public interest," so that the Commission would be required to approve plans under Section 7 (e) of the Act, notwithstanding the absence of such a provision, a broad avenue to that kind of abuse of the Commission's procedures and jurisdiction would be opened.

The purpose of including such a provision in a plan is to assure the absence of any such abuse by a company's management of its power under the Act to formulate, file, and amend plans for the readjustment of stockholders' rights. Consequently, that the abuse it was intended to prevent may not have occurred in this case does not militate against it. That the evil struck at has not, in a particular case, resulted is no ground for withdrawing the safeguards against abuses of the

public interest and thus permitting the fruition of transactions which, because of their general tendency to invite evil, are of a class deemed inimical to the public interest. To hold otherwise would be to "destroy the safeguards of the law and lessen the prevention of abuses." *Weil v. Neary*, 278 U. S. 160, 174 (1929); cf. *Woodstock Iron Company v. Richmond and Danville Extension Company*, 129 U. S. 643 (1889); *Oscanyan v. Arms Company*, 103 U. S. 261 (1880).

We submit, therefore, that the provision of the plan here attacked is not "detrimental to the public interest", but is, on the contrary, an appropriate safeguard, in the public interest, against abuses of the Commission's jurisdiction and procedures under the Act. And, we submit, the provision in question is, by the same token a protection to investors rather than a detriment to their interest. The interests of the public and of investors, in this instance at any rate, would appear to be identical.

The power of corporate managers under the Act to formulate, file and amend plans for the readjustment of shareholders' rights, and to effect or abandon them after approval, is, like every other power vested in corporate officers and directors, as such, a power in trust, to be exercised only for the benefit of their corporation and its shareholders. See *Pepper v. Litton*, 308 U. S. 295, 306 (1939). And it is axiomatic that a corporate officer or director may not "place himself under any direct and powerful inducement to disregard his duty to the corporation and its stockholders in the management of corporate affairs." *Ashman v. Miller*, 101 F. (2d) 85, 91 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939).

Where transactions that would place corporate officers in such a position have been agreed to but have not yet been consummated, they will not be enforced because it is their "inevitable tendency * * * to make the officers * * * pervert their trusts to their private gain at the price of injury at once to the stockholders and to the public." *Bestor v. Wathen*, 60 Ill. 138, 141 (1871), cited with approval in *Woodstock Iron Company v. Richmond and Danville Extension Company*, 129 U. S. 643, 659-662 (1889). If, however, the transaction has been consummated, the profits or other bene-

fits thereof are deemed to belong to the corporation and its shareholders, which achieves the dual purpose of relieving the officer of the embarrassment of being subject to an inducement (if it still persists) to put his own interests above those of his corporation and its shareholders, and of restraining him and others from embarking on similar ventures. See *Ashman v. Miller*, 101 F. (2d) 85, 90-92 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939).

The application of these principles to the facts in the case at bar demonstrates that the provision of the plan here in question is consonant with the legal rights of Federal and its shareholders, *vis à vis* petitioners, and that, far from being detrimental to the interest of investors, it is clearly in their interest.

Certainly it cannot be denied that Federal's shareholders were entitled to the utmost good faith at the hands of C. T. Chenery and the individual petitioners, at least while the proceedings to readjust the shareholders' rights were pending before the Commission, and, as officers and/or directors of Federal and/or Utility Operators Company, its parent, they were vested with the uncontrolled discretion to formulate new plans and amend old ones. Nor can it be denied that for C. T. Chenery and the individual petitioners to place themselves in any position which tended to restrain them in the free exercise of their official judgment and discretion in this regard, must be deemed incompatible with the *ultissima fides* due from them to Federal and its shareholders.

It must be clear that they placed themselves in such a position if, by trading in Federal's shares, C. T. Chenery and the individual petitioners created a situation where their decisions to amend the declaration so as to propose new plans or amend old ones were subject to being influenced either by the expected effect thereof on their market operations or by their changing market positions.

That both these situations were created there can be no doubt. One who is actively in the market for a company's shares and is at the same time conducting proceedings before the Commission to effect a readjustment of the rights *inter sese* of its various classes of stock is, of necessity, in a position where his self-interest may influence his judgment

to mold the proceedings so as to assure the profitableness of his market operations. He is also so situated that his current market position, recently achieved, may consciously or otherwise influence his judgment in the formulation or amendment of plans.

We urge, therefore, that C. T. Chenery and the individual petitioners had no right as against Federal and its shareholders to profit in the consummation of the plan through having traded in Federal's securities while the proceedings were pending before the Commission, and they were officers and/or directors of Federal and/or of Utility Operators Company, its parent. We submit that the provision of the plan here under attack was a proper means of asserting Federal's right and the right of its shareholders to the undivided loyalty of C. T. Chenery and the individual petitioners and of assuring Federal and its shareholders against faithlessness and corruption on the part of those who owed them the utmost good faith.

We submit, therefore, that the provision here in question does not render the plan detrimental to the interest of investors, but, that, on the contrary, it serves to protect the interests of Federal's investors in a most important respect. We urge, for all of the reasons above set forth, that the provision which petitioners attack is not "detrimental to the public interest or the interest of investors," within the meaning of Section 7 (e) of the Act, and that the Commission's refusal to deny effectiveness, under that section, to the declaration as amended was in all respects proper.

(3) *The plan is "fair and equitable to the persons affected" thereby within the meaning of Section 11 (e). A plan which permitted petitioners personally to profit in the consummation of the plan through purchases of securities affected thereby made while the individual petitioners and C. T. Chenery were officers or directors of Federal or its parent and while the proceedings for the readjustment of shareholders' rights were pending before the Commission, would have been neither fair nor equitable.*

The "fair and equitable" standard is one well known in the law of corporate reorganizations of which Section 11 (e) manifestly forms an integral part. Cf. *In re Community Power &*

Light Co., 33 F. Supp. 901 (S. D. N. Y. 1940). Thus, it was the standard applied in corporate reorganizations effected under the equity powers of the courts of the United States prior to the enactment of and its incorporation in former Section 77B of the National Bankruptcy Act. *Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co.*, 308 U. S. 106, 115 (1939). It is also the applicable standard for corporate reorganizations under both Chapters X and XI of that Act. *S. E. C. v. United States Realty & Improvement Co.*, 310 U. S. 434, 452 (1940).

Upon any application to the court to enforce and carry out a plan of corporate simplification or to redistribute voting power approved by the Commission under Section 11 (e), the court must, under the express provisions of that section, determine whether the plan is "fair and equitable." See *In re Community Power & Light Co.*, *supra*, 33 F. Supp. at 917. Thus, before a voluntary plan under Section 11 (e) may be approved, the Commission must find it to be "fair and equitable," and before such a plan may be enforced judicially, the court must also find that it meets that standard, which as we have seen, is one which the courts apply both under their equity and bankruptcy powers. Consequently, it would seem clear that the "fair and equitable" standard to be applied by the Commission under Section 11 (e) is essentially the same standard that the courts have long applied in the field of corporate reorganization. Cf. *Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co.*, *supra*.

It was the usual practice in reorganization proceedings prior to the enactment of Chapter X of the National Bankruptcy Act for more or less self-constituted "protective committees," or "reorganization managers" representing one or more of such committees, to undertake the conduct of the proceedings and the task of formulating the plan of reorganization. The members of these committees were held, on general principles of equity, to owe fiduciary duties to the security holders they represented and to have violated such duties if they traded in any of the corporation's securities while the proceedings were pending. *In re Paramount-Publix Corporation*, 12 F. Supp. 823, 830, 831 (S. D. N. Y. 1935), *aff'd* 83 F.

(2d) 1015 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936) and cited with approval in *American United Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park*, 311 U. S. 138, 147 (1940); *In re Republic Gas Corporation*, 35 F. Supp. 300, 303-306 (S. D. N. Y. 1936). And although the functions of such committees are much restricted under Chapter X, they nevertheless continue to be deemed fiduciaries. *In re Mountain States Power Co.*, 118 F. (2d) 405, 408, 409 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941); *Otis & Co. v. Insurance Bldg. Corporation*, 110 F. (2d) 333 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940).

The fiduciary character of protective committees springs from the fact that they have undertaken to act in the reorganization proceedings for the best interests of the security holders whom they represent, and that implicit in any such undertaking there is necessarily an obligation to observe the utmost good faith. This obligation is deemed violated when a committee member purchases securities of the corporation, whether of the class represented by his committee or not, *In re Paramount-Publix Corporation*, *supra*, and whether from persons whom his committee represents or on the open market. *In re Republic Gas Corporation*, *supra*. This is but an aspect of the familiar principle that a fiduciary may not engage in transactions which may involve a conflict between his own self-interest and the interests of those to whom he owes a duty of undivided loyalty. *Woods v. City National Bank & Trust Co.*, 312 U. S. 262, 267-269 (1941). Thus in the *Republic Gas* case, *supra*, 35 F. Supp. at 303, 304, it was said that this prohibition against trading in the company's securities by members of protective committees

grows out of the requirement that a trustee have no interest, or even temptation, to act adversely to the beneficiaries of his trust. Trafficking in any bonds of the issue would or might beget a desire to buy low or to sell high. The confidence reposed by depositors, as a body, in their trustee would be abused by such behavior on his part * * *.

* * * * *
* * * it incites a motive, or affords opportunity for a motive, on the part of the trustee to take advantage of his superior knowledge acquired in his trust capacity,

which may induce him to conceal his information from the beneficiaries or not to employ it exclusively for their benefit while they are relying on him scrupulously to devote himself to the furtherance of their welfare.

In proceedings for corporate simplification or for redistribution of voting power under Section 11 (e) of the Act, the company's management in effect assumes the position of a protective committee representing all classes of the company's securities. This is necessarily so, for under Section 11 (e) the company's management has the sole and uncontrolled discretion to file and amend a plan of corporate simplification or to redistribute voting power, and even after approval by the Commission, to effect or abandon it. This power, like the similar power under Sections 6 and 7 of the Act, considered under point 2 of this Argument, must be deemed a power in trust to be exercised only for the best interests of the company and all its security holders. Consequently, in the conduct of proceedings before the Commission under Section 11 (e), a company's management undertakes fiduciary obligations of an even sterner character than does a protective committee which participates in proceedings to reorganize a corporation under the aegis of a court. A protective committee may not, in such proceedings, represent classes of securities whose interests may conflict; a corporate management must and does represent, in proceedings under Section 11 (e), all classes of the company's securities, as well as the company itself.

It would seem clearly to follow that if it is a breach of duty for a member of a protective committee to purchase, on the open market or otherwise, any securities of any class of the company in reorganization while the proceedings continue, it is equally, if not more so, and for the same reasons, a breach of duty for a member of a corporation's management to purchase its securities while proceedings under Section 11 (e) are pending before the Commission. Nor is a violation of fiduciary obligations to be condoned because no harm may have been occasioned, *Magruder v. Drury*, 235 U. S. 106, 119, 120 (1914), or because fraud or other unfairness may not have resulted. *Woods v. City National Bank & Trust Co.*, *supra*.

The usual consequence, prior to the enactment of Chapter X of the National Bankruptcy Act, of a protective committee member's violation of his fiduciary duty by purchasing securities of the company in reorganization while the proceedings were pending, was that the Court denied him any compensation out of the estate for his services. *In re Paramount-Public Corporation, supra*; *In re Republic Gas Corporation, supra*. The same rule prevails in proceedings under Chapter X of the National Bankruptcy Act, Section 249 of which codifies and incorporates the law as developed by the courts prior to its enactment. *In re Mountain States Power Co.*, 118 F. (2d) 405, 408, 409 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941); *Otis & Co. v. Insurance Bldg. Corporation*, 110 F. (2d) 333 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940); Sen. Rep. No. 1916, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938), p. 38.

But the members of a company's management are not entitled to compensation for conducting proceedings under Section 11 (e) of the Act any more than they are for any part they may play in reorganization proceedings. See *In re Paramount-Public Corporation, supra*, 12 F. Supp. at 831. That, however, does not make them any the less fiduciaries, and would not prevent the enforcement of their obligations as such. If a member of a protective committee not entitled to compensation as such because he was also a member of the management of the corporation in reorganization, should violate his fiduciary duty and purchase securities of the company, its other security holders would undoubtedly be entitled to have his claim as a security holder completely subordinated or otherwise dealt with so that he might not profit from the breach of his fiduciary obligation. See *American United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park*, 311 U. S. 138, 145-147 (1940); cf. *Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co.*, 306 U. S. 307 (1939); *Pepper v. Litton*, 308 U. S. 295 (1939). While such relief was expressly provided in former Section 77B (b) of the National Bankruptcy Act, and is now provided in Section 212 of that Act, the right of security holders in this regard does not depend upon these enactments but springs from their basic right to a "fair and equitable" plan. Thus in the *Avon Park* case, *supra* (311 U. S. at 146), Mr. Justice Douglas said:

"* * * Where * * * investigation discloses the existence of * * * a breach of fiduciary obligations, * * * special benefits for the reorganizers, or the need for protection of investors against an inside few * * * the court has ample power to adjust the remedy to meet the need. * * * the limitation of the vote to the amount paid for the securities * * * the separate classification of claimants * * * the complete subordination of some claims * * * indicate the range and type of the power which a court of bankruptcy may exercise in these proceedings. That power is ample for the exigencies of varying situations. It is not dependent on express statutory provisions. It inheres in the jurisdiction of a court of bankruptcy. The necessity for its exercise * * * is based on the responsibility of the court before entering an order of confirmation to be satisfied that the plan in its practical incidence embodies a fair and equitable bargain openly arrived at and devoid of overreaching, however subtle * * *."

We submit that since the "fair and equitable"⁶ standard of the National Bankruptcy Act imposes upon the courts the duty of requiring that reorganization plans provide for the limita-

⁶ The *Avon Park* case arose under Chapter IX of the National Bankruptcy Act and the plan was therefore required to meet the standard of Section 83 (e) (1) which provides that the Court may not confirm a plan unless it is "fair, equitable, * * * and does not discriminate unfairly in favor of any creditor or class of creditors * * *." The phrase "does not discriminate unfairly in favor of any creditor or class of creditors," however, adds nothing to the "fair, equitable" standard. Thus, the same phrase appeared in the same setting in former Section 77B (f) but was not continued in Chapter X of the National Bankruptcy Act when the "fair and equitable" standard was set up in Section 221 (2), because it was considered to be redundant. See the Senate Judiciary Committee's Report on the Revision of the National Bankruptcy Act, S. Rep. No. 1916, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., pp. 35-36, where it is said: "Subsection (2) of Section 221 derived from Section 77B (f) (1) provides, as a condition to confirmation of a plan, that the judge must be satisfied that it is 'fair and equitable' and 'feasible.' *Implicit in the former phrase is a prohibition against any unfair discrimination in the plan in favor of any class of creditors or stockholders and the express statement to that effect in Section 77B is therefore unnecessary.*" [Italics supplied.]

tion or subordination of the claims of those who have violated their fiduciary duties, it would be anomalous to hold that the Commission was in error in approving as "fair and equitable" a plan of corporate simplification and redistribution of voting power under Section 11 (e) of the Act just because the plan approved contained such a provision. Indeed, in view of the meaning that has been given to the "fair and equitable" standard, we submit that, in the setting of this case, a plan that did not contain the provision here in question would not have been "fair and equitable" and that neither the Commission nor a court could have properly approved it in exercising their respective jurisdictions under Section 11 (e) of the Act.

While we have analogized the position of C. T. Chenery and the individual petitioners to that occupied by members of a protective committee, it should not be overlooked that the fiduciary obligations of a company's management in the conduct of its affairs, both to the corporation and its stockholders, is of a far more vital character. Protective committees owe fiduciary obligations only to a limited class over a limited period of time. The fiduciary duty of a company's managers in the conduct of its affairs, however, antedates the proceedings and, since their powers are powers in trust, *Pepper v. Litton*, 308 U. S. 295, 306 (1939), it extends to the company and the whole body of its security holders. And it is well established that a plan of reorganization is not "fair and equitable" that does not limit or cancel, to the extent appropriate to vindicate the rights of the corporation and its security holders, the claims of corporate managers who, in the conduct of the company's affairs before the institution of the proceedings, have abused their trusts. *Taylor v. Standard Gas Company*, 306 U. S. 307 (1939).⁷

⁷ The *Deep Rock* case, so-called. In that case it was held that the "fair and equitable" standards required the subordination of the claims of a dominant stockholder who was held to have abused its fiduciary obligations to the company and its security holders prior to the commencement of the proceedings. Cf. *Pepper v. Litton*, 308 U. S. 295, 306 (1939) where the Court said: "A director is a fiduciary. * * * So is a dominant or controlling stockholder or group of stockholders. * * * Their powers are powers in trust."

Although the abuse of trust in the case at bar occurred after the institution of the proceedings, we submit that the same result is required. The power to institute and to conduct proceedings to effect a readjustment of the rights of Federal's shareholders was vested in C. T. Chenery and the individual petitioners as Federal's management, and this power they held in trust to be exercised for the best interests of the company and its security holders. Thus, the abuse sought to be remedied by the provision of the plan here under attack went to the very conduct of the proceeding itself. We submit, however, that the result would be no different if corporate managers should violate their fiduciary duties to their corporation and its stockholders by, let us say, failing or delaying voluntarily to undertake a recapitalization of the company although its best interests and those of its security holders demand it, because to do so must result in the elimination of the class of stock (for which there is no equity) upon which their control rests.⁸ The duty to recapitalize a company when it needs it would seem no less cogent than the duty to capitalize it adequately at the outset. Cf. *Taylor v. Standard Gas Co.*, 306 U.S. 307 (1939). And it is the duty of corporate managers to conduct "the corporate affairs solely in the interest of the corporation, quite regardless of the effect of its policies and management upon the fortunes of individual stockholders * * *." *Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Rice*, 186 Fed. 204, 218 (N. D. Ala. 1910), *aff'd* 184 Fed. 878 (C. C. A. 5th, 1911). Certainly, if the delay were prompted by the desire of the management to afford themselves the time to acquire shares of the class which would receive control under any proper plan of recapitalization, there could be no doubt of the result.

We urge that the provision here in question did not render the plan unfair or inequitable, and that the Commission properly approved the plan as "fair and equitable to the persons affected" thereby within the meaning of Section 11 (e) of the Act.

⁸ We suggest this in partial answer to the question posed by petitioners in the last full paragraph on page 32 of their brief.

(4) *Chenery Corporation stands in no better position than C. T. Chenery would have had he personally purchased securities of Federal while the proceedings were pending before the Commission.*

It is undisputed that C. T. Chenery, president of Federal and of Utility Operators Company, its parent, at all times while the proceedings were pending before the Commission, was also president of the petitioner, Chenery Corporation, when it made the purchases of Federal's stock here in question. Nor is it disputed that Chenery Corporation is a family holding company, 16,737 shares of whose 22,937 outstanding shares are owned (and were owned while the proceedings were pending before the Commission and the purchases in question made) by C. T. Chenery and his wife. The remaining 6,200 shares are and were held by Chenery's three children, his sister, and three of his brothers. One of C. T. Chenery's brothers who was such a stockholder, C. M. Chenery, was also a director of Utility Operators Company while the proceedings were pending before the Commission, and is a petitioner in his own right upon this review. It is not questioned, furthermore, that the Federal securities purchased by Chenery Corporation while the proceedings were pending were purchased under the direction of C. T. Chenery, its president. Thus he testified (Pet. App. 13, 23, 24):

Q. Now Mr. Chenery * * * I ask you to describe the Chenery Corporation.

A. The Chenery Corporation is a family investment corporation formed in 1926. Stockholders are my three brothers, my sister, my wife, my three children and myself.

* * * * *

Q. Now Mr. Chenery why did you purchase this preferred stock?

A. I purchased it (interrupted)

Q. (Interposing) Why did the Chenery Corporation purchase the preferred stock?

A. Chenery Corporation purchased it on my advice.

* * * * *

Q. Now did you at any time request or recommend to any other officers or directors of Federal or the subsidiaries that they accumulate preferred stock?

A. Yes. * * * I said it was my view that it was sound policy for every person in the employ of the company who could spare money to buy such preferred stock as they could carry, and *that I would buy all that I could through the Chenery Corporation.* [Italics supplied.]

It follows that in so far as its purchases of Federal securities are concerned Chenery Corporation is in no different position than C. T. Chenery would have been if he had traded in his own name and right, for it is well established that "one who knowingly joins a fiduciary in an enterprise where the personal interest of the latter is or may be antagonistic to his trust becomes jointly and severally liable with him for the profits of the enterprise." *Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch*, 73 F. (2d) 121, 125 (C. C. A. 2d 1934), *cert. denied*, 294 U. S. 709; *Jackson v. Smith*, 254 U. S. 586 (1921).

Furthermore, it must be clear, in the setting of this case, that if a corporation like Chenery Corporation were free to purchase the securities of Federal while the proceedings were pending before the Commission, the jurisdiction and procedures of the Commission would be open to the abuses considered under point 2 of this Argument, to the same extent as they would be if the management of Federal were free to make such purchases. We submit, therefore, that upon this review Chenery Corporation can stand in no different position than C. T. Chenery would, and that its attacks upon the plan are no better grounded than those of the individual petitioners.

(5) *In answer to petitioners' contentions.*

Petitioners have so completely misunderstood the basis of the Commission's refusal to permit Federal to effect a plan that did not contain the provision complained of, and of its subsequent approval of an amended plan that did, that the points raised by petitioners seem hardly to have any relevance to this review. A brief consideration of each of petitioners' points will serve so to demonstrate.

Thus petitioners contend (Pet. B. 30-33) that the Commission's action in this case was at once "legislative" and "retroactive." But as we have seen, the Commission is required by Sections 7 (e) and 11 (e) of the Act to disapprove a plan if it is "detrimental to the public interest or the interest of investors" or unfair or inequitable to the persons affected thereby, and to approve a plan which is "fair and equitable" and not "detrimental to the public interest or the interest of investors." The Commission's refusal to allow Federal to effect a plan which did not contain the provision here under attack and its subsequent approval of an amended plan that did, were fairly bottomed upon the application of these statutory standards to the specific facts of this case. And it must be clear that the application by the Commission of the pertinent standards of the Act to the facts before it in any given case, is no more "legislative" or "retroactive" than a court's application, in a proceeding before it, of any principle of law or equity, statutory or otherwise.

The short answer to petitioners' contention (Pet. B. 33) that members of the staff of the Commission were fully cognizant, while the proceedings were pending, of the purchases here in question and yet did not advise petitioners that such purchases were "in any respect opposed to the standards laid down by the Congress and the Courts," is that the members of the Commission's staff were not charged with the duty of giving petitioners legal advice. In any event, neither the public nor Federal's shareholders may be deprived of their rights under the Act because members of the Commission's staff did not gratuitously advise petitioners of the law. Cf. *Utah Power & Light Co. v. U. S.*, 243 U. S. 389, 409 (1917); *U. S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.*, 310 U. S. 150, 225, 226 (1940).

Petitioners argue (Pet. B. 19-22) that because Section 17 of the Act requires officers and directors to report purchases and sales of their company's securities and to surrender to their company profits made through any purchase and sale of its securities within six months, the Act recognizes the right of corporate officers to trade in their company's securities without further limitation. But petitioners concede (Pet. B. 14)

that Section 17 does not recognize any right in officers or directors to acquire their company's securities by misrepresentation or other fraud. By the same token they must concede that Section 17 does not recognize any right on the part of an officer or director to acquire securities of his corporation when by so doing he places "himself under * * * direct and powerful inducement to disregard his duty to the corporation and its stockholders in the management of corporate affairs." *Ashman v. Miller*, 101 F. (2d) 85, 91 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939).

Certainly, petitioners would not urge that because of Section 17 a plan would be detrimental to the public interest or the interest of investors, within the meaning of Section 7 (e), or unfair and inequitable, within the meaning of Section 11 (e), because it provided that officers and directors might not participate ratably with respect to shares acquired by them through misrepresentation or other fraud practiced on the corporation or the body of its shareholders. Nor can it be argued with any more force that a plan is detrimental to the public interest or the interest of investors, and is unfair and inequitable, because it denies officers and directors the right to participate ratably with respect to such shares as they have acquired by placing themselves under direct and powerful inducements to disregard their duties to the corporation and its stockholders in the management of corporate affairs. This is especially so where the corporate affairs concerned were the formulation, filing, and amending of the plan itself and the conduct of proceedings thereon.

Petitioners' opening argument (Pet. B. 14-19) is beside the point. As must be clear, the Commission's action in refusing to allow Federal to effect a plan that did not contain the provision here attacked, and in later approving an amended plan that did, was not based upon any proposition that an officer or director is not, under ordinary circumstances, free to purchase the stock of his corporation. We believe that we have shown in points 2 and 3 of this Argument that the circumstances of this case were not "ordinary" in that by undertaking proceedings before the Commission with respect to a plan to readjust the rights of Federal's stockholders and to simplify

its corporate structure, C. T. Chenery and the individual petitioners, as Federal's management, assumed new and sterner obligations to their corporation and its shareholders.

Moreover, the Commission's decision was not based on any theory that petitioners should have purchased the shares for Federal. Nor was it based on any theory that, by the purchase of the shares in question, the petitioners violated any fiduciary obligations owed to the shareholders from whom they made their purchases. On the contrary, the fiduciary obligations which the Commission held to be involved were those owing to the corporation and the body of its shareholders. It is immaterial whether or not petitioners made full disclosure in purchasing the stock in question, for the vice in the purchase of securities of a company by its managers while proceedings are pending before the Commission for a readjustment of its shareholders' rights is that: (1) it "may beget a desire to buy low or to sell high", which, as we have seen, may place the corporate managers under a direct and powerful inducement to disregard, in the conduct of the proceedings, their duty to the corporation and its security holders; and (2) it affords an opportunity for a motive on the part of the corporate managers to take advantage of the knowledge, acquired through their conduct of the proceedings, for their own benefit and not to employ it exclusively for the benefit of the corporation and the body of its shareholders. Cf. *Ashman v. Miller*, *supra*, 101 Fed. (2d) at 91; *In re Republic Gas Corporation*, *supra*, 35 Fed. Supp. at 303, 304; see *supra*, pp. 12-14, 16, 17. It follows that the authorities cited by petitioners in support of their first contention (Pet. B. 14, 15) are not pertinent.

We have not overlooked petitioners' discussion (Pet. B. 23-30) of the cases cited by the Commission in its opinion considering the plan before it was amended to include the provision here under attack. We believe, however, that in the light of points 2 and 3 of our Argument, it must be evident that by their analysis of these cases petitioners are "grasping at shadows and letting the substance escape."

IN CONCLUSION

In closing we wish to recall again to the Court's attention the manner in which this case arose before the Commission.

It must not be overlooked that the proceedings before the Commission were instituted by Federal, its parent, Utility Operators Company, and their subsidiary, Federal Water and Gas Corporation, for the purpose of effecting a readjustment of the rights *inter sese* of Federal's shareholders. The Commission in effect declined to approve a plan which permitted the petitioners to participate ratably with respect to shares purchased by them while the proceedings were pending before the Commission and while C. T. Chenery and the individual petitioners were officers and/or directors of Federal and/or Utility Operators Company. Thereupon the plan was amended so as to include the provision here under attack and the Commission permitted the declarants to effect it.

It should also be pointed out to the Court that while we do not claim that there was present in this case the abuse of the Commission's jurisdiction and procedures referred to in point 2 of our Argument, nevertheless, occasions for such abuse were not wanting. It will suffice on this score to point out that the amendment which incorporated the provision here under attack was the thirteenth amendment to the declaration, and that three wholly different plans were proposed during the four years that the proceedings were pending before the Commission, until at last the fourth and final plan was eventually formulated.

We urge, for all of the reasons above set forth, that the Commission's order permitting the declaration as amended to become effective was in all respects proper and in accord with law and that this petition should, therefore, be dismissed.

Respectfully submitted.

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JANUARY 26, 1942.

APPENDIX TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

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Findings and Opinion of the Commission

In the Matter of FEDERAL WATER SERVICE CORPORATION,
UTILITY OPERATORS COMPANY, FEDERAL WATER AND GAS
CORPORATION, File Nos. 34-9, 34-41, 70-28, (Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935)

* * * * *

The applications and declaration¹ underlying this case have as their primary objective the reorganization of Federal Water Service Corporation (hereinafter called "Federal") pursuant to a plan of merger proposed by its management. The contemplated reorganization is to be effectuated by a merger of Utility Operators Company, the parent of Federal, and Federal Water and Gas Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Federal, into Federal.² Utility Operators Company and Federal are registered holding companies. All three corporations are organized under the laws of Delaware.

Utility Operators Company, the top company of what is commonly known as the Federal Water Service system, is solely a holding company. Its only assets are all of the outstanding shares of Federal's Class B common stock, 6,536 shares of the same company's preferred stock, \$3,000 principal amount of its debentures, and about \$600 worth of miscella-

¹ Federal Water Service Corporation has filed (File No. 34-9) an application pursuant to Rule U-12E-4, for a report on a plan for its reorganization, and a declaration pursuant to Rule U-12E-5, with respect to solicitation of consents to this plan. Utility Operators Company has filed (File No. 34-41) a similar application and declaration. Federal Water Service Corporation and Utility Operators Company have jointly filed (File No. 70-28) a declaration pursuant to Section 7 with respect to the alteration of rights of their security holders and the issuance of new securities incident to the proposed merger. Federal Water and Gas Corporation has filed (File No. 34-9) a declaration pursuant to Section 7 with respect to alteration of rights of the holder of its securities incident to the proposed merger. This declaration adopts the application and declaration filed by Federal Water Service Corporation and Utility Operators Company and asks that Federal Water and Gas Corporation be made a party thereto.

² Federal Water Service Corporation, the surviving corporation, will change its name to Federal Water and Gas Corporation (the name now borne by its subsidiary).

neous assets. Its only outstanding securities are shares of common stock, all owned by officers, directors, and present and former employees of Federal. The company owes no debt.

Federal Water and Gas Corporation has never actively engaged in any business, and its assets are unimportant. All of its outstanding securities, ten shares of common stock of the par value of \$100, are owned by Federal. Although not required to register under the Act, Federal Water and Gas Corporation is subject to it in certain respects as a subsidiary of a registered holding company.

Financial condition of Federal Water Service Corporation

Federal is solely a holding company controlling many subsidiaries which operate water, gas, electric, and other properties in thirteen states and in one foreign country. The following is a table of its outstanding securities: ³

Type of Security:	Amount
5½% Gold Debentures due 1954-----	\$5, 222, 000
Preferred stocks (stated values*)	
\$7.00 series, 15,296 shares-----	\$1, 529, 600
Arrearages-----	990, 416
\$6.50 series, 69,888 shares-----	6, 699, 282
Arrearages-----	4, 202, 016
\$6.00 series, 71,706 shares-----	6, 812, 070
Arrearages-----	3, 979, 683
\$4.00 series, 2,379 shares-----	148, 688
Arrearages-----	88, 023
Total preferred stocks-----	24, 449, 778

*Involuntary liquidating value is \$100 per share plus accrued dividends for all classes of preferred except the \$4 series which has an involuntary liquidating value of \$62.50 per share plus accrued dividends. Voluntary liquidating value is \$110 per share plus accrued dividends for all classes of preferred except the \$4 series which has a voluntary liquidating preference of \$68.75 per share plus accrued dividends.

Type of Security:	Amount
Class A Stocks**, 568,775 shares (exclusive of	
1,420 held in the treasury)-----	\$13, 666, 733
Arrearages-----	10, 617, 133
Class A Stocks-----	\$24, 283, 866
Class B stock, 542,450 shares-----	2, 500, 000
Total-----	56, 455, 644

**In the event of liquidation the Class A stock is entitled to receive, subject to the prior rights of the preferred stock, \$50 per share plus accumulated dividends, and thereafter to share equally with the Class B stock in any remaining assets.

³Here, as throughout, unless otherwise stated, figures are as of December 31, 1940.

On the balance sheet of Federal Water Service Corporation of December 31, 1939, total assets are stated at \$29,915,729, but the investments owned by the corporation are carried at \$23,836,361, a figure which the management itself regards as excessive. There are in addition intangible assets which it is proposed to write off in the reorganization.

With total assets stated at an admittedly high figure, there is nevertheless a capital surplus deficit of \$3,848,865. In addition, there is a deficit in earned surplus account of \$3,865,070. These deficits, totalling \$7,713,935, have provided the primary incentive to reorganization, for so long as they impair the capital represented by stock having a preference on the distribution of assets, the payment of dividends on any class of stock will be illegal under Delaware law.⁴

There are other factors. The heavy arrearages on the preferred and Class A stocks and the revision in stated value of assets are two others that have already been adverted to. Finally, there are the requirements of Section 11 (b) (2) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.

Under this section, it is the duty of the Commission to require, among other things, that each registered holding company and its subsidiaries take such steps as the Commission shall find necessary to insure that their corporate structures do not unfairly or inequitably distribute voting power among security holders. No elaborate demonstration is necessary to establish that the distribution of voting power in Federal violates the statutory standard. Normally, the entire voting power of the company is vested in the Class B stock, but because of dividend arrearages on the preferred and Class A, these stocks have now acquired a majority of the voting rights. The 42.73% of total voting power which still rests in the hand of the B stockholders is clearly unfair and inequitable in view of the fact that the capital deficit entirely wipes out the book value of the Class B stock, and that it has no actual value whatsoever, as we shall show below.

It is also the duty of the Commission, under Section 11 (b) (2), to require each registered holding company to take steps

⁴General Corporation Law of Delaware, Section 34 (1935).

to insure that its corporate structure does not unduly or unnecessarily complicate the structure of the holding company system. The deficits in both capital surplus and earned surplus accounts of Federal, its inability to pay dividends even on its stocks having prior rights, and its large arrearages, provide a combination of complexities which clearly falls within the scope of this section of the Act. For this reason as well its existing distribution of voting power, Federal was confronted with the prospect of compulsory simplification under Section 11 (b) (2) unless it could succeed in thoroughly revamping its structure by some other permissible method.

Prior attempts to effectuate reorganization

The management has recognized the need for reorganization for several years. Even before Federal registered under the Act, discussion between its representatives and members of the Commission's staff had begun, and when Federal registered on November 8, 1937, it immediately filed a plan for reorganization under Section 7 of the Act. The plan now before us is the fourth to be filed by the company, the three previous plans all having been withdrawn, in each case after hearing had been held thereon before a Trial Examiner of the Commission. With respect to none of the earlier plans have there been findings and opinions of the Commission. The record indicates, however, that one of the principal obstacles to the earlier consummation of a reorganization was the issue of allocation of new securities to the Class B stockholders. Each of the plans prior to the present one provided for participation in the equity of the reorganized company by the Class B stockholders (either immediately or upon the exercise of purchase warrants for additional stock).

The present plan, the first to involve the merger of Utility Operators Company and Federal Water and Gas Corporation with Federal, was filed on March 30, 1940. The application states that the merger device was used in view of a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Delaware in *Havender v. Federal United Corporation*,⁵ which established the propriety

⁵ 11 A. 2d 331 (Del. 1940)

under Delaware law of directly affecting accrued dividends on preferred stocks in a merger, in contrast to the position taken by the Delaware courts with respect to similar action by charter amendment.⁶

After due notice hearings were held on the applications and declarations herein before a trial examiner of the Commission.⁷ Tentative findings and opinion were prepared by the Commission (in which Commissioner Healy did not participate) and distributed to the parties. Thereafter, counsel to Federal and counsel to the Commission filed briefs and were heard in oral argument before the Commission.

Outline of Present Plan.—As already pointed out, Utility Operators Company and Federal Water and Gas Corporation are to be merged into Federal.⁸

The proposed participation by present holders of securities

The debentures of Federal Water Service Corporation are to remain undisturbed by the plan except for a small change in amount.⁹ The present stockholders of Federal Water Service Corporation and the common stockholders of Utility Operators Company¹⁰ are to receive new common stock, which the declaration states will have a par value of \$12 per share, as indicated in the following table:

⁶ Cf. *Keller v. Wilson & Co.*, 190 A. 115 (Del. 1936): *Consolidated Film Industries, Inc. v. Johnson*, 197 Atl. 489 (Del. 1937)

⁷ William S. Fox and Louis Russo, representing themselves and other holders of Class A stock appeared and were heard. A brief was filed by counsel to Mr. Russo.

⁸ Upon consummation of the merger, Federal Water Service Corporation is to change its name to Federal Water and Gas Corporation.

⁹ The face amount of debentures outstanding of the reorganized corporation will be \$5,259,000 instead of \$5,262,000. (These figures should be reduced by \$40,000 for debentures purchased in 1940.) \$3,000 of debentures now owned by Utility Operators Company will be cancelled.

¹⁰ The ten outstanding shares of Federal Water and Gas common, all owned by Federal, are to be cancelled; so are the 1,420 shares of its own Class A which Federal holds in its treasury; so, too, are all of the shares of Federal of all classes held by Utility Operators Company (including all of the Class B stock, entirely owned by Utility Operators Co.).

	Shares to be Con- verted	New Common			
		Shares		Par Value (at \$12 per Share)	Percent
		Rate	Number		
Federal Water Service Corporation:					
\$7.00 Preferred.....	14,355	7	100,485	\$1,205,820	9.50
\$6.50 Preferred.....	67,640	6½	439,060	5,275,920	41.54
\$6.00 Preferred.....	68,390	6	410,340	4,924,080	38.77
\$4.00 Preferred.....	2,348	4	9,392	112,704	.89
Total Preferred.....	152,733	-----	959,877	\$11,518,524	90.70
Class A.....	568,775	¾	56,877	682,524	5.38
Utility Operators Company: Common.....	56,428¾	*.7357	41,514	498,168	3.92
		-----	1,058,268	\$12,699,216	100.00

*This ratio is explained immediately below in the text.

None of the new common stock allocated to Utility Operators is allotted in recognition of its own stock or its ownership of all of Federal's Class B stock, which it is to surrender for can- the 5.38% of new common allocated to the present holders of the new common stock is based almost ¹¹ entirely upon its hold- ings of 6,536 shares of Federal preferred and the application of the same conversion rates, set forth in the above table, which were applied to other holdings of preferred. Hence, except for the 5.3% of new common allocated to the present holders of Class A stock, substantially all of the equity of the reorganized company will be given to the present preferred stockholders.

The declaration states that the new stock is to have a par value of \$12 per share, and that 1,500,000 shares are to be authorized, of which it is contemplated that 1,058,268 will be issued, as shown in the above table.¹²

Under the plan the intangible items, "commission on capital stock" and "organization expense," which are presently carried

¹¹ 300 shares of the new common represent consideration for the \$3,000 in debentures of Federal, which are being cancelled, and \$600 of other assets.

¹² Section 61 of the General Corporation Law of Delaware provides that a stockholder who objects to a merger and complies with applicable statutory provisions may receive the value of his stock from the surviving corporation. To the extent that this privilege is exercised in the present case the number of shares of new common to be issued will be reduced. If holders of 3,000 or more shares of Federal Preferred, irrespective of series, object to the merger, the boards of directors of both Federal and Utility Operators Com- pany reserve the right to abandon the proposed plan.

on the books at \$1,444,221.16 and \$424,732.50, respectively, will be written off the books, and the assets of the surviving corporation will be recorded on the books at their reasonable value as determined by the board as of the date of the merger,¹³ and such capital surplus as the recorded value of assets permits will be recorded. The following table shows the balance sheets of Federal Water Service Corporation and Utility Operators Company as at December 31, 1939, and a pro forma balance sheet of the surviving company as of the same date,¹⁴ giving effect to the merger:

	Federal Water Service Corporation	Utility Operators Company	Pro Forma* Federal Water and Gas Corporation (surviving company)
ASSETS			
Investments.....	\$24,406,757	\$187	\$17,607,808
Less—Reserve.....	570,396		
Net investments.....	23,836,361	187	17,607,808
Investment in Federal Special Funds.....	690,320		
Current assets:	262,238		262,238
Cash.....	3,660,437	1,012	3,661,449
Other.....	258,023	28	258,022
Commission on capital stock.....	1,444,221		
Organization expense.....	424,733		
Office furniture and fixtures.....	29,716		29,716
Total assets.....	29,915,729	691,547	21,819,233
LIABILITIES			
5½% unsecured debentures.....	5,262,000		5,259,000
Current liabilities.....	502,967	428	503,367
Miscellaneous reserves.....	508,323		508,323
Capital stock:			
Preferred.....	15,189,640		
Class A.....	13,666,734		
Class B.....	2,500,000		
Common.....		282,145	12,699,216
Capital surplus.....	(3,848,865)	409,967	2,849,327
Earned surplus.....	(3,865,070)	(993)	
Total liabilities.....	29,915,729	691,547	21,819,233

*Assuming no holders of stock now outstanding will avail themselves of statutory provisions entitling objecting stockholders to require purchase of their shares.

¹³ A write-down of approximately six million dollars in the value of investments is contemplated.

¹⁴ The record is not complete enough to present this comparison as of December 31, 1940.

The plan also provides that the present directors of Federal Water Service Corporation shall be the first directors of the surviving corporation, and that the election of new directors shall be "staggered" as follows: of the seven present directors, two shall remain in office until the next annual meeting of stockholders following the effective date of the merger agreement; two others, for one year thereafter; and the remaining three, for two years thereafter. The present board was chosen by the Class B stockholders. Under the proposed arrangement, the holders of new common will not be able to elect a majority of directors for approximately two years, control in the meantime continuing in the remaining members of the present board.

Applicable Provisions of the Act.—The plan involves the alteration of priorities, preferences, and voting power, and has been presented to us by a declaration under Section 7 of the Holding Company Act.¹⁵ In the first instance, the major questions before us center in the standards of Section 7.

* * * * *

We do not disagree with conclusion in Commissioner Healy's dissent that the standard "detrimental to the interests of investors" contained in the above sections is not identical with the standard of "fair and equitable" contained in Section 11 (e). Nor do we disagree that the plan before us must be considered in the light of the standards of section 11 (e). In reaching this conclusion, we are motivated by two factors:

(a) We have held that the test "detrimental to the interest of investors" involves a consideration of the question whether the terms of the proposed plan are within the permissible limits of bargaining indicated by the rights and priorities of the various classes of security holders. *International Paper & Power Co.*, S. E. C. 580, 582-583 (1937) (reversed on other

¹⁵ Section 6 (a): "Except in accordance with a declaration effective under section 7 and with the order under such section permitting such declaration to become effective, it shall be unlawful for any registered holding company or subsidiary company thereof, by use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or otherwise, directly or indirectly (1) to issue or sell any security of such company; or (2) to exercise any privilege or right to alter the priorities, preferences, voting power, or other rights of the holders of an outstanding security of such company."

grounds, *Lawless v. Securities and Exchange Commission*, 105 F. (2d) 574 (C. C. A. 1st, 1939)). We think that we cannot determine whether the proposed plan is within the permissible limits of bargaining for the different classes of security holders without consideration of what the position of these classes would be if we entered an order under Section 11 (b) (2).¹⁶

(b) It is apparent that one of the purposes of the proposals is to bring the Federal Water Service system into compliance with standards of Section 11 (b) (2). This plan is, in effect, the type of plan for which Congress made provision in Section 11 (e) of the Act—that is, “a plan * * * for the divestment of control, securities, or other assets, or for other action by such company * * * for the purpose of enabling such company * * * to comply with the provisions of subsection (b).” We think it plain, therefore, that we should consider this plan in the light of the standards imposed by the Act for plans presented under Section 11 (e), namely, that the plan be “necessary to effectuate the provisions of subsection (b) and fair and equitable to the persons affected by such plan.”

As we shall now proceed to show, our conclusion is the same whether we treat the plan under the standards of Sections 7 (d) (6) and 7 (e) or under the standards of Section 11 (e). For that reason we need not consider whether we should, in effect, give retroactive application to our Form U-1 (adopted February 2, 1940, long after Federal filed its declaration) which states that: “If an application states the facts which make applicable a particular provision of the Act of rules and the record is adequate to determine the questions arising under such provision, the Commission may grant an appropriate order notwithstanding the failure of the application to specify such provision * * *.” Nor, in view of this conclusion, need we consider whether Federal should be given further opportunity to present evidence bearing on issues presented by a plan tendered under Section 11 (e).

* * * * *

¹⁶ See *supra*.

Preferred Stock Purchases by Directors and Officers.—A further question as to the fairness of the plan arises with respect to the participation to be accorded to preferred stock held by members of the management of Federal. The plan of reorganization herein considered, like previous plans filed with us over the past several years, was formulated by the management of Federal, and discussions concerning the reorganization of this corporation have taken place between the management and the staff of the Commission over the past several years. C. T. Chenery, president of the debtor, and a corporation owned by his family purchased 8,618 shares of Federal preferred stock between November 8, 1937, when the first plan was filed with us, and June 30, 1940. These purchases were made on the over-the-counter market through brokers at prices ranging from 16½ to 34 for the \$6.00 preferred. Very few of the shares were bought at prices higher than 30 and a substantial portion of them was purchased at prices in the low 20's. Other officers and directors of Federal and of Utility Operators Company acquired 3,789 shares during the same period at prices at the same general level.

The following table shows the purchases made between November 8, 1937, and June 30, 1940, the amount paid and the book value of the new common shares for which this preferred would be exchanged:

	\$7.00	\$6.50	\$6.00	Total	Cost	No. of Common Shares	Book Value of the Com- mon to be Received in Merger
C. T. Chenery.....	1,211	3,547	3,860	8,618	\$240,148.01	54,692	\$803,972.40
Other Officers and Directors of Federal Utility Operators Company.....	255	2,793	741	3,789	88,198.88	24,385	358,459.50
	1,466	6,340	4,601	12,407	\$328,346.89	79,077	\$1,162,431.90

Under the proposed plan, the preferred shares so purchased would participate in the plan on a parity with all other shares of preferred stock of the same series. We have come to the conclusion that this feature of the plan cannot be approved.

In reaching this conclusion, we have not failed to take into

consideration the fact that after individual stockholders had made complaint of the management's purchases, the officers and directors agreed upon a policy of deferring individual purchases while particular plans were in contemplation but had not been made public. An honest effort appears to have been made to adhere to this policy.

But we do not think that this fact was enough. Corporate directors are fiduciaries—their powers are powers in trust. *Pepper v. Litton*, 308 U. S. 295. We hold further that in the process of formulation of a "voluntary" reorganization plan, the management of a corporation occupies a fiduciary position toward all of the security holders to be affected, and that it is subjected to the same standards as other fiduciaries with respect to dealing with the property which is the subject matter of the trust. Of course, the management does not hold title to the securities, but its duty of fair dealing with the persons for whom it acts is as great as is that of a trustee who holds title to a *res* for the benefit of his beneficiaries.¹⁷ A trustee may not "become the purchaser of the property which he represents or any portion of it though he has done so for a fair price without fraud at a public sale." *Michoud v. Girod*, 4 How. 502, 557 (1846). Accordingly, honesty, full disclosure, and purchase at a fair price do not take the case outside the rule. The need for an inflexible rule was recognized in *Michoud v. Girod, supra*:

Is it not better that the cause of the evil shall be prohibited, than that courts of equity shall be relied upon to apply the remedy in particular cases, by inquiring into all the circumstances of a case, whether there has or has not been fraud in fact? (At 557.)

¹⁷ In re *Standard Commercial Tobacco Co., Inc.*, 34 F. Supp. 304, 310 (S. D. N. Y. 1940) and cases cited. Compare Berle and Means, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property* 1 (1932) c. VII, *Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust*. Compare also sec. 16 (b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and sec. 17 (b) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, which recognize the fiduciary character of the management—officers, directors, and principal stockholders—and its opportunity to use inside information, by providing that any profits made on purchases and sales, or sales and purchase, within six months should inure to the benefit of the corporation.

Or, as the Supreme Court later stated in *Magruder v. Drury*, 235 U. S. 106, 119, 120 (1914):

The rule in such cases springs from his duty to protect the interests of the estate, and not to permit his personal interest to in any wise conflict with his duty in that respect. The intention is to provide against any possible selfish interest exercising an influence which can interfere with the faithful discharge of the duty which is owing in a fiduciary capacity. * * * It makes no difference that the estate was not a loser in the transaction or that the commission was no more than the services were reasonably worth.

In *Meinhard v. Salmon*, 249 N. Y. 458, Chief Justice Cardozo said:

Many forms of conduct, permissible in a work-a-day world for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morale of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this, there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the "disintegrating erosion" of particular exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by any judgment of this court.

These principles have been applied to persons whose fiduciary position arises from the fact that they act for others in the formulation of a reorganization plan. The principles have been codified in Section 249 of the Bankruptcy Act, but the application of the principle does not depend on the existence of a statute. It depends on the broad equitable principles enunciated in the cases heretofore cited. See *Woods v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago*, Supreme Court of the United States, decided February 3, 1941. Indeed, Section 249 of the Bankruptcy Act is merely declaratory of the position taken by the federal courts under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act as applied to dealings by reorganization committee members in the securities of the corporation being reorganized. See *In the Matter of Mountain States Power Co.* (C. C. A. 3d, March 5, 1941), *aff'g* 35 Supp. 307 (D. Del. 1940); *Otis & Co. v. Insurance Bldg. Corp.*, 110 F. (2d) 333 (C. C. A. 1st 1940); *In re Paramount-Publix Corporation*, 12 F. Supp. 823, 828 (S. D. N. Y. 1935) cited with approval in *American United Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, Florida*, 61 S. Ct. 157, decided Nov.

25, 1940; *In re Republic Gas Corporation*, 35 F. Supp. 300 (S. D. N. Y. 1936). The result of these cases does not depend on dishonesty or unfair dealing for it was conceded in the *Otis* case, *supra*, that the brokerage house which acted as committee had lost money in the transactions, that it had acted in good faith, that the sellers of the bonds knew that the house was representing the bondholders, and that it had entered into the transactions "for the accommodation" of its customers. Similar facts appeared in the *Mountain States* case. In the *Republic* case Judge Caffey said:

Because of the inconsistent positions which are an unavoidable incident, it is a fraud in law for a trustee to purchase property which is the subject matter of his trust and the making of such a purchase is misconduct.

There is no blinking the fact that the ground on which the court denounces as a fraud the purchase by a trustee of trust property is that it inevitably brings about conflict of interest between himself personally and the beneficiaries of his trust; or at least that it incites a motive, or affords opportunity for a motive, on the part of the trustee to take advantage of his superior knowledge acquired in his trust capacity, which may induce him to conceal his information from the beneficiaries or not to employ it exclusively for their benefit, while they are relying on him scrupulously to devote himself to the furtherance of their welfare (*Michoud v. Girod, supra*, pp. 554, 555, 559).

I believe that only by rigid enforcement of that duty can the continuance or reinstatement of old evils, which were of general knowledge, be prevented or, if prevention prove impossible, be minimized.

Furthermore, if, as I deem it established, the misconduct amounts to a fraud in law, I conceive of no good reason why the penalty for the fraud should not be denial of any compensation whatever for those services. Indeed, I feel that the only available device for promoting, if not assuring, justice to depositing bondholders in the management of their affairs, and thus of restoring or attempting to restore faith in deposit agreements, is strict application to committeemen of the ancient equity rules governing the conduct of trustees, including deprivation of compensation where there is a departure from those rules.

It may well be that there are some who, without veering away from the utmost faithfulness, could safely be left free to trade in bonds which are the subject matter of their trusts. Nevertheless, the danger of the contrary is so manifest, the bondholders themselves generally are so helpless and the hurt to them is or may be so serious that, in order to protect against the evil, or the possibility of the evil, from which bondholders have suffered so grievously in the past, and which Congress intended to bring to an end,

the court should inflexibly enforce the rule that members of committees shall not trade in the securities with respect to which they are acting or undertaking to act in behalf of the owners.

We think that the authorities heretofore cited are fully applicable to the position of the management of a corporation trading in the securities which will be affected by a voluntary plan of reorganization upon which the management is working. We, no more than a court of equity, should undertake to decide case by case whether the management's trading has in fact operated to the detriment of the persons whom it represents. As the Supreme Court said in *Woods v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago*, *supra*:

* * * It is no answer to say that fraud or unfairness were not shown to have resulted. Cf. *Jackson v. Smith*, 254 U. S. 586, 589. The principle enunciated by Chief Justice Taft in a case involving a contract to split fees in violation of the bankruptcy rules, is apposite here: "What is struck at in the refusal to enforce contracts of this kind is not only actual evil results but their tendency to evil in other cases." *Weil v. Neary*, 278 U. S. 160, 173. * * *

The remedies to be applied in particular cases may be chosen with utmost flexibility. In the *Otis & Company*, *Mountain States Power*, *Paramount-Publix* and *Republic Gas* cases, *supra*, the questions arose on the applications of fiduciaries for fees and in all cases the fees were disallowed.¹⁸ In this case no application for fees is presented to us, but other remedies may be appropriate. As Mr. Justice Douglas said in *American United Mutual Life Insurance Company v. City of Avon Park, Florida* (61 S. Ct. 157), decided November 25, 1940:

* * * Where such investigation discloses the existence of unfair dealing, a breach of fiduciary obligations, profiting from a trust, special

¹⁸ This treatment demonstrates that no attempt is made to apportion the remedy to the injury done, but the standard of fiduciary conduct is enforced by denying *all* opportunity for profit to fiduciaries who trade in the securities with respect to which they have the fiduciary duty. Compare section 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and section 17 (b) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, which, for the purpose of preventing the unfair use of inside information by directors, officers, and other insiders, provide that any profit made by them on purchases and sales, or sales and purchases, within six months, shall inure to the benefit of the corporation, regardless of the existence of overreaching or the amount thereof in the particular case.

benefits for the reorganizers, or the need for protection of investors against an inside few or of one class of investors from the encroachment of another, the court has ample power to adjust the remedy to meet the need. The requirement of full, *unequivocal disclosure; the limitation of the vote to the amount paid for the securities* (*In re McEwen's Laundry, Inc.*, 90 F. (2d) 872); the separate classification of claimants (see *First National Bank v. Poland Union*, 109 F. (2d) 54, 55); the complete subordination of some claims (*Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co.*, 306 U. S. 307; *Pepper v. Litton*, *supra*), indicate the range and type of the power which a court of bankruptcy may exercise in these proceedings. That power is ample for the exigencies of varying situations. *It is not dependent on express statutory provisions.* It inheres in the jurisdiction of a court of bankruptcy. The necessity for its exercise (*Pepper v. Litton*, *supra*, p. 308) is based on the responsibility of the court before entering an order of confirmation to be satisfied that the plan in its practical incidence embodies a fair and equitable bargain openly arrived at and devoid of overreaching, however subtle * * *. [Italics supplied.]

Similarly, deciding whether the terms of issuance of the new common stock are fair and equitable or are detrimental to the interests of investors, we must find that they are unfair, inequitable, and detrimental, so long as the preferred stock purchased by the management at low prices is to be permitted to share on a parity with other preferred stock. In this respect this case closely resembles the *Avon Park* case itself. That case involved a municipal composition under Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act. R. E. Crummer & Co., the city's fiscal agent, purchased obligations of the city at about 50 cents on the dollar, both before and after execution of the fiscal agency contract. In holding that the plan had been improperly confirmed, the Supreme Court ruled not only that all of the benefit to be obtained by the fiscal agent from the securities purchased had to be considered in determining whether its aggregate compensation was reasonable, but also that any excess benefits accruing to the fiscal agent would make the plan unfair and inequitable because it would discriminate in his favor as a creditor. See also *In re Norcor Mfg. Co.*, 109 F. (2d) 407 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940); *In re McCrory Stores Corp.*, 12 F. Supp. 267 (S. D. N. Y. 1935).¹⁹

¹⁹ Compare sec. 77B (b) of the Bankruptcy Act, which provides that "the judge * * * may limit any claims filed by such committee member or agent, to the actual consideration paid therefor" and sec. 212 of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, which provides that "the

We believe that a formula should be devised which will limit the participation of the preferred stock purchased by the management to an amount which takes into account the purchase prices paid, plus accumulated dividends since the dates of the respective purchases. We do not now attempt to indicate what that formula should be, since the matter is complicated by the fact that the apportionment of stock among the several series of preferred stocks is to be based upon their respective dividend rates and dividend accumulations rather than upon their liquidation values. Our staff will be available for consultation with Federal with respect to this matter, and we shall give further consideration to this question if and when Federal files amendments to its proposal.

For the present we deny effectiveness to these declarations because we must enter adverse findings under sections 7 (d) (1) and 7 (d) (2) so long as the par value of the proposed common stock is fixed as high as \$12 per share; because we find that the provisions with respect to the board of directors of the surviving company would result in an unfair distribution of voting power; and because we find that the provisions for participation by the preferred stock held by the management

judge * * * may limit any claim or stock acquired by any such person or committee in contemplation or in the course of the proceeding under this chapter to the actual consideration paid therefor." We do not read the *Avon Park* case or the other cases cited as holding that in no case may a claimant receive parity treatment for securities purchased at a discount during the reorganization. Such parity treatment is the usual rule. *Security-First National Bank of Los Angeles v. Rindge Land & Navigation Co.*, 85 F. (2d) 557 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936), rehrg. denied, 86 F. (2d) 3, certiorari denied, 299 U. S. 613, rhrg. denied, 300 U. S. 686; *Texas Hotel Securities Corporation v. Waco Development Co.*, 87 F. (2d) 395 (C. C. A. 5th) certiorari denied, 300 U. S. 679, rehrg. denied, 301 U. S. 713; *In re Utilities Power & Light Corporation*, 29 F. Supp. 763, 770 (N. D. Ill.), app. dism., C. C. A. 7th on March 9, 1940; *In re Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corporation*, 106 F. (2d) 22, 27 (C. C. A. 2d). Cf. *In re Tennessee Publishing Co.*, 81 F. (2d) 463, 466 (C. C. A. 6th), aff'd, 299 U. S. 18; *Cromwell v. County of Sac*, 96 U. S. 51, 60; and *Wade v. Chicago, Springfield & St. Louis R. R. Co.*, 149 U. S. 327, 343. We think the principle involved in the *Avon Park* case is limited to purchase during reorganization in violation of fiduciary duty. Compare the provisions of sec. 77B (b) and sec. 212 of the Bankruptcy Act, *supra*, which are limited to persons acting in a fiduciary capacity.

result in the terms of issuance of the new securities being detrimental to the interests of investors and the plan being unfair and inequitable. We shall withhold entry of an order refusing to permit the declarations to become effective for a period of 30 days. If during that time Federal files amendments to its proposal designed to cure the defects in its plan which we have pointed out, we shall give further consideration to the matter. If within such time amendments are not filed, we shall enter an order refusing to permit the declarations to become effective.

By the Commission: (Chairman Frank and Commissioners Eicher and Pike), Commissioner Healy dissenting (see separate opinion below), and Commissioner Henderson being absent and not participating.

Separate opinion of Commissioner Healy.

* * * * *

I

The first question for decision is: Under what section of the Act shall we judge the plan, Section 7 (e) or Section 11 (e)?

* * * * *

No one contends that this plan must be tested by the standards of Section 7 (e) merely because the management of Federal affixed the label of that section to the plan. It is axiomatic that the management of a corporation cannot by its choice of labels foreclose the security holders' right to have the plan judged by the appropriate standards of the Act and to enjoy whatever protection is afforded them thereunder.²⁰

²⁰ It is noteworthy that the present Form U-1 (which has supplemented Form U-7 on which Federal filed its application) states that: "If an application states the facts which make applicable a particular provision of the Act or rules and the record is adequate to determine the questions arising under such provision, the Commission may grant an appropriate order notwithstanding the failure of the application to specify such provision * * *."

II

* * * * *

I have concluded that the plan of reorganization should be tested by the standards of Section 11 (e).

* * * * *

C. Having concluded that "fair and equitable," as used in Section 11 (e) means what it regularly means in reorganization law, I pass to the question: Is this plan "fair and equitable"? That question has to be answered, however feasible the plan may be, however "necessary" or "appropriate" it may be to effectuate the purposes of Section 11 (b). It is a question of law. I think it should be answered in the negative.

(1) The proposal that preferred stock, obtained by the management while they were in essence the reorganization managers in charge of this plan, be permitted to participate exactly as other preferred stock seems against equity and good conscience. The impropriety of permitting them to participate on such a basis in the circumstances of this case has ample support. Cf. *Pepper v. Litton*, 308 U. S. 295; *Taylor v. Standard Gas Co.*, 306 U. S. 307.

* * * * *

FILED FEB 4 - 1942

IN THE
Joseph W. Stewart
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

No. 8074

CHENERY CORPORATION, H. M. ERSKINE,
R. H. NEILSON, *et al.*,
Petitioners,

against

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
Respondent.

ON PETITION TO REVIEW AN ORDER OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION

**BRIEF ON BEHALF OF FEDERAL WATER AND GAS
CORPORATION, AS INTERVENER**

CHARLES E. HUGHES, JR.
ALLEN S. HUBBARD
*Attorneys for Federal Water and
Gas Corporation*

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New York, N. Y.

IN THE
United States Court of Appeals

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**BRIEF ON BEHALF OF FEDERAL WATER AND GAS
CORPORATION, AS INTERVENER**

STATEMENT

Federal Water and Gas Corporation filed a petition* with this Court for leave to intervene in the above entitled proceeding setting forth its interest in the proceeding as follows:

"IV. Federal is interested in the relief to which petitioners herein are entitled if it should be held that paragraph FOURTH(d) of the merger agreement was in violation of the rights of petitioners as stockholders of Federal and believes that it should be made a party to this proceeding and that this Court should have jurisdiction over it. If said paragraph

*A copy of this petition is incorporated in this brief as an Appendix.

FOURTH(d) of the merger agreement was not in accordance with the legal rights of petitioners and they were legally entitled to receive the same treatment by the reorganization plan as was accorded to other holders of stock of Federal of the same class, Federal desires to correct the error by the issuance of its shares of authorized but unissued stock to the petitioners herein so that they will receive such stock upon the same terms as stock was offered to other stockholders of the same class by the merger agreement."

Since no contention has been made by either of the original parties to this proceeding that the error, if any, in paragraph FOURTH(d) of the merger agreement cannot be corrected in the manner set forth in the above quoted section of the petition for leave to intervene, no useful purpose would be served by extending this brief.

Respectfully submitted,

CHARLES E. HUGHES, JR.
ALLEN S. HUBBARD
*Attorneys for Federal Water and
Gas Corporation*

HUGHES, HUBBARD & EWING
One Wall Street
New York, N. Y.

APPENDIX

Petition of Federal Water and Gas Corporation for leave to intervene.

* * * * *

The petition of FEDERAL WATER AND GAS CORPORATION respectfully represents:

I. The above entitled cause has been brought in this Court as an original proceeding under the authority of Section 24(a) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 by the above named petitioners, stockholders of Federal Water Service Corporation, to review an order of the Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter called the "Commission") filed on September 24, 1941, in certain proceedings entitled "In the Matter of Federal Water Service Corporation, Utility Operators Company, Federal Water and Gas Corporation, File Nos. 34-9, 34-41, 70-28 (Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935)".

II. Federal Water and Gas Corporation, petitioner herein for intervention (hereinafter referred to as "Federal") is a Delaware corporation organized in 1926 under the name, Federal Water Service Corporation, and is one of the corporations which filed Applications and Declarations with the Commission in said proceedings before the Commission, upon which the order of the Commission of September 24, 1941 was issued.

III. Federal is interested in the above entitled proceedings in this Court for the following reasons:

(a) On March 30, 1940, Federal and two other Delaware corporations, Utility Operators Company and Federal Water and Gas Corporation, filed Declarations with the Securities and Exchange Commis-

sion under Section 7 of the Holding Company Act of 1935 and Applications for a Report upon a Plan of Reorganization of Federal to be accomplished by merger under Section 59 of the Delaware Corporation Law of Utility Operators Company and Federal Water and Gas Corporation into Federal which, by the merger agreement, was to assume the name of Federal Water and Gas Corporation. By the proposed merger agreement filed with the Commission on March 30, 1940, each stockholder of Federal, owning shares of Federal of any class, was treated the same as any other stockholder of Federal owning shares of the same class.

(b) On March 24, 1941, the Securities and Exchange Commission filed formal findings and opinion in the said proceeding in which it was held that such plan could not be approved in so far as it provided for participation of preferred shares purchased by officers or directors of Federal or Utility Operators Company or by Chenery Corporation after November 8, 1937 on a parity with other shares of preferred stock of the same class. In order to obtain an order of the Securities and Exchange Commission permitting the merger agreement to become effective and obtain a report from the Securities and Exchange Commission permitting a plan to be submitted to stockholders, Federal, Utility Operators Company and Federal Water and Gas Corporation amended the merger agreement so as to comply with the findings and opinion of the Commission of March 24, 1941 as interpreted by the staff of the Commission. Such amended merger agreement contained a paragraph, FOURTH(d), reading as follows:

"No shares of common stock of the surviving corporation shall be issued in lieu of the shares of preferred stock of Federal Water Service Corporation purchased since November 8, 1937 by Chenery Corporation, or since November 8, 1937 by the following persons when they were officers or directors of Federal Water Service Corporation or Utility Operators Company and which are owned by them on the effective date of the merger agreement: J. N. Greene, W. R. Edwards, C. M. Chenery, H. G. Calder, C. P.

Rather, R. H. Neilson, Wm. E. Matthews, III, Watson Dark, E. C. Deal, H. M. Erskine, F. T. Tansill, F. R. Harris, W. A. Culin, H. D. McHenry, T. H. Wiggin, E. C. Elliott and C. van den Berg, Jr. Each such holder shall be entitled to receive and the surviving corporation shall be obligated pay, upon the surrender of the certificates of such stock to the surviving corporation, the actual cost of such stock to such holder, together with interest thereon at four per cent per annum from the dates of its or his purchase of such stock to the effective date of the merger agreement. In ascertaining cost of preferred stock acquired by exchange of other securities for purposes of this provision, the fair market value at the date of exchange of the securities given in exchange shall be deemed to be the cost of such preferred stock. In the event any shares of preferred stock of Federal Water Service Corporation purchased by Chenery Corporation or by the said officers or directors of Federal Water Service Corporation or Utility Operators Company since November 8, 1937, shall have been sold by such corporation or individual prior to the effective date of the merger agreement, the surviving corporation shall, upon the surrender of the remaining such shares owned by such corporation or individual, be obligated to pay to such corporation or individual a sum equal to the actual cost of all preferred stock of Federal Water Service Corporation purchased by it or him since November 8, 1937, together with interest thereon at four per cent per annum from the dates of its or his purchase of such stock to the effective date of the merger agreement minus the proceeds of the sale by it or him of any such shares together with interest thereon at four per cent per annum from the dates of its or his sale of such stock to the effective date of the merger agreement. The shares of preferred stock to be acquired by the surviving corporation pursuant to this subdivision (d) of the merger agreement consist of 4,522 shares of preferred stock of Federal Water Service Corporation of the \$6 series, 5,610 shares of the \$6.50 series and 1,466 shares of the \$7 series."

(c) On August 15, 1941, Chenery Corporation and the other persons named in paragraph FOURTH (d) of

the merger agreement filed an application with the Commission for leave to intervene in the proceedings before the Commission and object to the approval by the Commission of the merger agreement in so far as it included paragraph FOURTH(d). Said application for intervention was granted and said persons became parties to the proceeding before the Commission and, pursuant to leave granted, filed a brief in support of their objections to paragraph FOURTH(d) of the merger agreement. On September 24, 1941 their objections to paragraph FOURTH(d) of the merger agreement were overruled by the Commission and the Commission granted its order permitting the Declarations of Federal, Utility Operators Company and Federal Water and Gas Corporation to become effective under Section 7 of the Holding Company Act of 1935 and issued its report on the Plan of Reorganization to be sent to stockholders.

(d) Meetings of the stockholders of Federal, Utility Operators Company and Federal Water and Gas Corporation were duly held on October 28, 1941; the merger agreement was approved by the requisite vote of the stockholders of each of said corporations and on October 31, 1941 the merger agreement was filed in the office of the Secretary of State of Delaware and a certified copy thereof recorded in the office of the Recorder of Kent County, Delaware, and thereby became effective. Pursuant to the merger agreement stockholders of Federal and Utility Operators Company have surrendered their stock for stock of the surviving corporation and there are now outstanding certificates for upwards of 800,000 shares of common stock of the surviving corporation which have been issued in exchange for certificates of preferred stock and Class A stock of Federal and stock of Utility Operators Company.

(e) At the stockholders meeting of Federal on October 28, 1941, Chenery Corporation and the individual stockholders, petitioners in the above proceeding, voted their stock which was referred to in paragraph FOURTH(d) of the merger agreement against the merger and accompanied their vote with letters in substantially the following form:

"Federal Water Service Corporation
90 Broad Street
New York, N. Y.

Dear Sirs:

I enclose herewith proxy for the shares of preferred stock of Federal Water Service Corporation owned by me which are treated by paragraph FOURTH(d) of the merger agreement to be submitted to the stockholders at the meeting of October 28, 1941 differently from shares of preferred stock of the same class owned by others. I have checked the space on the proxy marked 'against'. Pursuant to the notice printed thereon, you are to regard this proxy as an objection in writing to the merger for purposes of Section 61 of the Corporation Law of the State of Delaware. I am taking this action in connection with the petition which I, as one of the interveners, have filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to review the order of the Securities and Exchange Commission of September 24, 1941, and I hereby state with the intention that this statement should be relied upon by the Board of Directors of Federal Water Service Corporation in deciding whether to declare the merger agreement operative that

(1) if, in the proceeding taken by the interveners to review the order of the Securities and Exchange Commission, it is finally determined that said order shall be affirmed, I will surrender my stock referred to in paragraph FOURTH(d) of the merger agreement to the surviving corporation for cancellation for the consideration set forth in paragraph FOURTH(d) of the merger agreement;

(2) if, on the other hand, it should be finally determined in said proceeding that the said order of the Securities and Exchange Commission should be modified or set aside, I will accept stock of the surviving corporation in exchange for my stock referred to in this proxy as though the discriminatory and unlawful paragraph FOURTH(d) were not contained in the merger agreement and/or in satisfaction of any rights

which I may have to the value of said stock upon the same terms as stock of the surviving corporation has been offered for exchange to others, not included in paragraph FOURTH(d) of the merger agreement.

Very truly yours,"

Thereafter and within the time allowed by Section 61 of the Delaware Corporation Law said Chenery Corporation and each of the petitioners made demands upon Federal by letters in substantially the following form:

"Federal Water and Gas Corporation
90 Broad Street
New York, N. Y.

Dear Sirs:

This is to notify you that I contend that paragraph FOURTH(d) of the agreement of merger between Federal Water Service Corporation, Utility Operators Company and Federal Water and Gas Corporation is illegal and in violation of my rights as the holder of shares of preferred stock of Federal Water Service Corporation which shares have been discriminated against by paragraph FOURTH(d) of the agreement of merger and I demand that you issue to me shares of your common stock of the par value of \$5 each in exchange for said shares of preferred stock upon the same terms and conditions as such common stock was offered to other holders of the same class by paragraph FOURTH(e) of the agreement of merger or in the alternative, I demand damages for the unlawful conversion of said stock by said paragraph FOURTH(d) of the agreement of merger, or in the alternative, I hereby demand payment for said stock pursuant to Section 61 of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware, all to the end that in the event the order of the Securities and Exchange Commission in so far as it approved said paragraph FOURTH(d) of the said agreement of merger shall be modified or set aside, I shall have all the rights in the premises to which I am legally entitled.

Very truly yours,"

IV. Federal is interested in the relief to which petitioners herein are entitled if it should be held that paragraph FOURTH(d) of the merger agreement was in violation of the rights of petitioners as stockholders of Federal and believes that it should be made a party to this proceeding and that this Court should have jurisdiction over it. If said paragraph FOURTH(d) of the merger agreement was not in accordance with the legal rights of petitioners and they were legally entitled to receive the same treatment by the reorganization plan as was accorded to other holders of stock of Federal of the same class, Federal desires to correct the error by the issuance of its shares of authorized but unissued stock to the petitioners herein so that they will receive such stock upon the same terms as stock was offered to other stockholders of the same class by the merger agreement.

V. As a precedent for this petition, Federal cites *Lawless v. Securities and Exchange Commission*, 105 F. (2d) 574, where International Paper and Power Company was permitted to intervene in a proceeding brought by a stockholder to review an order of the Commission granting an application of that company.

WHEREFORE, Federal prays that it be allowed to intervene in this proceeding and be made a party thereto, with leave to file a brief and to participate in oral argument.

FEDERAL WATER AND GAS CORPORATION

By ALLEN S. HUBBARD

Attorney

CHARLES E. HUGHES, JR.

ALLEN S. HUBBARD

Of Counsel

STATE OF NEW YORK }
COUNTY OF NEW YORK } ss.:

ALLEN S. HUBBARD, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he is General Attorney for Federal Water and Gas
Corporation and that he is familiar with the matters referred
to in the foregoing petition and that he verily believes that
the statements therein contained are true.

ALLEN S. HUBBARD

Sworn to before me, this
6th day of January, 1942.

JAMES D. McCAULEY
Attorney and Counsellor-at-Law
Office Address:—One Wall St., N. Y. City
Residing in N. Y. Co. No. 5, Reg. No. 3 Mc 160
Cert. filed in Kings Co. No. 2, Reg. No. 3004
Cert. filed in Queens Co. No. 54, Reg. No. 7981-A
Commission Expires March 30, 1943

**REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
CHENERY CORPORATION, ET AL.**

IN THE

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

No. 8074

CHENERY CORPORATION, H. M. ERSKINE, R. H.
NEILSON, ET AL., *Petitioners,*

v.

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
Respondent.

**Petition for Review of Order of Securities and Exchange
Commission.**

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IN THE
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Respondent.

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REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS CHENERY
CORPORATION, ET AL.

Points of Agreement.

The brief filed on behalf of the Securities and Exchange Commission simplifies the issues:

1. The Commission's brief states the facts substantially as they are stated in the brief of the petitioners Chenery Corporation, et al.* There is no issue of fact in the case.

* We have a minor criticism of the Commission's choice of language. Commission's counsel say that petitioners were "trading in Federal's shares" (Res. Br. 13). We do not consider this statement quite accurate. The petitioners were purchasing, but the sales were negligible. 12,468 shares were purchased by eighteen petitioners. Two petitioners sold 135 shares and 725 shares respectively (Pet. App. 56-61, 65).

2. The Commission's brief states:

"Neither the Commission's refusal to permit Federal to effect a plan that did not contain the provision complained of, nor the Commission's subsequent approval of an amended plan that did, was predicated on any finding that petitioners defrauded, or failed to make the fullest disclosure to, the stockholders from whom they purchased the shares in question." (Res. Br. 8.)

"We do not mean to suggest that Federal's management filed the declaration or any amendment thereto for any ulterior purpose." (Res. Br. 11.)

3. The Commission also concedes that corporate officers and directors are ordinarily free to purchase shares of their company's stock (Res. Br. 9).

Applicable Section.

The Commission devotes a considerable portion of its brief to a consideration of the applicability of Section 11 as well as Section 7 to the present proceeding. Petitioners' brief, on the other hand, rested on the complete lack of statutory authority for the Commission's action, and did not stress particular sections of the Act to the exclusion of others. To the petitioners it seems clear that the invalidity of the Commission's action is the same no matter what section of the Act is considered applicable.

Yet the proceeding is one under Section 7 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, and not under Section 11 or any other section. The declarations of Federal Water Service Company were filed under Section 7. As the Commission said in its March opinion:

"The plan involves the alteration of priorities, preferences, and voting power, and has been presented to us by a declaration under Section 7 of the Holding Company Act". (Res. App. 37.)

In its March opinion the Commission entered "adverse findings under sections 7 (d) (1) and 7 (d) (2)" (Pet. App. 79).

And in the final opinion, dated September 24, 1941, reference is made only to Section 7 and not to Section 11. The Commission found that "no adverse findings are required under Section 7 (d) (1) and 7 (d) (2) of the Act" (Pet. App. 107). The opinion continued, "The revised plan of reorganization seems to meet the requirements of Section 7 of the Act set out in our original opinion". (Pet. App. 108.)*

Only Commissioner Healy, who filed a dissenting opinion raising issues not involved before this Court, considered that this was a proceeding under Section 11. The majority of the Commission properly treated the case as arising under Section 7, and merely remarked that the plan must also "be considered in the light of the standards of section 11 (e)" (Res. Br. 37).

In their application for leave to intervene before the Commission the petitioners did not limit their objections by reference either to Section 7 or to Section 11. They stated:

"The interveners object to the approval of any plan of reorganization containing a provision similar to that of Paragraph Fourth (d) of the proposed merger agreement set forth in Paragraph 6 hereof, or in accordance with the opinion of the Commission expressed March 24, 1941, to the effect that the preferred stock purchased by the interveners should be treated on a less favorable basis than other preferred stock. They respectfully represent that the entry of an order approving a plan containing such a discriminatory provision would be unfair, inequitable, and detrimental to the interests of investors and would be erroneous and illegal. * * *"
(Pet. App. 93.)

Again in the statement of points on appeal in the petition for review and in the petitioners' brief the statement is that the order is

* For this reason we did not print Section 11(e) in our brief under the heading of "Statutes Involved". We included in our printed appendix the entire final report of the Commission, the entire supplemental findings and opinion, and the entire final order (Pet. App. 97-113), together with a complete quotation from that part of the preliminary opinion of March 24, 1941, which dealt with "Preferred Stock Purchases by Directors and Officers", the problem involved in the present appeal. (Pet. App. 71-79).

“unfair and inequitable, is detrimental to the public interest and the interest of investors (including these petitioners), is in violation of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, and of Delaware Corporation law, and is erroneous and illegal”. (Pet. App. 8, Pet. Br. 10)

Thus the statements in the application to the Commission and in the appeal to this Court include the language “detrimental to the public interest or the interest of investors” discussed in Point (2) of the Commission’s brief relating to Section 7, and also the language “fair and equitable” discussed in Point (3) of the Commission’s brief relating to Section 11.

Discussion of Merits.

The Commission concedes (Res. Br. 25) that ordinarily an officer or director of a corporation is entitled to purchase the corporation’s stock.

But it is said by the Commission that this general rule does not apply to officers or directors of a public utility holding company which has filed a declaration under Section 7 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act. It is argued that officers and directors who have caused such a plan to be filed should be deemed to have “assumed new and sterner obligations to their corporation and its shareholders” (Res. Br. 26). This assertion is attempted to be supported by the contention that the judgment of the officers and directors who are called upon to “formulate, file and amend plans for the readjustment of shareholders’ rights, and to effect or abandon them after approval” (Res. Br. 12) might be affected if they were permitted to purchase the company’s stock.

Corporate laws generally provide for modification of stockholders’ rights by amendment to the charter, by merger or consolidation or by proceedings for reduction of capital.

No case can be cited in support of the proposition that a director cannot buy the stock of the corporation if a reorganization proceeding is pending or in contemplation. There is no basis in principle or authority for an attempted distinction, as concerns the right of directors to purchase stock, between a corporation which is in the process of reorganization and a corporation for which no plan of reorganization is contemplated.

The fact that a registered public utility holding company is required to submit its plan to the Commission for a report and is required to file a declaration under Section 7 before it can modify the rights of its stockholders affords even less basis for the assertion of a duty upon the part of the officers and directors to refrain from purchasing or selling the corporation's stock than would be the case in an ordinary corporate reorganization.

It is not contended by the Commission that officers and directors of a public utility holding company have control over the character of the plan which is submitted to stockholders. They can only propose a plan for the consideration of the Commission. They cannot solicit proxies without first proposing the plan and obtaining a report upon the plan from the Commission (Sections 11(g), 12(e)), an administrative body with experience in passing on the wisdom of proposed securities transactions. There is, therefore, no occasion for the invention of a new principle of corporate law in order to protect stockholders with respect to reorganization plans for a public utility holding company. The Commission's control over the submission of any plan to the stockholders is an adequate guarantee that their rights cannot be affected because of any interest which the directors or officers might have in the corporate securities. The exercise of such discretion as officers and directors in a public utility holding company have to formulate, file and amend plans and to effect or abandon them is far more limited in a reorganization under the Public Utility Holding Company Act than in a reorganization outside of the Act.

The Commission contends (Res. Br. 9) that its action "is squarely bottomed on the statutory standards by which the plan was necessarily to be gauged". There is, however, nothing in the statutory standards which gives the Commission the power that it asserts. Section 7(e) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act makes it mandatory upon the Commission to permit a declaration under Section 7 to become effective regarding the exercise of a privilege or right to alter the priorities, preferences, voting power or other rights of the holders of an outstanding security unless the Commission finds that such exercise of such privilege or right will result in an unfair and inequitable distribution of voting power or " * * * is otherwise detrimental to the public interest or the interest of investors or consumers." The Commission has construed this statutory standard in the instant case. It has said that it "involves a consideration of the question whether the terms of the proposed plan are within the permissible limits of bargaining indicated by the rights and priorities of the various classes of securityholders." * (Res. App. 37) When the Commission refers to the rights and priorities of the various classes of securityholders, it must take these rights and priorities as they exist under state law. There is no other source for the rights and priorities. A person who is a stockholder under state law is entitled to the same rights with respect to his stock as any other stockholder. Equality of treatment among stockholders of the same class is fundamental in any plan of reorganization under state law.

Plainly, Congress did not authorize the Commission to compel discrimination among holders of securities of a single class when it gave the Commission a veto power over security transactions if it found that they were "detrimental to the public interest or the interest of investors or consumers".

* Citing *International Paper and Power Co.*, S. E. C. 580, 582-583 (1937) reversed on other grounds, *Lawless v. Securities and Exchange Commission*, 105 F. (2d) 574 (C. C. A. 1st, 1939).

Section 11(e) in our view is not applicable, as the declarations before the Commission were not filed under Section 11(e). But the words "fair and equitable" in Section 11(e) manifestly do not give to the Commission power to discriminate between holders of stock of a single class. In order to determine whether a plan is fair and equitable, the Commission must take the rights of stockholders as it finds them and upon the basis of such rights determine whether the modification proposed is "fair and equitable."

The questions of policy which are relied upon by the Commission as justification for its treatment of the stock of petitioners were fully considered by Congress in enacting Section 17 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act. This section provides that reports of purchases by officers and directors should be made to the Commission, and that the corporation may recover profits made by such officers and directors from sales within six months of purchase. The absence of any other requirement, prohibition or penalty in regard to stock purchases by corporate officers and directors shows a Congressional intent to permit them to purchase such stock freely to the extent such purchases are not affected by Section 17.

As recently as January 23, 1942, Mr. Ganson Purcell, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, at a hearing before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House of Representatives stated with reference to possible amendment of the similar section in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934:

"* * * It seems to the Commission that Congress was eminently wise in seeking to deal with the problem by expressly prohibiting only the most prevalent form of the abuse of inside information—trading designed to take quick profits from short-term market fluctuations". (Typewritten record of hearing, p. 2504)

The same can be said of Section 17 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. If Congress had wished to bring about the result required by the Commission in

this proceeding, a provision would have been included in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 that officers and directors who purchase stock while a plan is under consideration by the Commission shall be required to surrender such stock as a prerequisite to the approval of such a plan.

Congress did not so provide in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, the only statute which is involved in this proceeding. There is no such requirement at common law or in equity. The decisions relied on by the Commission are wholly inapplicable.*

The brief filed by the Commission argues that abuses may result from purchases of stock by the management in situations such as are involved in the present case. It is said that the right of the management to purchase while proceedings are pending for readjustment of shareholders' rights (1) may give to the management a powerful financial inducement to disregard its duty to the corporation, and (2) may afford an opportunity to the management to take personal advantage of its knowledge of corporate affairs. (Res. Br. 20.) These arguments are, of course, obvious. But there is less reason for prohibiting such purchases while proceedings are pending before the Commission, with all the publicity necessarily incident thereto, than when the corporation is quietly engaged in the normal conduct of its affairs. A corporate officer or director is almost invariably better acquainted with the financial status of the corporation than are other stockholders. He is almost always able to predict more accurately the possible future trends of corporate profits. He can usually tell better than anyone else when it is best to buy or when it is best to sell the stock of the corporation. All of these considerations might suggest a flat prohibition against the purchase of stock by the management of a corporation.

On the other hand, there are equally obvious reasons for permitting, and indeed, encouraging, the participation in

* The decisions cited by the Commission are distinguished in our original brief at pages 23 to 30 inclusive.

ownership of a corporation by its management. The very desire for personal gain should lead to a more conscientious and energetic prosecution of corporate affairs. The fact that the management is in the same class as other shareholders would tend also to lead to a fairer treatment of these other shareholders. Additional examples are readily apparent.

All of these arguments, pro and con, are such as should properly be addressed to a legislative body, in order that the public policy involved may be carefully weighed, and that all parties concerned may be given notice of any proposed change in the law. Such arguments actually were presented to Congress at the time of the enactment of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and as a result, Congress reached a compromise position between complete freedom for management to purchase shares and complete prohibition. This compromise is set forth in Section 17 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act.

What the Commission has done is to disregard the decision reached by Congress, and to reconsider for itself the various factors involved in the problem. It has done this without the benefit of testimony directed to the particular matter of policy involved, and without public hearings in which opposing views could be fully aired. Moreover, it has done this in a manner which penalizes persons who, in good faith, acted on the basis of the Congressional determination of policy set forth in Section 17. Although perhaps "members of the Commission's staff were not charged with the duty of giving petitioners legal advice" (Res. Br. 24), it is nevertheless a fact that the staff of the Commission was fully aware of the purchases of stock by the petitioners. Section 20(d) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 provides:

"* * * No provision of this title imposing any liability shall apply to any act done or omitted in good faith

in conformity with any rule, regulation, or order of the Commission, notwithstanding that such rule, regulation, or order may, after such act or omission, be amended or rescinded or be determined by judicial or other authority to be invalid for any reason."

The provisions of this section may or may not be applicable to this case, but the spirit of this section was certainly violated by the promulgation of this decision that officers and directors of a corporation must surrender at cost and interest stock which they had purchased while a plan of reorganization was under consideration, when no such thought was suggested by anything in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, or by the regulations of the Commission, or by any decision of the Commission up to that point, and when the officials of the Commission were cognizant during the entire period that such purchases were being made and made no suggestion that there was any impropriety therein.

Respectfully submitted,

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